Wrathall (2021:107-108) – objetos, meras coisas ou significativos

[…] these reflections draw on the vision that the Metaphysics offers (see A 1 981b23) of science emerging out of a certain leisure, of humanity “releasing itself from its tendencies to direct itself to its routine tasks” to instead utake a break and make a sojourn” (GA62  :354/160). Such an insistence on “objects in the sense of mere things” “emerging” only out of objects being “originally there for [us] as objects as meaningful [als bedeutsame]” (GA62  :354/160) finds echoes in Being and Time  ’s discussion of the “change-over” from dealing with the available to our coming to observe the occurrent (SZ   357). But how we are to understand this “change-over” is a difficult question.

One might wonder, for example, whether Heidegger can make sense of Dasein encountering “mere things” if entities are given “on the path of care”; and when Heidegger characterizes such a “sojourning” as “in and for the basic movement of those dealings characterized by concern” (GA62  :355/161), this may prompt the reaction that many — beginning perhaps with Husserl   — have had to Being and Time  : that we must argue “against Heidegger” to secure science’s status as not tied to “any necessity of life” but instead as capable of simply “look[ing] at things, and wanting] to know things,” things with which it need have “nothing to do” (unpublished note of [108] Husserl  ’s translated and quoted in Moran   2000,183). From such a perspective, Heidegger’s depiction of Dasein as living in a world which it has “always already … taken up in care in one way or another” seems to save us from the spectre of Cartesian skepticism, but only by sacrificing our claim to objective knowledge, knowledge of the world “conceived of in terms of the objectivity of nature that has been stripped of all meaningfulness [der bedeutsamkeitsverarmten Gegenständlichkeit der Natur]” (GA62  :355/161), a knowledge stripped of what we might think of as the parochial concerns of a creature “caught in meaningfulness.”

[…]

Heidegger did indeed stress in Being and Time   that, although “looking at the world theoretically” “dim[s] down” “the specific worldhood” of the “available” to “the uniformity of what is purely occurrent,” “this uniformity comprises a new abundance of things” (SZ   138); and already in the early discussions sketched above, what Heidegger sees emerge from science’s Aristotelian “sojourn” is “an autonomous form of dealings with” the world (GA62  :354/160). But to assess whether such a stance is really available to Heidegger, key issues are how we understand the “founding” of scientific knowledge in “being-in” and the sense in which the objects of such knowledge are “stripped of all meaningfulness.”

[WRATHALL  , Mark A. The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon. Cambridge New York (N.Y.): Cambridge university press, 2021]