Sheehan (2015:12-13) – Aristóteles entende as coisas como fenômenos

[…] Heidegger argumenta que Aristóteles   entende sempre as coisas como fenômenos - isto é, como aquilo que aparece no campo do comportamento e da interpretação humanos. A frase de Aristóteles τὸ ὄν   λεγόμενον (as coisas na medida em que são tomadas em λόγος  ) refere-se às coisas na medida em que as apreendemos como inteligíveis desta ou daquela maneira. Em outras palavras, Aristóteles entende sempre, ainda que implicitamente, as coisas como situadas numa relação fenomenológica com os seres humanos e, portanto - uma vez que o homem é a coisa viva que tem λόγος - em correlação com a inteligência humana. Não nos limitamos a esbarrar nas coisas com os nossos sentidos corporais e depois acrescentamos-lhes significados. Pelo contrário, temos sempre uma relação a priori  , não com o significado específico da coisa, mas com a sua inteligibilidade geral, a sua capacidade de ter um significado específico num contexto específico. Assim, Heidegger declara corajosamente que Aristóteles era tanto um idealista como Kant  .

[…] Most commentators might offer Aristotle, Heidegger’s favorite philosopher, as an example of traditional objectivist ontology. But when Heidegger reads Aristotle, he in fact interprets him not   as a naïve realist but as a phenomenologist avant la lettre. We note that this interpretation   is not yet Heidegger’s “retrieval of the unsaid” (die Wiederholung   des Ungesagten) in Aristotle, which would be the articulation of the ground of being that metaphysics had overlooked. Rather, this phenomenological reading is based on Heidegger’s conviction, from the winter semester of 1921–1922 onward, that Aristotle’s metaphysical texts are replete with unthematized examples of the proto-phenomenological correlation between things and the apprehension of them. In his famous 1939 text   on ϕύσις in Aristotle’s Physics II 1, Heidegger argues that Aristotle always understands things as phenomena—that is, as what shows up within the field of human comportment and interpretation. Aristotle’s phrase τὸ ὄν λεγόμενον (things insofar as they are taken up in λόγος) refers to things insofar as we apprehend them as intelligible in this way or that. In other words, Aristotle always, if implicitly, understands things as situated in a phenomenological relation with human beings and thus—since man is the living thing that has λόγος—in correlation with human intelligence. We do not merely bump up against things with our bodily senses and then add meanings to them. Rather, we always have an a priori relation not to the specific meaning of the thing but to its general intelligibility, its ability to have a specific meaning within a specific context. Thus Heidegger boldly declares that Aristotle was as much an idealist as was Kant.

If the meaning of “idealism” amounts to understanding that being [i.e., the meaningful presence of entities] can never be explained by way of those entities but is already “transcendental  ” with regard to each of those entities, then idealism affords the only correct possibility for a philosophical problematic. If so, Aristotle was no less an idealist than Kant.

Heidegger’s interpretations of Aristotle are always imbued with the phenomenological way of seeing that he had learned in the 1920s from his mentor Edmund Husserl  . The keystone of that phenomenological vision is the ineluctable fact of meaningfulness. Yes, Heidegger does use the language of Aristotelian ontology, but he uses it with a phenomenological valence that has not been sufficiently thematized in the scholarship. Heidegger always philosophizes within a phenomenological view of things as ad hominem (κατὰ τὸν λόγον) —that is, in correlation with human concerns and interests. This entails that whatever we encounter is a priori meaningful. In fact, when it comes to useful things in the world of everyday practice, Heidegger holds to the strictly phenomenological position that the “in-itself-ness” of such things is not located somehow “within” those things when taken as separate from human interests. Rather, the in-itselfness of a tool is precisely its status as usable in relation to the intentions of the person   who is using it. For Heidegger, Sein   in all its forms is always written under phenomenological erasure—that is, under the aegis of a phenomenological reduction of things to their meaningfulness to man.