Stambaugh (1991:50-52) – tempo existencial em Heidegger (II)

Com os termos "ek-stase  " e "espaço horizontal de jogo", chegamos a uma análise mais técnica e, ao mesmo tempo, ao cerne da concepção de temporalidade de Heidegger. Veremos também que, enquanto Heidegger afirma maioritariamente que a autenticidade é uma modificação da inautenticidade, no caso da temporalidade, a temporalidade autêntica é, sem exceção, afirmada como mais primordial do que a temporalidade inautêntica. Se começarmos com a concepção do tempo como uma série de pontos-agora, que é a concepção vulgar e inautêntica, nunca chegaremos à temporalidade ek-stásica e horizontal, a concepção autêntica.

O termo "ek-stase", que na linguagem comum parece particularmente adequado ao vocabulário de um adolescente demasiado entusiasta, tem para Heidegger um significado muito preciso. É cognato com o termo "existência"; ambos significam literalmente [51] "destacar-se". O que é que ek-sist, destacar-se, significa? Aqui a conhecida e sugestiva afirmação de Sartre  , "Existo meu corpo", pode ser útil. Embora a frase não seja gramatical e seja invulgar, uma vez que Sartre está a usar um verbo intransitivo transitivamente, podemos ter uma noção intuitiva do que ele quer dizer. "Existo meu corpo" significa que vivo nesse corpo da forma mais concreta e íntima possível. Não posso, de forma alguma, escapar-lhe, embora possa, até certo ponto, transcendê-lo; por exemplo, quando as pessoas funcionam apesar da dor. Heidegger exprime este fato ao falar da existência que sou e tenho de ser. Não posso mudar de ideias e "começar de novo" como outro alguém. O termo "existência" torna-se, nos últimos escritos de Heidegger, ex-portação (Austrag  ) e estar-dentro-de (Inständigkeit  ). Ex-portação [portar-para-fora], uma palavra bastante invulgar, significa manter-se fiel a alguma coisa, suportá-la. Isto não tem de ter conotações negativas, mas tem conotações intensas. Os períodos de grande alegria também têm de ser "ex-portados".

In order to distance himself from the conception of time as a string of now-points, Heidegger introduces such concepts as the datability and significance of time and speaks of its ecstatic and horizonal character.

We set forth datability as the first essential factor of time taken care of. It is grounded in the ecstatic constitution of temporality. The ‘now’ is essentially a now-that. . . . The datable now that is understood in taking care, although not   grasped as such, is always appropriate or inappropriate. Significance belongs to the now-structure. Thus we called time taken care of world time. In the vulgar interpretation   of time as a succession of nows, both datability and significance are lacking. The characterization of time as pure sequence does not let these two structures ‘appear.’ The vulgar interpretation of time covers them over. The ecstatic and horizonal constitution of temporality in which datability and significance of the now are grounded, is levelled down by this covering over. The nows are cut off from these relations, so to speak, and, as thus cut off, they simply range themselves along after one another so as to constitute the succession. (SZ §81)

Datability and significance get away from the conception of time as uniform and quantitative. The ‘now’ of world time is a ‘now it is time for lunch,’ ‘now it is time to go home.’ The ‘now’ is not a uniform, indifferent ‘now’ interchangeable with any other ‘now,’ but is filled with a qualitative content. This content gives to the ‘now’ its significance. The more datability and significance are involved in the experience of time, the more the idea   of quantitative measurement and calculation simply drops away. Time becomes the experience itself, not the measurement of the experience.

With the terms “ecstatic” and “horizonal” we arrive at a more technical analysis and at the same time at the heart of Heidegger’s conception of temporality. We shall also see that, whereas Heidegger mostly states that authenticity is a modification of inauthenticity, in the case of temporality authentic temporality is without exception stated to be more primordial than inauthentic temporality. If you start out with the conception of time as a series of now-points, which is the vulgar, inauthentic conception, you will never get to ecstatic and horizonal temporality, the authentic conception.

The term “ecstatic,” which in common parlance seems particularly suited to the vocabulary of an overenthusiastic teenager, has for Heidegger a very precise meaning. It is cognate with the term “existence;” both mean literally [51] “to stand out.” What does ek-sist, standing out, mean? Here Sartre’s well-known, suggestive statement, “I exist my body,” can be helpful. Even though the sentence is ungrammatical and unusual, since Sartre is using an intransitive verb transitively, we can have some intuitive sense of what he means. “I exist my body” means that I live in that body in the most concrete and intimate way possible. I can in no way escape it, although I can to some extent transcend it; for example, when people function in spite of pain. Heidegger expresses this by speaking of the existence that I am and have to be. I cannot change my mind and “start over” as someone else. The term “existence” becomes in Heidegger’s later writings perdurance (Austrag) and standing-within (Inständigkeit). Perdurance, a rather uncommon word, means to stick with something, to bear it. This need not have negative connotations, but it does have intense ones. Periods of great joy also have to be “perdured.”

The term “horizonal” is mostly used in conjunction with “ecstatic” and simply refers to the specific direction, context and finitude of any temporalizing. Both terms, ecstatic and horizonal, serve to indicate what, for lack of a better word, I shall call the “dimensionality” of being. This is not a term used by Heidegger himself, but the idea is there in Being and Time   and emerges more significantly in later writings, particularly in On Time and Being [Durchmessung, literally, “measuring through.”].

I stated that for Heidegger instead of being what is measured, time is rather what does the measuring. Here “measuring” is not meant in a quantitative, calculative sense, but qualitatively and, above all, constitutively. Temporality does not measure something objectively present already there, but first constitutes dimensions. This is Heidegger’s way of elucidating something so close to us that we mostly do not even see it; we just take it for granted. That is what Heidegger means by Da-sein  , being there, being-in-the-world as opposed, for example, to the way the animal is in its environment. The animal has a very restricted sense of time. If I tie up a dog in front of the local supermarket, I cannot say to him: “I’ll be out in fifteen minutes.” As far as the dog is concerned, I am leaving for [52] good. Worse yet, if I go on vacation, I cannot leave him in the kennel and say: “I’ll be back in three weeks.” All the poor dog can do is hope.