GA65:136 – Wirklich - efetivo

Caso ainda seja permitido caracterizar para um entendimento imediato o seer do “ente”, então recorreremos aqui ao efetivamente real como o propriamente ente. O efetivo é o que conhecemos como o que se presenta, o constante.

No outro início, porém, o ente nunca é o efetivo no sentido desse ente “atual”. Mesmo lá onde ele vem ao encontro constantemente, para o projeto originário da verdade do seer, esse ente é o que há de mais fugidio.

Efetivo, isto é, essente, é o lembrado e é ainda o pronto. Lembrança e preparação abrem o campo de jogo temporal do seer, para o qual o pensar precisa abjurar a “atualidade” como a única e primeira determinação até aqui. (Porque é aqui que reside o campo de decisão imediato sobre a verdade do seer, o salto para o outro início precisou ser tentado como Ser e tempo  ). Todavia, se gostaria ainda de deixar a partir da concepção habitual do tempo (desde Aristóteles   – Platão  ) o νῦν em seu primado, deduzindo apenas a partir de sua modulação o passado e o futuro; e isso sobretudo porquanto a lembrança só pode ser lembrada a partir de e em recurso a algo atual e a algo atual em seu sido, e sobretudo porquanto algo futuro não tem senão a determinação de se tomar algo atual.

Ainda que o atual nunca seja algo nulo e tenha a sua parcela na fundação da lembrança e da preparação, isso só se mostra de qualquer modo assim, se a atualização do a cada vez presente já for suportada e afinada inteiramente pela lembrança e pela preparação, a partir de cuja intimidade nunca pode cintilar senão o presente. Experimentado originariamente, ele não tem como ser calculado segundo o seu caráter fugidio, mas sim segundo a sua unicidade. Esse é o novo e essencial conteúdo da constância e da presentação a serem determinadas a partir de lembrança e preparação. (p. 253)

En caso de que todavía esté permitido para un próximo entendimiento caracterizar el ser [Seyn] a partir del “ente”, entonces invocaremos a lo real como lo propiamente ente. Conocemos lo real como lo presente, estable.

Pero en el otro comienzo el ente nunca es lo real en el sentido de esto [212] “actual”. Éste es, aun donde sale al encuentro con estabilidad, lo más fugaz para el proyecto originario de la verdad del ser [Seyn].

Real, es decir, siendo, es primero lo recordado y además lo dispuesto a. Recuerdo y disposición a abren el espacio-de juego-temporal del ser [Seyn], al cual el pensar tiene que denegar la “actualidad” como determinación vigente primera y única. (Porque aquí se encuentra el próximo campo de decisión sobre la verdad del ser [Seyn], tuvo que intentarse el arranque hacia el otro comienzo como Ser y tiempo  .) Sin embargo si se quisiera desde la concepción habitual del tiempo (desde Aristóteles   – Platón  ) dejar al νῦν su preeminencia y tan sólo derivar de su declinación pasado y futuro, cuanto más por cierto recuerdo sólo podrá recordarse desde y en la referencia a algo actual y sido actual, cuanto más algo futuro sólo tendrá la determinación de devenir algo actual.

Aunque lo actual nunca es lo vano y tiene su participación en la fundación del recuerdo y disposición a, así todo esto, sin embargo, sólo cuando el ser actual de lo respectivamente presente ya es sostenido y del todo predispuesto por recuerdo y disposición a, desde cuya intimidad sólo relampaguea siempre la actualidad. Experimentada originariamente no puede ser calculada según su fugacidad sino según su singularidad. Ésta es el nuevo y esencial contenido de la estabilidad y el presenciarse, por determinar a partir de recuerdo y disposición a. (p. 212)

In case it is still admissible, for purposes of an immediate understanding, to characterize be-ing in terms of beings, then we will appeal to the actual as what genuinely is. We know the actual as what is present, as the constant.

In the other beginning, however, a being is never actual in the sense of this "being-present." Even where this being-present is encountered in constancy, it is the most fleeting thing for the originary projecting-open of the truth of be-ing.

Actual, i.e., what is, is only the remembered and the still accessible. Remembering and access open the free-play of the time-space of be-ing, with regard to which thinking must disavow "presentness" as the heretofore only and unique determination. (Because here is the nearest region of decision about the truth of be-ing, leaping up [Ansprung] into the other beginning had to be attempted as Being and Time  .) But considering the ordinary understanding of time (since Aristotle   and Plato  ), one might leave the νῦν in its priority and derive past and future from the modification of this priority—especially since remembering can only remember from out of and by appealing to something present and something that has been present, especially since something futural is fated only to become something present.

Although what is present [das Gegenwärtige] is never the nothing and takes part in the grounding of remembering and access, all of this is so only if the presenting of what is always present is already carried and attuned by remembering and access, from whose intimacy the present [Gegenwart] flashes up. Originarily experienced, the present cannot be reckoned according to its fleetingness but according to its uniqueness. [182] [GA65  :257-259] This is the new and essential thrust of constancy and presencing, to be determined in terms of remembering and access. (p. 181)

If it is still allowed, for the sake of a preliminary orientation, to characterize beyng on the basis of “beings,” then we will call upon the actual as what genuinely is. We know the actual as the present, the constant.

In the other beginning, however, beings are never the actual in this sense of “presence.” Such presence, even where it is encountered as constancy, is for the originary projection of the truth of beyng the most ephemeral.

What is actual, i.e., what is, is first that which is remembered and that which is still the prepared. Memory and preparedness open the temporal-spatial playing field of beyng in which thinking must renounce the “presence” that previously was the one and only determination. (Because it is here that the most proximate domain lies for the decision regarding the truth of beyng, the initiation of the leap to the other beginning had to be attempted as “Being and Time  .”) Yet one might want to retain the ordinary conception of time (predominant since Aristotle  -Plato  ), leave the νῦν [“now”] its privilege, and derive the past and future as modifications of the νῦν, especially because memory can remember only out of and in calling upon something present and something that has been present and because what is in the future has but one destiny, namely, to become something present.

Although what is present is never the negative and participates in the grounding of memory and preparedness, yet all this is so only if the presencing of what in each case is present has already been borne and pervasively disposed by memory and preparedness. Only from the intimacy of these can the present gleam forth. In original experience, the present cannot be reckoned according to its ephemeralness but only according to its uniqueness. This latter is the new and essential content of the constancy and presencing that are to be determined on the basis of memory and preparedness.

Falls es noch erlaubt ist, zur nächsten Verständigung das Seyn vom »Seienden« her zu kennzeichnen, dann werden wir uns auf das Wirkliche als das eigentlich Seiende berufen. Das Wirkliche kennen wir als das Anwesende, Beständige.

Im anderen Anfang aber ist das Seiende nie das Wirkliche im Sinne dieses »Gegenwärtigen«. Dieses ist, auch wo es in Beständigkeit begegnet, für den ursprünglichen Entwurf der Wahrheit des Seyns das flüchtigste.

Wirklich, d. h. seiend, ist erst das Erinnerte und ist noch das Bereite. Erinnerung und Bereitung öffnen den Zeit-spiel-raum des Seyns, dem das Denken die »Gegenwärtigkeit« als bisherige erste und einzige Bestimmung abschwören muß. (Weil hier das nächste Entscheidungsfeld über die Wahrheit des Seyns liegt, mußte der Ansprung zum anderen Anfang als »Sein und Zeit  « versucht werden.) Doch möchte man aus der gewöhnlichen Auffassung der Zeit (seit Aristoteles   – Plato  ) das νῦν in seinem Vorrang belassen und aus dessen Abwandlung erst Vergangenheit und Zukunft ableiten, zumal doch Erinnerung nur erinnern kann aus und in der Berufung auf ein Gegenwärtiges und Gegenwärtiggewesenes, zumal Zukünftiges nur die Bestimmung hat, ein Gegenwärtiges zu werden.

Wenngleich das Gegenwärtige niemals das Nichtige ist und an der Gründung der Erinnerung und Bereitung seinen Anteil hat, so dies alles doch nur, wenn das Gegenwärtigen des je Anwesenden schon getragen und durchstimmt ist von Erinnerung und Bereitung, aus deren Innigkeit immer nur die Gegenwart aufblitzt. Ursprünglich erfahren kann sie nicht nach ihrer Flüchtigkeit berechnet werden, sondern nach ihrer Einzigkeit. Diese ist der neue und wesentliche Gehalt der aus Erinnerung und Bereitung zu bestimmenden Beständigkeit und Anwesung. (p. 257)