McNeill (1999:4-6) – segunda concepção do desejo de ver

A interpretação desta curiosidade quotidiana como um desejo apenas de ter visto já aponta para uma segunda concepção possível [da vontade de ver], que seria a do desejo filosófico de ver, tal como representado pela história da ontologia ou da metafísica. Esta vontade procuraria, de fato, ver, mas desta vez numa forma de apreensão não sensorial, e fá-lo-ia para compreender ou conhecer a verdade. Nessa medida, não seria mera curiosidade; não procuraria apenas ter visto, mas precisamente agarrar-se ao seu objeto, assegurar a sua visão, permanecer na pura contemplação da verdade. Esta segunda forma de desejo difere da primeira, portanto, não apenas na sua orientação, mas no seu desejo de permanecer na presença do seu objeto.

The interpretation   of this everyday curiosity as a desire only to have seen already points to a second possible conception [of the will to see], which would be that of the philosophical desire to see, as represented by the history of ontology or metaphysics. This desire would indeed seek to see, but this time in a nonsensory manner of apprehending, and would do so in order to understand or gain knowledge of the truth. To that extent it would not   be mere curiosity; it would not seek merely to have seen, but precisely to hold fast to its object, to secure its vision, to remain in pure contemplation of the truth. This second form of desire differs from the first, therefore, not only in its directedness, but in its desire to remain in the presence of its object. Yet in another respect this philosophical desire may be nothing other than [5] a reflection, or the repetition on another level, of the everyday tendency. [1] For it remains, first, a desire to see; and, second—as we shall indicate in a moment—a desire to have seen. Moreover, with the emergence of this kind of understanding, a priority of vision or of the visual metaphor comes to impose itself in the domain of human knowledge: the seat of knowledge is ultimately located in the "eye of the soul" (omma tes psyches) referred to by Plato   and Aristotle  .

It seems that Heidegger, in this section on curiosity, provides us with a sketch of the initial genesis   not only of curiosity, but also of philosophical knowledge. It is when our everyday concern with worldly things is interrupted, writes Heidegger, when we rest or take a break from things, that the vision (Sicht  ) pertaining to our everyday circumspection (Umsicht) becomes freed. Ontologically, this means that care then becomes a tarrying alongside these worldly things; it seeks to see them merely in their "outward appearance" (Aussehen) (SZ  , 172).

Now this "freeing" of vision that Heidegger describes here is not yet that of a developed philosophical desire (it does not yet seek the nonsensible idea   or eidos  ); but nor is it as yet the desire that characterizes curiosity, for a description of the latter, without any further account of its genesis, is introduced only in the subsequent paragraph bearing the reservation "however" (aber). Curiosity is the opposite of a tarrying alongside: it is a nontarrying that brings about "the continual possibility of dispersion [Zerstreuung  ]" (SZ, 172). In other words, this initial account of the desire to see the world merely in its look is not yet a description of curiosity, if the latter is to be understood as a desire merely to see, for it has not yet [6] been interpreted in contrast to possible knowledge of the world, in terms of possible truth. Only then can this phenomenon be regarded as the desire only or merely to see, as opposed to "grasping" and "being knowingly in the truth."