Buren (GA63:nota 29) – Blickstellung - Blickstand - posição de mirada

“Position for looking,” “position of looking,” and “position which looks at” have been used for Blickstellung   and Blickstand, since as Heidegger makes clear in §17B he means by these terms not   simply a reflective and deliberately adopted epistemological “standpoint,” but more literally and in a deeper sense a “position” (Stellung  ) and “state” (Stand  ) of interpretive “looking” (Blicken) or “seeing” (Sehen  ) which we are in “at the particular time,” which is part of our historical facticity, and which, so Heidegger maintains in the present section and in §§9, 15, and 17, the method of straightforward “seeing” in previous phenomenology naively and fatefully overlooked. What is meant by these terms is closer to Aristotle  ’s description of each of the modes of knowing and truth (the so-called “intellectual virtues”) as a ἕξις   (“state of having,” “habit”), a term which Heidegger cites in §24, translates as Gewohnheit (“habit,” “custom,” see pp. 66, 75, 80), and uses in conjunction with ἀλήθεια   (“truth” in the sense of a state of the “uncoveredness” of beings) to describe everyday “familiarity” with the world and “knowing one’s way around” in it. See ‘Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles,” p. 260: “Φρόνησις [practical wisdom] is a ἕξις [state], a how of having available the true safekeeping of being. And as a ἕξις, it is a γινόμενον τῆς ψυχή  ς [having-become of the soul] which temporalizes itself and unfolds itself in life itself as its own possibility, brings life into a definite state (Stand], . . .” Other key terms which are formed from blicken (“to look”) and sehen (“to see,” “look”) and are used in conjunction with those above have been translated as follows: Blick (auf  ) (“looking [in the direction of, toward, at],” “view”), Hinblick auf (“point of view which looks in the direction of and at”), Blickbahn (auf) (“path of looking [toward]”), Blickfeld (“horizon   of looking”), Blickrichtung auf   (“direction of looking toward”), Blicktendenz auf (“tendency of looking toward”), Im-Blick-halten   (“holding-in-view”), Augenblick (“how matters look in the moment”), hinsehen (auf) (“to look [in the direction of, toward, at]”), Hinsehen (auf) (“looking [in the direction of, toward, at],” “seeing”), (im) Absehen (Absicht) (auf) (“with a view to,” “being-with-a-view-to,” “purpose”). Hinsicht (“point of view”), Vorsicht (auf) (“foresight [with respect to]”), Gesichtsfeld (“horizon”). For the sense in which Heidegger uses this family of ocular terms in connection with interpretation   in hermeneutics, see especially §§9-10 and 15-18 in the body of the text  , endnote 3, and Translator’s Epilogue.