GA18:183-184 – ser humano determinado em seu ergon como praxis

Thus it follows that the how of being-composed is to be cultivated in relation to being-there, as ἕξις is oriented in this way. However, there is a difficulty in this formulation of the γένεσις of ἕξις, insofar as the question arises: what, in general, does it mean to become just through acting justly? Of course, I must already be just to act justly. [1] Aristotle   discusses this difficulty in Book 2, Chapter 3, of the Nicomachean Ethics. He resolves this difficulty by recourse to relations of a different sort, in τέχνη. [2] In τέχνη, it depends upon the γιγνóμενα behaving in the right manner. Shoemaking depends upon the shoe, the τέλος, the ἔργον, behaving in the right manner, and thereby being a good, suitable shoe. Nothing further comes into question here. By contrast, we know that the being of human beings is determined in its ἔργον as πρᾶξις. This has the τέλος in itself, comes to its end through itself. For this reason, the basic conditions governing the ἔργον of human beings are entirely different than those in the case of a τέχνη. For this πρᾶξις, it depends on how the one acting, as such, behaves toward himself. It depends on ἕξις, being-composed and this πῶς ἔχων of the πράττων, [3] the “how” of the “one acting” is defined in accordance with three aspects:

1. εἰδώς [4] – φρóνησις: he must be “knowing,” must act in the right “condition of looking around,” which is oriented toward the καιρóς with respect to the subject matter.

2. προαιρούμενος, [5] he must act from out of himself “on the basis of an actual being-resolved to . . .”

3. Acting in such a way that he is thereby βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων, [6] “stable and not to be brought out of composure.” This recalls the determination of πάθος as δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες; [7] we are brought out of one frame of mind into another. What is characteristic is not the resulting condition, the having-come-into-another-frame-of-mind, but rather the having-lost-composure, being on the way from one state to another, the peculiar unrest that is given with πάθος itself in relation to φóβος characterized as ταραχή, [8] “tumult,” “getting mixed up.” [GA18MT  :123-124]