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Dafürhalten

quinta-feira 15 de agosto de 2019

Dafürhalten, ὑπόληψις, tomar por, considerar verdadeiro, to deem, to take something as something, hipótese

Como anexo [aos modos de desvelamento], Aristóteles   acrescenta a ὑπόληψις, o tomar por, considerar algo verdadeiro, e a δόξα  , a visão, a opinião. Esses dois modos do ἀληθεύειν   (desvelamento) caracterizam o ser-aí humano em seu ενδέχεται (ter acolhido): ενδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι; na medida em que o ser-aí humano se movimenta nesses modos do desvelamento, ele pode se enganar. A δόξα (opinião) não é simplesmente falsa; ela pode ser falsa; ela pode dissimular o ente, colocar-se diante dele. [GA19  :22; GA19MAC:22]


“Τέχνη arises when there is . . . one ὑπόληψις, a determinate opinion [Dafürhalten], whose object is the καθόλου  .” (Met. 1,1,981a5ff.) In ἐμπειρία  , certainty exists regarding the referential connection. If the ἐμπειρία is consolidated, then out of a repeated looking at the matter in question a ὑπόληψις μία καθόλου develops. Through the many single cases to which Dasein   comports itself in ἐμπειρία in the mode of the “as soon as this, then that,” and through repetition, constantly comporting itself to them in the mode of the “as soon as this, then that,” what is one and the same and consequently the very “what” are extracted and understood (ἐννοεῖσθαι). Beyond the purely temporal   connection, the “what” is disclosed. The εἶδος ἀφορίζεται (cf. a10), “the εἶδος is extracted,” and the matter is now understood κατ’ εἶδος ἕν  , in view of one outward look that persists and constantly recurs. What was given in ἐμπειρία in a wholly provisional understanding is thereby modified: the “as soon as-then” becomes the “if such and such, then so and so,” the “if-then.” This neutral “if” has from the first a quite remarkable meaning: it does not   denote a mere “as soon as” but already a certain “because.” If (and that means, in a certain sense, because) such and such appears, then I have to take these or those steps. In this way, therefore, a more genuine understanding modifies the referential connection. And the understanding becomes more genuine insofar as the outward look of the matter in question is extracted. The understanding is then no longer founded in a pre-presentification of the connection effective in practice, in a retention of the order of succession, but in an actual presentation of the outward look of the thing itself which is to be treated in some way or other. [GA19RS:51-52]

VIDE: Dafürhalten