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Caputo (MEHT:163-165) – homem em Heidegger e Eckhart (IV)

quinta-feira 29 de fevereiro de 2024, por Cardoso de Castro


Heidegger explora aqui e noutro lugar (GA8  ) a raiz "halten  " na palavra Verhältnis   [relacionamento]: Dasein   é "mantido" em relação com Ser pelo próprio Ser. Na "Introdução" de "O que é a metafísica?", Heidegger refere-se a "um pensamento que se tornou realidade pelo próprio Ser" (GA9  ), ou seja, que é mantido como pensamento pelo próprio Ser. E no "Epílogo" da mesma obra ele diz:

Ser não é produto do pensamento. Pelo contrário, de fato, o pensamento essencial é um acontecimento de Ser (Ereignis   des Seins). (GA9)

A relação de Dasein com Ser não é obra de Dasein, mas de Ser. O pensamento de Ser (onde o "de" é um genitivo objetivo) é o [164] pensamento de Ser (onde o "de" é um genitivo subjetivo). O pensamento não é algo de que o homem seja capaz por si próprio. O pensamento realiza-se no homem, mas não pelo homem.

Assim, numa frase que poderia muito bem ter sido escrita pelo próprio Meister Eckhart  , Heidegger diz:

Uma relação com algo seria uma relação verdadeira se este algo [=x] fosse mantido em sua [x’s] própria essência por aquilo [=y] com o qual está relacionado. (GA13  )


We have seen, moreover, that the process by which the Father generates the Son in the soul is the process of producing His own “image”: “The heavenly Father bears in me His very image” (Q, 220,16-7/ Serm., 239). We recall that it was not   sufficient for the Son to be merely like the Father in order to be His Image; it was also required that He be sustained in His being as an image by the Father. Now Heidegger’s account of the relationship between Being and Dasein conforms remarkably to what Eckhart demands of a “true image” and relation:

But how is Being related to ek-sistence, provided that we may so rashly ask this question at all? Being itself is the relationship (Verhältnis) insofar as it [=Being] holds (hält) ek-sistence (Ek-sistenz  ) in its existential, i.e., ex-static essence (Wesen  ) in itself and gathers it [= Eksistenz] to it self as the dwelling place of the truth of Being in the midst of beings. (HB, 77/204)

Heidegger here and elsewhere (WHD  , 1/3-4) exploits the root “halten” in the word Verhältnis: Dasein is “held  ” in its relationship to Being by Being itself. In the “Introduction” to What Is Metaphysics?, Heidegger refers to “a thinking which has come to pass by Being itself” (WM, 13/213), i.e., which is held up as thought by Being itself. And in the “Epilogue” to the same works he says:

Being is no product of thought. On the contrary, indeed, essential thinking is an event of Being (Ereignis des Seins). (WM, 47/356)

The relation of Dasein to Being is not the work of Dasein, but of Being. The thought of Being (where the “of” is an objective genitive) is the [164] thought of Being (where the “of” is a subjective genitive). Thinking is not something that man is capable of on his own. Thought comes to pass in man, but not by man.

Thus in a sentence which could very well have been written by Meister Eckhart himself, Heidegger says:

A relationship to something would be a true relationship if it [=x] is held in its [x’s] own essence by that [=y] to which it is related. (G, 50/72)

This meets Eckhart’s requirement for a “true image” exactly. The relationship of Dasein to Being is not the “doing” of Dasein but of Being. Being itself brings Dasein into relationship with itself, and sustains that relation. For the early Heidegger, Dasein’s relationship to Being seems to have originated in Dasein itself and to have depended upon Dasein’s ability to sustain that relation. Thus the question of Being depends upon man’s ability to raise and answer it, man’s ability to break through the accumulation of prejudices and presumptions about Being in order to truly ask the question of Being anew. The ability to question is itself a measure of Dasein’s capacity to resolve, its will to know (EM, 16/17). But it seems to have been one of the decisive realizations of the later Heidegger, and so of the Heidegger who began more and more to take on a likeness to the mystics, that Being does not come as the “answer’’ to a “question” (SD, 20-1/20; US, 175/71-2). It is the very attempt to interrogate Being, to make it give an account of itself to man, that must be surrendered. “Questioning’’ submits to the demand in Leibniz  ’s principle to render a sufficient reason. But Being, as we have seen, is without why; we must let Being lie forth of itself. Even the “why” of the question of Beingwhy is there something rather than nothing?must be given up. The “why” must give way to “because” (SG [1], 188). Being comes not as the answer to a question but as a “gift,” a “favor” (Gunst: WM, 49/358), which is bestowed upon man. Being is thought because Being “gives itself to be thought” (WILD, 1-2/34). We are endowed (begabt) with the gift (Gabe) of thought by Being itself (WHD, 86/126)

This conforms closely to what Eckhart says of the birth of the Son. The birth of the Son is the work of God, not of the soul, although the soul’s co-working and cooperation is required (Q, 94,27/Cl., 102). The image of the Father which is generated in the soul is engendered by the Father:

[165] The work is so proper to Him [the Father] that no one other than the Father is able to effect it. In this work, God effects all His works; the Holy Ghost depends on it and [so do] all creatures. If God effects this work which is His birthin the soul, then this birth is His work, and the birth is the Son. God effects this work in the innermost part of the soul, and in such a hidden manner that neither an angel nor a saint knows why, and even the soul itself can do nothing other than endure it. It belongs uniquely to God. (Q, 376,32-377,6/Ev  ., 125)

However, Eckhart does say that the soul itself bears the Son:

In the same stroke, when He bears His only begotten Son in me, I bear Him back in the Father. (Q, 258,30-1/Serm., 214)

But Eckhart means to say that the soul “co-bears” (mit-gebiert: Q, 161,28/Serm., 135) and co-works (mitwirkt: Q, 94,10-27/Cl., 102) with the Father in giving birth to the Son. The soul has become so totally unified with God that the work of the Father has become the work of the soul as well. God’s own work and my own are the same (Q, 176,16-7/Serm., 235). His work is my work, and my work is His. Eckhart does not mean to suggest that the soul apart from the Father could bear the Son no more than Heidegger would suggest that Dasein is in a position to summon up or command Being into unconcealment (G, 65-6/84). Dasein and the soul are humble and poor: they prepare a place of shelter for a guest over whom they have no authority.

Ver online : John Caputo

CAPUTO, John D.. The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought. New York: Fordham University Press, 1986

Q – Meister Eckhart: Deutsche Predigten und Traktate. Hrsg. u. übers. v. Josef Quint. München: Carl Hanser, 1965.

Serm. – Meister Eckhart: An Introduction to the Study of his Works with an Anthology of his Sermons. Selected and trans. James M. Clark. London: Nelson & Sons, 1957.

Cl. – Meister Eckhart: Selected Treatises and Sermons. Trans. J. M. Clark and J. V. Skinner. London: Faber & Faber, 1958.

WHD Was heisst Denken? 2. Auflage. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1961. What is Called Thinking? Trans. J. G. Gray and F. T. Wieck. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

WM Was ist Metaphysik? 9. Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1965.

G Gelassenheit. 2. Auflage. Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1960.

EM Einführung in die Metaphysik. 2. Auflage. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1958. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. R. Manheim. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1961.

SD Zur Sache des Denkens. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1969. On Time and Being. Trans. J. Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

SG Der Satz vom Grund. 3. Auflage. Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1965.

[1GA10 Der Satz vom Grund. 3. Auflage. Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1965.