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Richardson (2003:44-46) – Dasein (There-being)

terça-feira 28 de novembro de 2023, por Cardoso de Castro

tradução parcial

Qual é a concepção inicial do ser-aí? Vimos como o ser-aí é concebido como uma compreensão de ser que é radicalmente finita. É, então, um fenômeno completamente ontológico (não antropológico), qualquer que seja a sua relação com o homem. O que quer que se diga dele será uma consequência deste caráter ontológico. A existência, assim entendida, é concebida como uma "irrupção" (Einbruch) na totalidade dos entes, em razão da qual esses entes enquanto entes se tornam manifestos. "Com base na [sua] compreensão de ser, o homem é o Aí através de cujo ser a irrupção manifestativa entre os entes tem lugar. …" [GA3  :206] Em outras palavras, o ser-aí é o Aí do ser entre entes — ele deixa-ser (manifestar) entes, tornando assim possível qualquer encontro com eles.

original

What is the initial conception of There-being ? We have seen how There-being is conceived as a comprehension of Being that is radically finite. It is, then, a completely ontological (not   anthropological) phenomenon, whatever may be its relation to man. Whatever is to be said of it will be a consequence of this ontological character. Existence, thus understood, is conceived as an “irruption” (Einbruch) into the totality of beings, by reason of which these beings as beings become manifest. “On the basis of [his] comprehension of Being, man is the There through whose Being the manifestive irruption among beings takes place. …” [1] In other words, There-being is the There of Being among beings — it lets beings be (manifest), thereby rendering all encounter with them possible. It follows, then, that, correlative to the referential dependence of There-being on beings, there is a dependence of beings on There-being that they be (manifest). In letting beings be (manifest), however, There-being obviously does not “create” them but only dis-covers (ent-decken) them as what they are. What about beings before There-being discovers them? The question cannot be asked, as long as one restricts oneself to the focus of sheer phenomenology. In any case, this mutual dependence between beings and There-being is in fact only an explicitation of what we said before about Being as a correlate of There-being [2] Hence the There-being, rather than a mere synonym for man, is essentially a coming-to-pass that takes place in man. Of course, this poses problems. If There-being takes place in man, what is the precise relation between the two? For that matter, what man are we talking about? There is an obscurity, then, [46] not only concerning the relationship between There-being and Being but concerning the relationship between There-being and man — all the more, then, between Being and man. If one retains a purely ontological (vs. anthropological) interpretation   of There-being, one can see that Jean Beaufret  ’s question becomes plausible, even inevitable: “How give a sense to the word ‘humanism’?” [CartaH:56]

Ver online : William J. Richardson

[RICHARDSON, W. J. H. Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought. New York: Fordham University Press, 2003, p. 44]

[1] “Auf dem Grunde des Seinsverständnisses ist der Mensch das Da, mit dessen Sein der eröffnende Einbruch in das Seiende geschieht,. ..” (GA3:206).

[2] SZ:219-221].

If it is by the irruption among beings of existence that these beings become manifest, then there is no difficulty in understanding how There-being “lets” these beings be (seinlassen). In letting them be manifest, it “liberates” them from concealment, [45] hence renders them free. We are prepared for Heidegger’s notion of liberty, at first so disconcerting. Liberty is liberation, sc. letting-be, hence not primarily an “act of the will” but a purely ontological process of the same order as, in fact identical with, There-being as transcendence [GA3:206; GA9].

But what is the precise relationship between There-being and man ? To be sure, the relationship is intimate. The entire problematic of fundamental ontology arises out of an attempt to explain the ontological structure of man which renders possible his natural penchant for metaphysics. We have seen how There-being is a comprehending of Being which is intrinsically finite, and which is the source of unity between the Being-question and the finitude of man who poses it. If fundamental ontology is not an anthropology, it is and remains an interrogation of There-being insofar as this is the ontological structure of man in his intrinsic finitude. It will be easy, then, to see why There-being is spoken of so often as the equivalent of man [GA3:13, 205-206]. It is perfectly understandable, too, why the author insists so strongly that There-being is always “mine,” to the extent that he will designate “mine-ness” as the second (after existence) fundamental characteristic of There-being [SZ:42-43].

But it could be exceedingly misleading to reduce this intimacy between There-being and man to the simple identification of There-being and the individual, still more to consider the ontological dimension as a property of man, more precisely of his intellect. Rather, the There-being is the ontological structure of man, ontologically prior (ursprünglicher) to man, and it is the finitude of There-being as an intrinsically finite comprehension of Being that is the ground of the finitude of man: “… more original than man is the finitude of There-being in him.”[[“… Ursprünglicher als der Mensch ist die Endlichkeit des Daseins in ihm.” (GA3:207). Heidegger italicizes whole.