Philipse: ética e ontológico-ôntico

[…] the ontology of a region of entities is claimed to be more fundamental than, and a priori   in relation to, the empirical or positive   sciences of this region. SZ:268-270 – Análise ontológica da consciência Allegedly, the method of the ontology of Dasein   is independent of empirical research concerning humans. As we will see, this methodological claim, which reminds us of the Husserlian Wesensschau  , has disastrous effects on Heidegger’s analysis of ethics, for it implies that empirical and factual investigations of human morality are irrelevant to the ontology of Dasein.

If the distinction between ontology and the ontical level, as applied tο Dasein, is the distinction between, on the one hand  , what is essential to human existence whenever and wherever it is found, and, on the other, factual possibilities of existing that may be different at different times and places, Heidegger has to decide with regard to each human phenomenon where it belongs: at the ontical or at the ontological level. What is Heidegger’s view on ethics in this respect? Is it conceivable that specific moral   norms or inclinations belong to the ontological level? In that case, Olafson’s attempt to derive substantial moral insights from Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein might be a fruitful one. Or is it rather that Heidegger relegates all substantial moral norms to the ontical level, admitting at the ontological level only general structures of human existence that allow for the possibility of both moral and immoral (or amoral) behaviour? In this latter case, Olafson’s philosophical strategy may seem to be doomed.

One might think that findings of anthropological research are relevant here, because one possible argument for considering something as ‘essential’ for humans is that it is found in all human cultures. Although many moral norms turn out to be specific to particular societies, anthropologists have discovered so-called ethical universals, norms endorsed by all human communities, such as prohibitions of murder, lying, incest, and rape, and obligations of mutual help and sympathy. What is more, ethologists have observed moral patterns of reciprocal altruism within groups of mammals such as dolphins, wolves, capuchins, and chimpanzees. These and other studies lend considerable support to the hypothesis   that there is a common genetic basis to universal moral feelings and behaviour of social animals, and this hypothesis might in [444] turn be accounted for by the theory of evolution. Should we conclude from these empirical investigations that at least some fundamental moral norms or inclinations belong to the ontological level?