Heidegger, fenomenologia, hermenêutica, existênciaWe can now consider some central Heideggerian terminology. First, note that Heidegger speaks of investigating our own Being (27/7). It would be more conventional to speak of our nature or our essence, rather than our Being. In fact, we usually distinguish between the nature of something (its essence) and its Being (its existence). A dragon can be defined in its essence as a large, fire-breathing reptile; its existence is another matter altogether. But Heidegger treats both of these issues as issues about Being. Of course, he is well aware of the usual distinction, which he often calls the difference between "what-Being" (what something is) and "that-Being" (the fact that something is). But this is another traditional distinction that needs to be reconsidered and can be called into question. Maybe the "that-Being" and the "what-Being" are not so distinct, after all. The particular difference it makes that there is an entity rather than nothing (the meaning of the entity’s existence) may be linked to what type of entity it is (its essence). Maybe what it means to exist for an entity with the nature of a rock is very different from what it means to exist for an entity with the nature of a person . Rocks and humans may have different ways of being present, of being there.
This brings us to Heidegger’s most important terminological innovation — the expression Dasein . This word is usually left untranslated. In everyday German it parallels our word "existence", but etymologically it means "Being-there". (Stambaugh , following Heidegger’s instructions for future translations, hyphenates the word. The spelling "Da-sein " emphasizes the root meaning.) Heidegger uses this term to refer to us, the entities who have an understanding of Being.
Why not just use the word "man" or "human beings"? In general, Heidegger doubtlessly wants to avoid the tired old term "man" and invent a new usage, in order to get us to look at ourselves with fresh eyes. We are to conceive of ourselves in new ways, and challenge the prejudices of millennia of philosophy, psychology and anthropology. Why "Dasein" in particular, then? When he first introduces the word "Dasein" (27/7) Heidegger gives no explanation of why he has chosen it, but his reasons appear, directly or indirectly, as the text goes on:
(a) We should notice that this noun Heidegger uses to designate us is the infinitive form of a verb. This suggests that what is distinctive about us is something more like an activity or process than like any sort of thing.
(b) It is not just any activity or process that characterizes us, but a way of Being. Our sort of Being, our mode of existing, is what marks us out. As I just suggested, our way of existing is qualitatively different from the way in which a rock exists. As Heidegger will shortly put it, the term Dasein is "purely an expression of [our way of] Being" (33/12). Dasein’s "Being-what-it-is (essentia ) must… be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia )" (67/42). Thus, Dasein is "a very specific expression of Being which is here chosen for an entity, whereas [normally we] name an entity in terms of its what-content and leave its specific Being undetermined, because we hold it to be self-evident".
© Which way of Being distinguishes us? Being there. Of course, a rock is "there" in the sense that it has a spatial location. But we are "there" in a much — richer sense: we inhabit a world, we are capably engaged in a meaningful context. It makes a difference to me that I am climbing this mountain, in this country, in this year — but to the mountain it makes no difference at all where or when it exists, because it is oblivious to all beings. We have a "there" as no other entity does, because for us, the world is understandable. Much of Being and Time will be devoted to exploring this phenomenon.
(d) Furthermore, we are "Being there" in the sense that Dasein is in such a way as to be its ’there’ " (171/133) — an odd assertion, and one that we will be prepared to absorb only when we have looked more closely at the concept of a world. But to anticipate the results of Heidegger’s investigation, it is not just that we happen to be in a world, a "there" — rather, our "there" is so essential to us that we would be nothing at all without it. Conversely, it would be nothing without us. The world of Germany in 1927, for instance, as this particular world with all its meaning and structure, could not be what it was without the Germans of 1927; conversely, the Germans of 1927 would not have been who they were without that world. Our world is the context in terms of which we understand ourselves, and within which we become who we are. As José Ortega y Gasset puts it, "I am myself plus my circumstance".
(e) There is one more sense of "Dasein", a sense that Heidegger stresses in his later work: we are the "there" of or for Being. In other words, we are the site that Being requires in order (literally) to take place. Without Dasein, other entities could continue to be, but there would be no one to relate to them as entities. Their Being would have no meaning at all.
To review: in order to discover the meaning of Being in general, we are going to look at our own way of Being, Dasein’s way of Being. We can tentatively say that what is distinctive about Dasein is the way it exists, the way it is enmeshed in its world, its "there". Our existence in a "there" somehow implies an understanding of Being — and allows us to raise questions about Being, as Heidegger is now doing.
At this point, Heidegger considers an objection that strikes at the heart of his method (27/7). We are trying to understand Being by examining Dasein — but how can we grasp Dasein’s particular way of Being unless we already understand Being in general? Heidegger’s entire project seems circular.
Throughout Being and Time, Heidegger is in dialogue with objections that he poses to himself. This particular objection is a persistent one; he will raise it again on 194-5/152-3 and 362-3/314-15. In fact, this type of objection is fundamental, because it can be raised against any philosophical quest. In Plato ’s Meno, for instance, the impatient Meno tires of trying to discover what virtue is. "How will you look for it, Socrates , when you do not know at all what it is?. . . If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?" The trouble is that in order to search for something, you must already be acquainted with that for which you are searching.
Socrates answers Meno with a myth: he tells him that we knew all things before we were born, and now we are just trying to remember them. The truth in this myth is that we can know something vaguely without knowing it clearly. When we philosophize, we try to get a clear understanding of something that is already vaguely familiar. This is exactly what Heidegger is doing when he asks the question of the meaning of Being. Thus, on the basis of a vague understanding of Being in general, we will clarify our understanding of our own Being and use this understanding, in turn, to clarify our understanding of Being in general.
Although in §2 Heidegger claims "there is no circle at all" in his approach (27/7), he is more accurate when he says that although there is a circle, it is not a vicious circle (194/153). The important thing "is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way" (195/153), "to leap into the ’circle’" (363/315). The circle would be sterile and vicious if Heidegger began by setting down a definition of Being at large, or of our own Being, and then used the definition to prove dogmatic claims. Instead, he will begin with a general account of Dasein’s Being which he will then refine and reinterpret in the course of his investigation. He constantly returns to his previous descriptions and reconceives them, trying to make them more accurate and nuanced. We can thus think of Being and Time as having a spiral structure: each turn around the "circle" reaches a deeper level.
Since the question of circular reasoning leads to the question of how human understanding in general works, we will revisit this issue when we have gone farther into Heidegger’s account of Dasein.
