Pedersen (2020:4-5) – orexis

O que Heidegger opta por realçar nesta compreensão aparentemente simples do movimento dos seres vivos é a concepção específica de desejo (orexis  ) que está aqui em causa. Para Heidegger, uma das coisas importantes e interessantes no relato de Aristóteles   é que o "ponto de partida para o movimento não é a observação pura e simples de um objeto desejável" e que "não é o caso de o ser vivo começar por observar as coisas desinteressadamente, olhar apenas em redor numa atitude neutra, e depois mover-se em direção a algo; pelo contrário, a orexis é fundamental". O que isto mostra é que os seres vivos têm uma abertura fundamental para serem afetados pelo mundo, o que permite que as coisas lhes apareçam imediatamente como desejáveis ou indesejáveis. Na orexis encontra-se não só o impulso para o objeto de desejo, mas também a capacidade de experienciar as coisas no mundo como desejáveis ou como importantes de alguma forma. Heidegger exprime este aspecto duplo da orexis quando a descreve como "sentir-se sintonizado de tal e tal forma, sentir-se bem e mal, e assim também estar atento a" (GA22  :185-187/156).

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A imagem emergente da estrutura da ação animal é a seguinte. O desejo fornece a componente conativa da ação, mas aqui é considerado como um impulso em direção a algo que se encontra no ambiente. É, afinal, o objeto do desejo que ativa o desejo e que serve como a verdadeira base do movimento. Ter um desejo, desejar, é assim reconcebido como ser atraído para algo encontrado no ambiente e não como um estado interno que fornece um "empurrão" para iniciar o movimento puramente a partir do interior do animal. No entanto, o desejo não pode ser ativado sem alguma capacidade perceptiva que permita ao animal encontrar o ambiente em termos do que é prejudicial e benéfico ou, mais amplamente, importante e sem importância. É a isto que chamarei o aspecto "orientador" da ação. Heidegger junta a componente orientadora com a componente conativa da ação nas suas primeiras discussões sobre a orexis, mas, como vou continuar a mostrar, podemos separar estes dois aspectos da ação e fornecer uma análise mais profunda dos mesmos separadamente, reconhecendo ainda assim a sua natureza fundamentalmente interligada.

As we have already seen for Heidegger, life is movement. Having established that living beings are characterized by their ability to move themselves toward something that matters to them, Heidegger proceeds to discuss Aristotle’s consideration of the basis of motion (arche   kineseos). Aristotle states that it is the object of desire (orekton) that is the basis of movement. For Aristotle, it is the object of desire that brings about the motion of a living being. As Aristotle states in De Anima  , “in every case the mover is the object of desire” (433a27), and the “first mover of all is the object of desire, since it moves us without being moved” (433b12). Suppose a lion sees a gazelle and then proceeds to chase it. According to Aristotle’s account, the gazelle is the object of desire. Upon seeing the gazelle, the lion’s desire to eat the gazelle is stirred into motion. The desire in turn pulls the lion into motion in pursuit of the gazelle. In this way the gazelle causes movement but is itself unmoved.

What Heidegger chooses to highlight in this seemingly straightforward understanding of the movement of living beings is the specific conception of desire (orexis) at work here. For Heidegger, one of the important and interesting things about Aristotle’s account is that the “point of departure for the motion is not   the pure and simple observation of a desirable object” and that “it is not the case that the living being first observes things disinterestedly, merely looks about in a neutral attitude, and then moves toward something; on the contrary, orexis is fundamental.” What this shows is that living beings have a fundamental openness to being affected by the world, which allows things immediately to appear to them as desirable or undesirable. There is found in orexis not only the urge toward the object of desire but also the capacity to experience things in the world as desirable or as mattering in some way. Heidegger expresses this dual aspect of orexis when he describes it as “feeling oneself attuned in such and such a way, feeling well and ill, and thus also being on the lookout for” (GA22:185-187/156).

[5] Now one may ask why Heidegger emphasizes the importance of distinguishing (krinein   ) for life, and hence, the motion of living beings. It is apparent that when a living being moves toward an object of desire, the living being has distinguished that particular object as something desirable. The capacity of orexis to reveal objects as desirable is the capacity to distinguish objects from one another, at least insofar as their desirability is concerned. Remember that for Aristotle the object of desire is the basis of motion. However, living beings can only be moved by the desirable object if they take it as something desirable. Returning to the example of the lion and the gazelle, the gazelle does prompt desire to move the lion, but the gazelle can only do this in the first place because the lion sees the gazelle as something to be eaten. For animals, this distinguishing takes place through perception (aisthesis  ). Perception here is not to be thought of as a straightforward sensing of things in the world in terms of their objective qualities, but rather “it exists in a context of pursuit and flight.” In other words, perception is always already oriented toward seeing things as desirable (worthy of pursuit) or detrimental (worthy of being avoided).

The emerging picture of the structure of animal action is as follows. Desire does provide the conative component of action, but here it is thought of as a pull out toward something encountered in the environment. It is, after all, the object of desire that activates desire and serves as the true basis of the movement. Having a desire, desiring, is thus reconceived as being drawn toward something encountered in the environment rather than an internal state that provides a “push” to initiate movement purely from within the animal. However, desire cannot be activated without some perceptive capacity that allows the animal to encounter the environment in terms of what is harmful and beneficial or, more broadly, important and unimportant. This is what I will call the “orienting” aspect of action. Heidegger conjoins the orienting component with the conative component of action in his early discussions of orexis, but as I will proceed to show, we can pull apart these two aspects of action and provide deeper analysis of them separately while still acknowledging their fundamentally intertwined nature.