Zimmerman (1982:102-103) – eu e temporalidade

A temporalidade tridimensional é o sentido unificador do tríplice Ser do Dasein   como cuidado [Sorge  ]. Por isso, a temporalidade torna possível a unidade do ser humano. Mais fundamental do que o ego   pessoal é a temporalidade que "se gera a si própria" (sich zeitigt). "A temporalidade gera-se a si mesma e, de fato, gera possíveis modos de si mesma. Estes tornam possível a multiplicidade do modo de ser do Dasein, e especialmente a possibilidade básica de existência autêntica ou inautêntica." (SZ  , 328/377) Como Heidegger disse em 1929: "Mais primordial que o homem é a finitude do Dasein nele." (GA3  , 207/237) Na passagem seguinte, Heidegger martela os seguintes temas interligados: o sujeito não é uma substância autofundante; o eu é uma forma de existir que se encontra sempre num contexto mundano; este contexto é constituído pela revelação temporal   — o sentido do Ser do Dasein; o eu inautêntico carece de uma "posição" genuína porque foge da verdade; o eu autêntico é integrado e unificado porque resolve revelar-se como, e tornar-se da forma mais apropriada, a temporalidade que já é.

Heidegger makes it clear that selfhood is rooted in temporality, the sense of Dasein’s Being: [103]

When fully conceived, the care structure includes the phenomenon of selfhood. This phenomenon is clarified by interpreting the meaning [sense] of care; and it is as care that Dasein’s totality of Being has been defined. (SZ, 323/370)

Three-dimensional temporality is the unifying sense for the threefold Being of Dasein as care. Hence, temporality makes possible the unity of the human being. More fundamental than the personal ego is the temporality which “generates itself” (sich zeitigt). “Temporality generates itself, and indeed it generates possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of Dasein’s mode of Being, and especially the basic possibility of authentic or inauthentic existence.” (SZ, 328/377) As Heidegger said in 1929: “More primordial than man is the finitude of Dasein in him.” (KP, 207/237) In the following passage, he hammers home the following interconnected themes: the subject is not   a self-grounding substance; the self is a way of existing which is always found in a worldly context; this context is constituted by temporal disclosedness — the sense of Dasein’s Being; the inauthentic self lacks genuine “standing” because it flees from the truth; the authentic self is integrated and unified because it resolves to disclose itself as, and to become in the most appropriate way, the temporality which it already is.

If the ontological constitution of the self is not to be traced back either to an “I”-substance or to a “subject,” but if on the contrary, the everyday fugitive way in which we keep on saying “I” must be understood in terms of our authentic potentiality-for-Being, then the proposition that the self is the basis of care and constantly present at hand   is one that still does not follow. [My emphasis.] Selfhood is to be discerned existentially only in one’s potentiality-for-Being-one’s-self, that is to say, in the authenticity of Dasein’s Being as care. In terms of care, the constancy of the self, as the supposed persistence of the subjectum, gets clarified. But phenomenon of this authentic potentiality-for-Being also opens up our eyes for the constancy of the self in the sense of its having achieved some sort of position. The constancy of the self, in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness, is the authentic counter-possibility of the non-selfconstancy [Unselbst-standigkeit] which is characteristic of irresolute falling. Existentially, “self-constancy” signifies nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness. The ontological structure of such resoluteness reveals the existentiality of the self’s selfhood. (SZ, 322/369)