Buren (GA63:nota 1) – intencionalidade da consciência (termos de Husserl)

Intentional   terms appropriated from Husserl  . Not   only does Heidegger’s discussion of Husserl’s phenomenology occupy a central place in his course (§14), but his characterization of the dynamic directional nature of the interpretation   of the be-ing of facticity takes up, though with less emphasis than in his preceding writings, the following four terms which Husserl had used to describe different aspects of the intentionality of consciousness, i.e., of its “being-directed toward” (Gerichtetsein   auf  ) something: (1) Bezogensein auf.. . (interpretation’s “being-related to . . .’ at the particular time), Bezug   auf (“relation to [toward] . . .”), or Sichverhalten   zu (“comporting-itself toward . . .”); (2) the Gehalt (“content”) to which interpretation is directed and related, i.e., the being of the object; (3) the Vollzug   (“actualizing”) of the interpretive relation to … ; and (4) the ongoing Zeitigung   (“temporalizing and unfolding”) of this actualizing of the interpretive relation to. .. . Regarding Zeitigung and Vollzug, see also endnote 26. [Buren  , nota 1 GA63  ]