πάθος   (τό)

GA1   117; GA9   217; GA11   22-4; GA18   4, 119, 121, 124, 140, 161-3, 167-72, 179, 183, 184, 191, 194-7, 199, 202-4, 241-3, 245-50, 261, 326, 355, 391; GA19   456-8, 475, 480, 615; GA22   126, 154, 166; GA24   259; GA31   79; GA33   115, 186, 187, 190; GA34   114, 216, 263; GA36/37 256; GA45   155; GA62   102,135, 203; GA66   320; GA67   134; EC4 32; GA87   99. (HC)

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O termo alemão Stimmung   é um termo que possui um campo semântico deveras peculiar. Traduzido em sua dimensão mais coloquial, o termo indica um “estado de humor”, um “afeto”, uma “disposição”, assim como uma “atmosfera" que se forma em um ambiente ou um “astral” que surge em uma determinada circunstância. O uso heideggeriano do termo procura, por sua vez, retirar da palavra toda e qualquer conotação subjetivista. A Stimmung não é um estado de humor ou uma afecção do sujeito, mas aponta muito mais para uma afinação de todos os elementos que tomam parte em uma situação. Em sua relação com Stimme   (voz) e Stimmen (afinar), a Stimmung indica o estabelecimento de uma afinação harmonizadora. A essa significação acrescentamos o adjetivo “afetivo” apenas porque a Stimmung se abate sobre nós como um afeto, como um pathos. Em verdade, Heidegger traduz mesmo em suas preleções de juventude o termo grego pathos por Stimmung (N.T.). [Casanova  ; GFOposi:50]

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pathos, the second aspect that is a consideration for pistis  , is treated extensively by Aristotle   in the subsequent chapters of Book 2 [Rhetoric]. The expression pathos has multiple meanings at the same time; it has fundamental significance within Aristotelian philosophy. We can list three basic meanings of this expression, and accordingly three concrete contexts that it designates: (1) the average, immediate meaning [durchschnittliche, nächste Bedeutung  ] is that of “variable condition” [veränderliche Beschaffenheit  ]; (2) a specifically ontological meaning, which is important for the understanding of kinesis  : pathos in connection with paschein, what one most often translates as “suffering” [Leiden  ]; (3) a resulting meaning: variable condition in relation to a definite concrete context, variable condition within a definite being-region of life: “passion [Leidenschaft].” pathos in this last   sense is the topic of the Rhetoric and the Poetics.

At first, we will take up the last meaning and, at the same time, the proper context in which the phenomenon designated as pathos is discussed. The context becomes visible in Chapter 4 of Book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics. In this chapter, Aristotle begins the investigation into what arete   genuinely is. The aim of the investigation into the being-character of arete   has, for its immediate task, to set forth what in general arete is to be understood as, and out of which being-contexts it appears: genesis   of arete. Aristotle introduces this investigation with a discussion that is important for us: [citação grega de EN B 4, 1105 b 19 sq.]. pathos belongs, therefore, to that “which comes to be in the soul.” psyche   is the ousia   of a zoon  , it constitutes the being of those beings that are characterized as being-in-their-world [In-seiner-Welt  -Sein  ]. Thus it has being in three distinct modes of its coming to be: pathe, dynameis, hexeis  .

[citação grega de EN B 4 1105 b 21 sq.], and so on, “as a whole, the sort of thing with which hedone and lype are co-given” a definite finding-oneself [Sichbefinden], “being-elevated [Gehobensein],” “being-depressed [Herabgedrücktsein].”

On the other hand  , hexis is, at first, something which characterizes the manner and mode [Art und Weise  ] in which we are in such a pathos. hexis is that in relation to which we are praised or blamed. With respect to the passion, for example, with respect to the fact that we are in a rage, “we are neither praised nor blamed.” The manner and mode in which I am in a rage, in what situation  , on what occasion, against whom—that is what underlies praise or blame, the pos. hexis relates to the pos echomen pros ta pathe, “how we carry ourselves,” “what composure we have,” with such a pathos. pathos is a determinate losing-one’s-composure [Aus-der-Fassung-Kommen  ].

The dynameis relate to those being-determinations of living things [Seinsbestimmungen   des Lebenden] that Aristotle too characterizes as physei ón  : in the possibility of our factical being-there [faktischen Daseins], there are co-given the possibilities of being enraged, of being sad, of being happy, of hating, and so on. These dynameis are also ginomena én tê psyche.

The being-co-given [Mitgegebensein] of pathe as ginomena is important as modes of being itself [Weisen   des Seins selbst  ], and insofar as we are living, as modes of becoming [Weisen des Werdens], relating to being-in-a-world [Sein-in  -einer-Welt], as well as the fact that the pathe have a possible connection with hexis. On the basis of a more precise understanding of what is meant by hexis, we will understand the analysis of the pathe, seeing how what is designated as pathos defines being-in-the-world [Sein-in-der-Welt] in a fundamental sense, and how it comes into consideration as such a basic determination of being-in-the-world with the cultivation of krisis, of “taking-a-position [Stellungnehmens],” of “deciding” [Entscheidens] a critical question. By showing this fundamental role of pathe in krinein   itself, we will also gain the possibility of seeing the basis of logos   itself more concretely. [GA18:167-168; GA18MT:113-114]