GA9:LetterH - thinking

Thinking perfects the relation of be[-ing] (Sein) to the essence of man. It does not make or effect this relation.  Thinking only bears it as that which is handed over to be[-ing].  This bearing consists in the fact that in thinking be[-ing] comes into language. [...]  Thinking does not in that way just turn into action in the sense that an effect issues from it or that it is applied <to something>.  Thinking acts in that it thinks.  This <kind of> action is presumably the simplest and at the same time the highest because it concerns the relation of be[-ing] to man.  But all effecting rests on be[-ing] and is intent on <some kind of> be-ing.  Thinking, on the other hand, lets itself be absorbed by be[-ing] in order to speak the truth of be[-ing].  Thinking consummates this allowing.  Thinking is l’engagement par l’Être pour l’Être. I do not know if it is linguistically possible to say both of these ("par" et "pour") in one, namely, as penser, c’est l’engagement de l’Être. Here the genitive form "de l’. . ." expresses both the genitivus subiectivus and the <genitivus> obiectivus. Yet <the terms> ’subject’ and ’object’ are the jargon of metaphysics, which from early on in the form of western logic and grammar co-opted the interpretation of language. Today we have only just begun to discern what was concealed in the process.  The freeing of language from grammar by a more original articulation of its essence remains <something> for thinking and poetry to do.  Thinking is not only l’engagement dans l’action for and by be-ing <in some way>, meaning what is actual in the present situation.  Thinking is <rather> l’engagement by and for the truth of be[-ing]. Its history is never past, it is always imminent.  The history of be[-ing] bears and determines essence of thinking, and that means to also carry it out, we must free ourselves from the technical interpretation of thinking.  Its beginnings reach back to Plato and Aristotle.  There thinking itself is valued as a kind of techne, a procedure of thinking over in the service of doing and making.  In that case, however, thinking over is already seen with a view to praxis and poiesis. Thus thinking, when taken by itself, is not "practical." The characterization of thinking as theoria and the determination of cognition as <a way of> behaving is one already in accord with the "technical" explanation of thinking.  It is more a reactive move to preserve a sort of independence for thinking in contrast with action and doing.  Since then, "philosophy" has had to justify its kind of life before "science."  It thinks that this will most certainly happen by elevating itself to the level of science.  Yet these efforts amount to the relinquishment of the essence of thinking.  Philosophy is pursued by the fear of losing respect and value if it is not science. This is regarded as a shortcoming which is equated with being unscientific.  Be[-ing] as the element of thinking is abandoned by the technical explanation of be[-ing].  Beginning with the Sophists and Plato, "logic" has sanctioned this explanation ever since.  One <thus> assesses thinking according to a measure inappropriate to it. This assessment resembles a procedure that <would> try to evaluate the essence and capabilities of a fish according to how long it is able to live in on dry land.  For a long time now, for far too long, thought has been on dry land.  Can one now call the effort to bring thinking back into its element "irrationalism"? [LetterH - Miles Groth]