Katherine Withy (2019) – Befindlichkeit e vocação

Heidegger analisa tanto a disposição [Befindlichkeit  ] como a compreensão [Verständnis  ], considerando o modo como nos abrem (i) a nós próprios (auto-revelação), (ii) ao mundo como espaço de inteligibilidade possível (revelação do mundo) e (iii) às entidades, inteligíveis como isso e aquilo que são (descoberta). Em resumo, a sua explicação da compreensão é a seguinte: (i) projetamo-nos ou assumimos uma identidade — por exemplo, empresário, avô ou bebedor de café. Esta identidade (ii) serve como um "para-que" (Worumwillen  , cf. hou heneka de Aristóteles  ) que determina e organiza todas as formas possíveis em que as entidades podem ser (significativas para nós) — como úteis, prejudiciais, irrelevantes, etc., para viver a nossa identidade particular. Com base nestas formas possíveis de ser (significativo), nós (iii) damos sentido a coisas particulares como úteis, prejudiciais, irrelevantes e assim por diante. Assim, por exemplo, se eu assumir a identidade de empresário, abre-se para mim o mundo do empreendedorismo, em termos do qual posso descobrir (entre outras coisas) capital de risco, linhas de crédito e desastres de relações públicas.

Mas, em primeiro lugar, por que razão assumo o projeto de ser empresário? Porque não o de empregado de escritório, ou de pai ou mãe que fica em casa, ou de funileiro de quintal? Obviamente, os meus talentos e aptidões adequam-se a algumas identidades e não a outras — e algumas identidades podem ser excluídas por outras identidades que já assumi. Mas porque é que assumi essas identidades em primeiro lugar? E porque é que escolho esta identidade do conjunto daquelas para as quais sou adequado? Faço-o porque sou chamado a fazê-lo. As nossas identidades são vocações (L. vocare, chamar, convocar) — não necessariamente no sentido em que são as nossas vocações mais profundas e verdadeiras, mas pelo menos no sentido em que "falam" conosco. (Se, por exemplo, a minha profissão ou o meu gênero socialmente atribuído não me falam desta forma, então trata-se apenas de um papel social que habito e não de uma identidade que projeto). O fato de me sentir chamado a uma vocação é necessário para que eu me projete nessa forma de ser eu. Caso contrário, não haveria razão para que a minha projeção se apoderasse de uma identidade em vez de outra.

Heidegger analyzes both finding and understanding by considering how they open us (i) to ourselves (self-disclosing), (ii) to the world as a space of possible intelligibility (world-disclosing), and (iii) to entities, intelligible as that and what they are (discovering). In brief, his account of understanding is this: (i) we project ourselves onto, or take up, some identity—such as entrepreneur, grandparent, or coffee drinker. This identity (ii) serves as a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ (Worumwillen, cf. Aristotle’s hou heneka) that determines and organizes all the possible ways in which entities can be (meaningful to us)—as useful for, detrimental to, irrelevant to, etc., living out our particular identity. On the basis of these possible ways of being (meaningful), we (iii) make sense of particular things as useful, detrimental, irrelevant and so on. Thus, for example, if I take up the identity of entrepreneur, the world of entrepreneurship opens up for me, in terms of which I can discover (among other things) venture capital, lines of credit, and public relations disasters.

But why do I take up the project of being an entrepreneur in the first place? Why not   that of office worker, or stay-at-home parent, or backyard tinkerer? Obviously, my talents and aptitude suit me to some identities and not others—and some identities might be ruled out by other identities I have already taken up. But why did I take up those identities in the first place? And why do I pick this identity from the suite of those to which I am suited? I do so because I am called to. Our identities are vocations (L. vocare, to call, to summon)—not necessarily in the sense that they are our deepest, truest callings, but at least in the sense that they ‘speak’ to us. (If, for example, my profession or my socially-given gender does not speak to me in this way, then it is merely a social role that I inhabit and not an identity onto which I project). Finding myself called to a vocation is necessary for me to project myself onto that way of being me. Otherwise, there would be no reason for my projecting to seize upon one identity rather than another.

The call to a vocation is delivered by the call of conscience. Conscience is introduced in Division II of BT to show that it is [156] existentielly possible to relate to death authentically. As an instance of disclosing, conscience involves finding, understanding, and discoursing. It is discoursing insofar as it is a call—although one that speaks silently and without determinate words or content. It does not chide us for some infraction but summons us to ourselves: it calls us from our authentic being to some possible way of being us, upon which we resolve. Resolutely projecting onto this possibility of being is hearing the summons of conscience and is the understanding moment of conscience’s disclosing. Heidegger argues that when this projecting is carried out in anticipation of death, it is most fully itself and the case of Dasein   projecting is authentic.

There are many possibilities of being, or identities, available to take up from the public world. How is it decided which of these we are to resolve upon? Despite Heidegger’s voluntaristic language in this chapter, the identity that we take up is not chosen but given, and so found: “On what is it [sc. Dasein] to resolve? Only the resolution itself can give the answer” (SZ   298). What we resolve upon is given—and given in the resolution itself. It is given as that which has already made a claim on us, that which has already called us to resolve upon it. Even, and perhaps especially, when we go through a long deliberative period about who to be and which identities to take up, what we describe as the final moment of choice is (to a greater or lesser degree) experienced as a moment of being chosen—of receiving a call that “comes from me and yet from beyond me ” (SZ 275).

To receive a call like that of a vocation is to hearken (horchen ) to it (cf. SZ 163). While to hear is to understand (SZ 163) (and this is why hearing the call of conscience is resolute projecting), to hearken is to listen, to receive, to prick one’s ears up at the call and allow oneself to be addressed. I suggest that this hearkening is the finding moment in conscience. As hearkening, finding is our being open to being addressed, called, summoned. We can also think it as a tuning or attuning (Gestimmen ): hearkening to the call of our vocation is a matter of becoming in tune (richtig gestimmt ) with ourselves. By tuning (stimmen ) us to our vocation, finding is self-disclosing.

But what about the fact that we find ourselves not only called to take up a particular identity but already stuck with identities? Some of [157] these are identities we are already projecting upon, and some of these (such as gender, race, and social standing) are or can be identities that we find thrust upon us by our community. Indeed, we find ourselves already having been issued not only some of our identities but also our aptitudes and talents, as well as our bodies, our histories, our time and place, and so on. Is this a different type of finding—not finding ourselves called, but finding ourselves stuck with something? No; it is a variety of finding ourselves called. For what we find ourselves stuck with is what Heidegger calls our ‘facticity’ (SZ 56). Whereas present-at-hand   objects are simply possessed of facts (Tatsachen ), such as their dimensions, weight, and spatial location, we—as cases of Dasein—are possessed of Facts (Fakten ) (SZ 56), such as being short, being overweight, and being in Chicago—as well as being good at math, being a woman, and having gone to boarding school. Fakten are different from Tatsachen in that the former figure in our self-interpreting. This means that they are identities or vocations that we are given and that we must take up—that we must be—in one way or another.4 If we do not find something as such a calling, then it is a mere fact rather than a Fact and so irrelevant to our lives. It follows that, for self-interpreting entities like us, what we find given to us to deal with is a species of what we find called to take up. Thus we can say generally that to be self-finding is to find ourselves called to a vocation, in the broadest possible sense.