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GA18 / GA18MT / GA 18 / GA XVIII
Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie (Summer semester 1924), ed. M. Michalski, 2002, XIV, 418p.
TRADUÇÕES
I. DER VORLESUNGSTEXT AUF DER GRUNDLAGE DER STUDENTISCHEN NACHSCHRIFTEN
ERSTER TEIL Vorverständigung über die Bodenständigkeit der Begrifflichkeii auf dem Wege einer Explikation des Daseins als In-der-Welt-sein in der Orientierung an aristotelischen Grundbegriffen
ZWEITER TEIL Wiederholende Interpretation aristotelischer Grundbegriffe auf dem Grunde des Verständnisses der Bodenständigkeit der Begrifflichkeit
II. DER VORLESUNGSTEXT AUF DER GRUNDLAGE DER ERHALTENEN TEILE DER HANDSCHRIFT
Matérias
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Katherine Withy (2024) – pathe e Befindlichkeit
1º de agosto, por Cardoso de Castro
As coisas nos afetam. Elas nos afetam, afligem, atingem, importam e nos movem. Somos movidos ou afetados por "coisas" no sentido comum — a parafernália de nossa vida diária — mas também por nós mesmos, por outros e por fenômenos ontológicos como o ser e o tempo. Todas essas coisas são capazes de nos afetar. Como elas podem fazer isso?
Sobre essa questão, Martin Heidegger acha que a história da filosofia não ofereceu "nada essencialmente novo" desde Aristóteles (GA20: 393; SZ: 139). (…)
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Gonzalez: Heidegger and Aristotle on the Human Agathon and Telos
7 de dezembro de 2017, por Cardoso de Castro
Extrato de HYLAND & MANOUSSAKIS, Heidegger and the Greeks. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006, p. 129-131.
Let us begin at the beginning, that is, with the good. The first text of the Nicomachean Ethics to which Heidegger turns in the course is appropriately the opening chapters of Book 1, devoted to a discussion of the agathon. Heidegger has been reflecting on the characterization of the human being in the Politics, according to which human beings differ from other animals (…)
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GA18:9-12 – definição (Definition)
2 de março de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro
3. La determinazione del concetto tramite la dottrina della definizione nella «Logica» di Kant
§3. The Determination of the Concept through the Doctrine of Definition in Kant’s Logic.
Gurisatti
[…] I «problemi logici» traggono origine dall’orizzonte della comunicazione scolastica di questioni, senza alcun interesse per un confronto con le cose: ci si limita a trasmettere determinate possibilità tecniche.
In tale logica si chiama definizione quel mezzo in cui il concetto assume la (…)
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GA18: Estrutura da Obra
30 de janeiro de 2017, por Cardoso de Castro
Metcalf & Tanzer
METCALF, Robert D. & TANZER, Mark B.. Martin Heidegger - Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (GA18). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.
INTRODUCTION
The Philological Purpose of the Lecture and Its Presuppositions
§1. The Philological Purpose of the Lecture: Consideration of Some Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy in Their Conceptuality
§2. The Presuppositions of the Philological Purpose: Demarcation of the Manner in Which Philosophy (…)
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GA18:25-26 – ousia (οὐσία)
28 de janeiro de 2023, por Cardoso de Castro
HEIDEGGER, Martin. Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy. Tr. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009. p. 18-19
However, with οὐσία it is not the case that the terminological meaning has arisen out of the customary meaning while the customary disappeared. Rather, for Aristotle, the customary meaning exists constantly and simultaneously alongside the terminological meaning. And, according to its customary meaning, οὐσία means property, (…)
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GA18:305-306 – agathon - Bem
26 de junho de 2021, por Cardoso de Castro
HEIDEGGER, Martin. Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy. Tr. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009, p. 207-208
Since, accordingly, the ἀγαθóν itself, as πέρας of πρᾶξις, characterizes the being of the world as being-there thus and so at each moment [Sein der Welt charakterisiert als jeweils so und so daseiendes], the discourse of an ἀγαθὸν καθóλου, of a “good in general,” [Guten überhaupt] makes no sense. Not only does ἀγαθóν not mean (…)
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GA18:106-108 – ente que fala
14 de setembro de 2020, por Cardoso de Castro
§ 13. Das Sprechendsein als Hörenkönnen und als Möglichkeit des Verfallens. Der doppelte Sinn des άλογον (Eth, Nie. A 13, De an. B 4)
There are ἀρεταί, modes of possibilities of being, that are oriented by genuine speaking, deliberating, concrete grasping. Then there are modes of being able to have being at one’s disposal, in which λóγος is also there, but in which the deciding factor lies in the “taking hold,” the προαίρεσις. The first are the ἀρεταί διανοητικαί; the second are ἀρεταί (…)