Hegel: consciência do objeto e de si mesma

85 - [Aber nicht nur] Uma achega de nossa parte se torna supérflua segundo esse aspecto, em que conceito e objeto, o padrão de medida e o que deve ser testado estão presentes na consciência mesma. Aliás, somos também poupados da fadiga da comparação entre os dois, e do exame propriamente dito. Assim, já que a consciência se examina a si mesma, também sob esse aspecto, só nos resta o puro observar.

Com efeito, a consciência, por um lado, é consciência do objeto; por outro lado, consciência de si mesma: é consciência do que é verdadeiro para ela, e consciência de seu saber da verdade. Enquanto ambos são para a consciência, ela mesma é sua comparação: é para ela mesma que seu saber do objeto corresponde ou não a esse objeto.

O objeto parece, de fato, para a consciência, ser somente tal como ela o conhece. Parece também que a consciência não pode chegar por detrás do objeto, [para ver] como ele é, não para ela, mas como é em si; e que, portanto, também não pode examinar seu saber no objeto. Mas justamente porque a consciência sabe em geral sobre um objeto, já está dada a distinção entre [um momento de] algo que é, para a consciência, o Em-si, e um outro momento que é o saber ou o ser do objeto para a consciência. O exame se baseia sobre essa distinção que é uma distinção dada. Caso os dois momentos não se correspondam nessa comparação, parece que a consciência deva então mudar o seu saber para adequá-lo ao objeto. Porém, na mudança do saber, de fato se muda também para ele o objeto, pois o saber presente era essencialmente um saber do objeto; junto com o saber, o objeto se torna também um outro, pois pertencia essencialmente a esse saber.

Com isso, vem-a-ser para a consciência: o que antes era o Em-si não é em si, ou seja, só era em si para ela. Quando descobre por- tanto a consciência em seu objeto que o seu saber não lhe corresponde, tampouco o objeto se mantém firme. Quer dizer, a medida do exame se modifica quando o objeto, cujo padrão deveria ser, fica reprovado no exame.

O exame não é só um exame do saber, mas também de seu padrão de medida. (Introdução §85)

Notion and object, the criterion and what is to be tested, are present in consciousness itself, but we are also spared the trouble of comparing the two and really testing them, so that, since what consciousness examines is its own self, all that is left for us to do is simply to look on. For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what for it is the True, and consciousness ot its knowledge of the truth. Since both are for the same consciousness, this consciousness is itself their comparison; it is for this same consciousness to know whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or not. The object, it is true, seems only to be for consciousness in the way that consciousness knows it; it seems that consciousness cannot, as it were get behind the object as it exists for consciousness so as to examine what the object is in itself, and hence, too, cannot test its own knowledge by that standard. But the distinction between the in-itself and knowledge is already present in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. Something is for it the in itself; and knowledge, or the being of the object for consciousness, is, for it, another moment. Upon this distinction, which is present as a fact, the examination rests. If the comparison shows that these two moments do not correspond to one another, it would seem that consciousness must alter its knowledge to make it conform to the object. But, in fact, in the alteration of the knowledge, the object itself alters for it too, for the knowledge that was present was essentially a knowledge of the object: as the knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it essentially belonged to this knowledge. Hence it comes to pass for consciousness that what it previously took to be the in-itself is not an in-itself, or that it was only an in-itself for consciousness. Since consciousness thus finds that its knowledge does not correspond to its object, the object itself does not stand the test; in other words, the criterion for testing is altered when that for which it was to have been the criterion fails to pass the test; and the testing is not only a testing of what we know, but also a testing of the criterion of what knowing is.

So an intervention by us becomes superfluous in this respect, that concept and object, the standard and what is to be assessed, are present in consciousness itself. But not only that, we are also spared the trouble of comparing the two and really assessing them, so that, as consciousness assesses itself, all that remains for us in this respect too is simply to look on. For consciousness is on the one hand consciousness of the object, on the other hand consciousness of itself; consciousness of what to it is the true, and consciousness of its knowledge of the true. Since both are for consciousness , consciousness itself is their comparison; it becomes a matter for consciousness whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or not. The object, admittedly, seems to be for consciousness only as consciousness knows it; consciousness seems unable, as it were, to get behind the scenes to see the object not as it is for consciousness , but as it is in itself , and so unable to assess its knowledge by it. However, the very fact that consciousness knows of an object at all already involves this distinction: to consciousness something is the in-itself , while another moment is the knowledge, or the Being of the object for consciousness. This differentiation is at hand, and the assessment rests upon it. If in this comparison the two do not correspond, then it seems that consciousness must alter its knowledge to make it conform to the object; but in the alteration of the knowledge, the object itself alters for it too, for the existing knowledge was essentially a knowledge of the object: along with the knowledge the object too becomes another, for it essentially belonged to this knowledge. Hence consciousness finds that what it previously took to be the in-itself is not in itself, or that it was in itself only for consciousness . Since consciousness thus finds in its object that its knowledge is at odds with the object, the object itself does not hold out either; or the standard of the assessment alters when that of which it was supposed to be the standard fails the test; and the assessment is not only an assessment of the knowledge, but also of the standard of the assessment. 1

However, from this aspect not only will it be superfluous for us to add anything and not only because concept and object, the standard and what is to be examined, are present in consciousness itself. Rather, we are lifted above comparing the two and conducting a genuine examination such that, while consciousness examines its own self, the only thing that remains to us is purely to look on.7 This is so because consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other hand, it is consciousness of its own self. It is consciousness of what, to it, is the true, as well as consciousness of its knowing of the true. While both are for the same consciousness, consciousness itself is their comparison. It is an issue for that consciousness whether or not its knowing of the object corresponds to the object. To be sure, for consciousness, the object seems to be such only in the manner that consciousness knows it; consciousness seems, as it were, to be incapable of getting behind the object to the object as it is in itself and not as the object is for consciousness. However, consciousness therefore also seems to be incapable in its own self of testing its knowing of the object. Yet precisely because consciousness knows of an object at all, there is already present the difference that something is, to consciousness, the in-itself, but another moment is knowing, or the being of the object for consciousness. It is upon this difference which is present that the testing depends. If, in this comparison, the two do not correspond to one another, then it seems as if consciousness must alter its knowing in order to make it adequate to the object. However, in knowing’s alteration, the object itself is, to consciousness, also in fact altered; for the knowing which is present was essentially a knowing of the object; along with the knowing, the object also becomes something different, for it belonged essentially to this knowing. Thus to consciousness it comes to be the case that what, to it, was previously the in-itself, is not in itself, or that it was in itself only for consciousness. While it therefore finds on its object’s part that its knowing does not correspond to the object, the object itself also does not endure. That is, the standard for the examination is altered when that for which it was supposed to be the standard itself fails the examination, and the examination is not only an examination of knowing but also an examination of the standard of knowing.