Heidegger, fenomenologia, hermenêutica, existênciaPhenomenology [Phänomenologie] is put together from λόγος and ϕαινόμενον. Φαινόμενον means: something that shows itself. Φαίνομαι is the same as “to show itself,” ϕαίνω the same as “to bring something to the light of day.” The stem is ϕα; this is connected with ϕῶς which is the same as light [Licht], daylightness [Helligkeit]. […]
What is seeing [Sehen], what is it that is perceived as such in seeing, how is what is accessible in seeing characterized with respect to its content and its perceptibility? Οὗ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ὄψις, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὁρατόν. “What is perceivable in seeing is the visible”; something of this sort is characterized as color [Farbe]. Color is what is spread over something visible in itself. The respective coloring of an entity is perceived each time ἐν ϕωτὶ, in light, more precisely, in daylight [im Hellen].
Thus, the first thing to be made out is what daylight [Helle] is. Daylight is apparently something that lets something else be seen through it, διαϕανές [transparent]. This daylight is not of itself visible, but only by means of a color, alien to it. Daylight is what allows something to be seen, namely, the actual color (οἰκεῖον χρῶμα) of the things that I have in daylight. Aristotle discovered that daylightness [Helligkeit] is not a body [Körper]
(τί μὲν οὖν τὸ διαϕανὲς καὶ τί τὸ ϕῶς, εἴρηται, ὃτι οὔτε πῦρ οὒθ’ ὅλως σῶμα οὐδ’ ἀπορροὴ σώματος οὐδενός …,ἀλλιὰ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου τινὸς παρουσἱα ἐν τῷ διαϕανεῖ:),¹⁵
[As for what the transparent [1] is and what light is, it has been explained that it is neither fire nor a body at all nor even the outflow of a body … but presence of fire or some such thing in the transparent,]
that it does not move, but is instead the heaven’s actual manner of existing [eigentlichen Daseins des Himmels], allowing things to be seen, the day’s being [Tagsein]. Daylight is a manner of presence [Weise der Anwesenheit] of [something] (παρουσία, ἐντελέχεια). Empedocles taught that light moves; καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς [but Empedocles was not right]. Trendelenburg saw in the Aristotelian doctrine a relapse; but this judgment shows that he did not understand Aristotle at all.
Aἴσθησις [perception] is the manner of existing of something living in its world. The manners of perceiving things are characterized by Aristotle by means of the sort of thing perceived, what is accessible in the perceiving. There are three sorts of αἰσθητά: 1. ἴδια, 2. κοινά, 3. συμβεβηκότα [things perceived: 1. special, 2. common, 3. incidentally at hand].
[1.] An ἴδιον is something accessible through one specific manner of perceiving [Weise des Vernehmens] and only through that manner of perceiving. It has the character of being ἀεἱ ἀληθές [always true]. Seeing, insofar as it exists, always uncovers only color, hearing always uncovers only sound. 2. κοινόν. There are characteristic ways of being that are not fitted to one specific manner of perceiving, e.g., κίνησις [change]. 3. συμβεβηκός is what is regularly perceived (κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται αἰσθήτόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν εἴη Διάρους υἱός [something perceptible is said to be incidentally at hand, for instance, if the white thing were Diaeres’ son]²⁶). For, as a rule, I do not see color, I do not hear sounds, but instead the singer’s song, something that is encountered along with the immediate perceiving [das im nächsten Vernehmen Mitbegegnende]. When it comes to the perceptibility of something [Hinsichtlich der Vernehmbarkeit] κατὰ συμβεβηκός deception [Täuschung] is possible and even the rule [Regel].
Aristotle determined color, among other things, to be an ἴδιον. Daylight is the presence of fire [Anwesenheit von Feuer]. Daylight does not move. Only the sun moves, the presence of which is the daylight. Whoever says that daylight moves is speaking παρὰ τὰ ϕαινόμενα, he is speaking past what shows itself. Φαινόμενον is what shows itself of itself to be of a certain sort and is immediately here as such. Speaking in a Kantian fashion, daylight is the condition of the possibility of the perceptibility of color [Bedingung möglicher Vernehmbarkeit von Farbe]. Precisely in this Kantian use of language, one can recognize the difference between what, in both cases, is understood by “condition.” [Bedingung] This is not to say, however, that Aristotle and Kant should be contrasted with one another as realists and idealists (there is no such contrast in Greek philosophy). What does “condition of the possibility of the perceptibility of color” mean, what does “being a condition” mean for Aristotle ? Color is seen in daylight. The thing seen must be at daytime. Daylight is something that is part of the being of the world itself. Daylight is the sun’s presence [Helle ist Anwesenheit von Sonne]. The character of being for this manner of being-present [Anwesendsein] is to let things be seen through it. Letting something be seen is the sun’s manner of being. The perceptibility of things [Vernehmbarkeit der Dinge] is subject to a condition, that of a specific manner of being of this world itself. “Being a condition” applies to a manner of being of the world itself [Weise des Seins der Welt selber]. The sun’s being on hand [Vorhandensein von Sonne], precisely what we mean when we determine: it is daytime, is part of the existence in the world. By this means we speak of a fact of the matter that is part of the being of the world itself. The result of this is that ϕαινόμενον initially means nothing other than a distinctive manner of an entity’s presence [ausgezeichnete Weise der Anwesenheit von Seiendem].
