Braver (2014:24-25) – Eigentlichkeit - Autenticidade

A autenticidade traduz a palavra alemã "Eigentlichkeit", que se baseia na raiz "eigen" para "próprio", como em algo que é próprio. Heidegger diz que eu só posso ser autêntico porque a minha vida já é minha ou, com mais jargão, a autenticidade é fundada na minúcia de cada caso do Dasein (SZ  :43). À primeira vista, isto parece estranho — se as nossas vidas são sempre nossas, então como é que não as podemos ter e, portanto, ser inautênticos? Teremos uma discussão muito mais pormenorizada sobre a autenticidade em 2.II, mas podemos fazer uma primeira aproximação dizendo que a autenticidade é uma espécie de atualização plena do ser-minha sempre presente. A minha vida é automaticamente minha, mas nem sempre a possuo ou a assumo no sentido de a reivindicar explicitamente, de assumir a responsabilidade por ela, de a tornar verdadeiramente minha. Veremos mais sobre este tipo de inautenticidade em 1.IV e 2.I.

Authenticity translates the German word "Eigentlichkeit," which is built on the root "eigen" for "own," as in something that is one’s own. Heidegger says that I can only be authentic because my life is already mine or, with more jargon, authenticity is founded on Dasein’s in-each-case-mineness (68/43). At first sight this seems strange — if our lives are always our own, then how could we not have them and thus be inauthentic? We will get a much more detailed discussion of authenticity in 2.II, but we can get a first approximation by saying that authenticity is a kind of full actualization of the always present mineness. My life is automatically mine, but I don’t always own it or own up to it in the sense of explicitly laying claim to it, taking responsibility for it, truly making it my own. We will see more of this kind of inauthenticity in 1.IV and 2.I.

There is an expression, "become who you are," first said by Pindar   and later adopted by Hegel   and Nietzsche   (quoted at 186/145), that captures some of what authenticity means. At first glance, the command makes no sense — if I already am who I am, how can I become it? But we can start to see the point when we distinguish between a passive way of being who you are and an active appropriation of your way of being. Certainly, we are all already Dasein, but without really realizing this in both senses of the word: understanding it and intentionally trying to live in a Daseinish way. In fact, Heidegger thinks that most of the time we live in ways that are inappropriate to the kinds of beings that we are, so we need to appropriate our lives, which are already our "property," to do what is proper to our way of being (this is another family of words that capture some of what "eigen" means). To become what we are is to grasp the nature of our existence and deliberately live in harmony with it. This gives the Existential Imperative an ethical dimension, in the broad sense of the word: we uncover our distinct nature in order to live lives more appropriate to it. Note, however, that living appropriately or authentically does not mean taking up specific activities, the way many philosophers have singled out particular tasks we need to do in order to live good lives. Heidegger insists that he is not recommending a [25] concrete ideal (69/43). Authenticity is a way of living whatever kind of life we choose; it functions as an adverb rather than a verb or a noun. (p. 24-25)