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Polt (2013:) – pistis (confiança)

sábado 20 de janeiro de 2024, por Cardoso de Castro


Para a maioria de nós, a maior parte do tempo, o dado em si não é um problema. As coisas em geral estão simplesmente disponíveis e presentes. Tomamo-las como garantidas: não as reconhecemos nem como algo tomado nem como algo concedido. Na experiência comum, confiamos nos entes, usamo-los e referimo-nos a eles, sem refletir sobre o fato de estarem acessíveis em primeiro lugar. Tal como esperamos automaticamente que o chão nos apoie quando damos um passo, contamos com a subsistência do conjunto dos entes em todos os nossos atos. A palavra de Platão   para a nossa relação com as coisas corpóreas é também a palavra certa para a nossa relação pré-filosófica com todas as coisas: pistis   (República 511e), que é melhor interpretada não como crença nem como fé, mas como confiança.


For most of us most of the time, the given as such is no problem at all. Things in general are simply available and present. We take them for granted: we do not   recognize them either as something taken or as something granted. In ordinary experience we rely on beings, use them, and refer to them, without reflecting on the fact that they are accessible in the first place. Just as we automatically expect the ground to support us when we take a step, we count on the subsistence of the whole of beings in our every act. Plato’s word for our relation to corporeal things is also the right word for our prephilosophical relation to all things: pistis (Republic 511e), which is best interpreted neither as belief nor as faith, but as trust.

Of course, within the sphere of things as a whole, there are problems and limits in abundance. Particulars are often untrustworthy or unavailable, painfully and importantly so. Our need for these nongiven things consumes our energy and our thought. We hunt, plan, communicate, and calculate as we try to secure the insecure. Getting beings can even become our main way to relate to them; we then treat action as a matter of getting and keeping objects, and knowledge as a matter of getting and keeping information  . But while we are engaged in this attempt to get things, we take the whole for granted as reliable and thus for-get it. Strictly speaking, since we may never have recognized the whole in the first place, one can say that it lies in oblivion.

We are primally familiar with the whole; we inhabit it. It is our own in the sense that we are comfortable in it, as a fish is comfortable in the sea. But this is why we cannot recognize it as our own, any more than a fish can recognize that it belongs in the sea and not on land. Precisely because we trust the whole, we cannot experience it as a whole. As long as we are immersed in it, it is impossible for us to encounter it as such.

In terms of philosophical positions, this moment corresponds to a naive empiricism. In order to find the truth we are simply supposed to perceive what is there, get the facts about it, and generalize. This concept of knowledge will always be the most popular, because within our everyday immersion in the whole it functions perfectly well as a way of accumulating information. This attitude can pervade the most advanced scientific research no less than it pervades the most thoughtless, routine behavior; the questions and techniques may differ while the basic relation to the whole remains the same.

The experience of a whole as such requires a space that, paradoxically, is not contained within the whole. The verge of this space is the boundary that defines the whole, that allows it to be a “well-rounded sphere” (Parmenides  , frag. 8). This limit divides what is from what is not. But in ordinary experience, nothingness is nothing; absence is absent. Particulars may be lacking and desired, but a radical other to beings as a whole is unsuspected. Things in general are present so thoroughly, so reliably, so inexhaustibly that they do not come into question.

Ver online : Richard Polt

[POLT, Richard F. H. The emergency of being: on Heidegger’s contributions to philosophy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2013]