entelecheia  , ἐντελέχεια, έντελέχεια

From this standpoint, we may judge the meaning, for Aristotle  , of the fundamental concept ἐντελέχεια. A being determined by ἐντελέχεια means fundamentally the type of being that maintains itself in its genuine being-possibility [eigentlichen Seinsmöglichkeit  ] so that the possibility is consummated [vollenden]. If the being is such that it can possess [haben  ] its τέλος  , then the τέλος stands in view so that it can be spoken about. In this concept of ἐντελέχεια, the most fundamental character of the there comes to expression. This determination of the τέλος can now become of fundamental significance insofar as the being of beings [Sein des Seienden  ] can become explicit for this being itself, and this possibility of being explicit of the genuine being for a being remains for a being that we characterize as living [Leben  ], being-in-a-world [Sein-in  -einer-Welt  ]. On this account, then, the soul is, for Aristotle, “the ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη of a body [Körper  ] which carries in itself the possibility of living [Möglichkeit des Lebens].” [De an. Β 1, 412 a 27 sq.] Here, you see where the detailed discussion of this basic concept of τέλειον is grounded. Once we secure this determination, we will be in a position to understand more precisely the further discussion of the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν as ἀγαθόν δι’ αὑτό. [GA18MT  :62]

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Έντελέχεια: “presence, being-present of a being as end,” in the sense of the final point that is completed, that has itself in itself in its “end”—τέλος as character of being-there, which constitutes being-completed; έντελέχεια: that which maintains itself in its being-completed, what is there in the genuine sense. (GA18MT:200)

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It is important to bring the meaning of the expression back to the context in which it functions: clarification of beings with regard to their being. Εντελέχεια, the mode of being-there as maintaining-itself-in-being-completed. Εντελέχεια μόνον: that which only maintains itself in being-completed, such that it is what excludes every δύναμις  ; a completed being that is there, which is always already completed, which was never produced, which never would be but is simply present. That which excludes the possibility of having not   been also excludes the possibility of ever disappearing. The present of such a being is not thought up, but is seen in the movement of the heavens, indeed seen; yet not simply in mere observation, but experienced in fear, even if, in the end, this being-that-is-always-there did not remain standing, vanished from the there. (GA18MT:201)

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VIDE: entelecheia

ἐντελέχεια

NB  : a vis activa é também caracterizada como entelecheia, aludindo-se a Aristóteles (cf. p. ex. Système Nouveau, § 3). Na Monadologia (§ 18) é assim formulada a razão para tal designação: "car elles ont en elles une certaine perfection (ekhousi to enteles)", "pois as mônadas têm em si certa perfeição [Perfektion], carregam em si, de certa maneira, uma perfeição, na medida em que cada mônada, como se irá mostrar, já carrega consigo seu elemento positivo, e, na verdade, de maneira tal que este, segundo sua possibilidade [Möglichkeit], é o próprio universo [Universum  ]".

Esta interpretação [Deutung  ] da entelecheia não corresponde à verdadeira tendência de Aristóteles. Por outro lado, assume Leibniz   esta expressão com novo significado em sua Monadologia.

Já no Renascimento entelecheia é traduzido com o sentido que Leibniz lhe dá: perfectihabia: A Monadologia cita (§ 48) Hermolaus Barbaras   como tradutor. Este Hermolaus Barbaras traduz e comenta, no Renascimento, Aristóteles e o comentário de Themistius (320-390) e precisamente com a intenção de afirmar o Aristóteles grego contra a escolástica medieval. Sem dúvida, sua obra esteve ligada a grandes dificuldades. Conta-se que ele — na carência e perplexidade [Not und Verlegenheit  ] diante da significação [Bedeutung  ] filosófica do termo entelecheia — invocou o diabo [Teufel] para lhe prestar esclarecimentos [Aufschluss  ]. [MHeidegger:206-207; GA9  :84]