Sheehan (1995) – a "clareira" do e para o ser, die Lichtung

Recorde-se que o tópico central de Heidegger não é o "ser" — pelo menos não em qualquer dos significados habituais desse termo — mas antes aquilo a que ele chama a "clareira" do e para o ser, die Lichtung. Esta clareira é o locus do ser, análogo (mas apenas análogo) à descrição de Aristóteles   da alma pensante como o lugar onde as formas das coisas podem aparecer (topos eidon: De Anima III, 4, 429a 27-28). Em alemão, a clareira surge como o Da de Sein, o lugar onde o quê, o isso e o como das coisas — o seu ser — se podem tornar efetivamente manifestos na experiência humana.

Recorde-se também que a essência de um ser humano é ser "já" (isto é, essencialmente/necessariamente) aquele lugar onde as coisas se mostram como o que, aquilo e como são. A natureza do ser humano é ser o locus para o "como/enquanto" — onde "como/enquanto" é uma abreviatura para "a possibilidade de as coisas aparecerem como/enquanto isto ou aquilo", i.e., aparecerem no seu ser.

O "como/enquanto" conota discursividade, não apenas como uma possibilidade humana, mas sobretudo como uma necessidade humana. Estamos "condenados" a (ou "atirados" para) nos relacionarmos com as coisas de forma mediata e discursiva, ou seja, através de uma estrutura "como". A discursividade implica a combinação de diferentes elementos, mantendo-os distintos. Na discursividade, o "como/enquanto" sintetizador e o "como-não" diferenciador não são disjuntivos, mas mutuamente inclusivos. Esta síntese-e-diferenciação acontece tanto na praxis (usar algo como um meio para atingir um fim, mas não como o único meio) como na teoria (ver Sócrates   como um ateniense, mas não como o único ateniense e não apenas como um ateniense). Heidegger designa a estrutura dessa atividade sintético-diferencial pela palavra grega logos, que para ele não significa "palavra", "razão" ou "linguagem", mas "discursividade".

Recall that Heidegger’s central topic is not “being” — at least not in any of the usual meanings of that term — but rather what he calls the “clearing” of and for being, die Lichtung. This clearing is the locus of being, analogous (but only analogous) to Aristotle  ’s description of the thinking soul as the place where the forms of things may appear (topos eidon: De Anima III, 4, 429a 27-28). In German the clearing comes out as the Da of Sein, the place where the whatness, thatness, and howness of things — their being — can become actually manifest in human experience.

Recall also that the essence of a human being is to be “already” (i.e., essentially/necessarily) that place where things show up as what, that, and how they are. The nature of the human being is to be the locus for the “as” — where “as” is shorthand for “the possibility of things appearing as this or that,” i.e., appearing in their being.

The “as” connotes discursiveness, not only as a human possibility but above all as a human necessity. We are “condemned” to (or “thrown” into) relating to things mediately and discursively, i.e., by way of an as-structure. Discursiveness entails combining different elements while keeping them distinct. In discursiveness the synthesizing “as” and the differentiating “as-not” are not disjunctive but mutually inclusive. Such synthesis-and-differentiation happens both in praxis (using something as a means to an end but as not the only means) and in theory (seeing Socrates   as an Athenian but as not the only Athenian and as not only an Athenian). Heidegger calls the structure of such synthetic-differential activity by the Greek word λόγος, which for him means not “word” or “reason” or “language” but “discursiveness.”

So, the human being is always already thrown into λόγος. And λόγος as the possibility of discursive meaningfulness is what Heidegger calls “world.” To be condemned to this field of discursiveness means to have to clear the field and hold it open. This is what Heidegger initially called “being-in-the world.” In order (a) to show that one’s “thrownness” into (or a priori relegation to) λόγος means that one can have no footing outside of λόγος — neither in the αἴσθησις typical of animals nor in the νοῦς characteristic of angels; and (b) to capture the logical/ontological (not chronological) priority operative here; that is, © to emphasize that one’s nature as being-in-λόγος is something one assumes rather than creates — in the interest of all that, we might say: one always already has, of necessity, cleared and held open the field of discursiveness. [1]

Clearing and holding open the field of discursiveness means being already positioned (indeed, condemned) to “take-as.” [2] To have to take X as Y, i.e., to need to use or know X in terms of something else, means that you must already be structured so that you can be in touch with Y. Your being is a “distention” (Ausbreitung). [3] You are “ahead” of your actuality, “stretched” into your possibilities, such that you have both yourself and other things from out of (or: in terms of) your possibilities. Operatio sequitur esse: Your activities are discursive because your structure is distensive. [4]