GA18:105-107 – arete e êthos

There are άρεταί [aretai], modes of possibilities of being, that are oriented by genuine speaking, deliberating, concrete grasping. Then there are modes of being able to have being at one’s disposal, in which λόγος [logos] is also there, but in which the deciding factor lies in the “taking hold,” the προαίρεσις [proairesis]. The first are the άρεταί διανοητικαί [aretai dianoetikai]; the second are άρεταί ήθικαί [aretai êtikai]. [1] διανοεΐσθαι [dianoetikai]: “to think through,” “to suppose in a thorough manner,” “to reckon through.” Ηθικός [Êthikos] does not mean “moral”; one must not superficially hold oneself to words when considering the “ethical virtues.” Ήθος [Êthos] means the “comportment” of human beings, how the human being is there, how he offers himself as a human being, how he appears in being-with-one-another—the way that the orator speaks, has a comportment in the way he stands with respect to the matters about which he speaks. The partitioning of the άρεταί [aretai] cannot be followed more closely now. Later, we will examine the άρεταί διανοητικαί [aretai dianoetikai] [2] since the basic possibility of considering, of scientific research, of the βίος θεωρητικός [bios theoretikos], and therewith the basic possibility of human existence, is found in their domain. For us to get λόγος [logos] in view, it is important that this fundamental division of human being-possibilities, among orientations to λόγος [logos], is seen in its basic possibility of λόγος [logos]. (p. 73)