BRENTANO  , Franz (1838-1917).

At the end of the 19th century, ‘scientific’ philosophy in all of its directions was pervaded by the theme of consciousness. It has an explicit awareness of its connection with Descartes  , who was the first to identify consciousness, res cogitans  , as the basic theme of philosophy. It is difficult to see through this philosophy of the turn of the century to all of its particulars. This is not   the place to pursue the particular connections; it is irrelevant for our inquiry. Let us note only that since 1840 an Aristotelian tradition   has been an active force within this movement. It was founded by Trendelenburg. It arose from the opposition to Hegel   and began as a way of assimilating the historical research by Schleiermacher   and Böckh into the field of Greek philosophy. Dilthey   and BRENTANO are students of Trendelenburg. GA20EN   §4

Franz BRENTANO was a student in Berlin at the end of the sixties, where he first studied Catholic theology. His first work was on Aristotle  . He sought to interpret Aristotle against the horizon   of medieval philosophy, above all that of Thomas Aquinas. Such an interpretation   is the distinguishing mark of this work, which is not to say that this is really the way to understand Aristotle. On the contrary, through this kind of interpretation Aristotle essentially undergoes a drastic reinterpretation. But that is not the crucial issue. What is important is that BRENTANO himself, through his preoccupation with Greek philosophy, arrived at some more original horizons for his philosophical inquiry. Personal difficulties with Catholic belief, in particular the mystery of the Trinity and, in the seventies, the declaration of the infallibility of the Pope, forced him to leave this intellectual world. But he took with him some well-defined horizons and a reverence for Aristotle, and now moved into the current of a free and unrestricted philosophical science. GA20EN §4

The way out of the tradition was traced for him by Descartes. BRENTANO’s work thus reveals a unique blend of Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophizing and modern Cartesian inquiry. He makes the philosophical goal of a science of consciousness his own. But the decisive move is to be found in BRENTANO’s Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint (1874). Here for the first time he detaches himself from the tendency to transpose the methods of natural science and physiology into the exploration of psychic life. Characteristic for the direction of his thought is the thesis   of his inaugural dissertation (1866): Vera methodus philosophiae non alia est nisi scientiae naturalis (“The true philosophical method is none other than that of the natural sciences”). It would be wrong to interpret this thesis as a call to transpose the methods of natural science into philosophy. The thesis rather means that philosophy has to proceed in its field exactly as the natural sciences do in theirs, namely, it has to draw its concepts from its own matters. This thesis is not a proclamation in favor of a brute transfer of scientific methodology into philosophy but the opposite: the exclusion of the methodology of natural science and the call to proceed in philosophy as the natural sciences do in their field—with a fundamental regard for the character of the subject matters in question. GA20EN §4

BRENTANO thus tried to provide the foundations for the science of consciousness, of lived experiences, of the psychic in the broadest sense, by accepting the actual elements just as they are given in this field. He did not begin with theories about the psychic, about the soul itself, about the connection of the psychic with the physiological and biological. Instead, he first clarified what it is that is given when one speaks of the psychic, of lived experiences. His major work, Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint (1874), is divided into two books. The first book discusses psychology as a science and the second addresses psychic phenomena in general. ‘Empirical’ here does not mean inductive in the sense given to it by the natural sciences, but rather drawn from the subject matter, without constructions. The first thing, therefore, is to characterize the psychic phenomena themselves, to order their multiplicity according to basic structures; hence the task of a ‘classification.’ ‘Classification’ means dividing and ordering actual elements which are already given. Ordering is always done from a point of view, as everyone says. Point of view is that toward which I look, with regard to which I make certain distinctions in a domain of subject matter. This regard or point of view can vary in kind. I can order a given manifold of objects with regard to a devised scheme; I can imagine that there are very general processes which run from within to without and others which proceed from without to within, and order the psychic phenomena from this point of view. Second, the point of view can be taken from the objective context which bears a connection with that which is itself to be ordered, in the manner that I order psychic processes with regard to physiological relationships. The attempt was accordingly made to define even thinking and willing in terms of phenomena of neural kinetics. Third, the point of view can itself be drawn from the actual elements to be ordered. No principle is superimposed upon them; it is rather drawn from the actual elements themselves. This is the real maxim which BRENTANO follows in his classification: “The order of lived experiences must be natural.” An experience must be assigned to a class to which it belongs in accordance with its nature. ‘Nature’ here means that which is what it is, as seen from itself. When it is genuine, a classification can be made only “from a prior familiarity with the objects,” “from the study of the objects.” I must have prior familiarity with the objects, their basic structures, if I am to order them properly, in accord with the subject matter or object. The question therefore arises, what is the nature of psychic phenomena compared with the physical? This is the question posed by BRENTANO in the first book on psychology. He says that psychic phenomena differ from all physical phenomena by nothing so much as by the indwelling in them of something objective. Accordingly, if there are to be distinctions within the field of psychic phenomena, they must be distinctions with respect to the basic structure of this indwelling, distinctions in the way in which something is objective in these lived experiences. These differences in how something is objective in the various lived experiences, the represented in representing, the judged in judging, the willed in willing, accordingly form the principal distinctions of classes among the psychic phenomena. This basic structure of the psychic, whereby something objective inheres in each lived experience, is called intentional   inexistence by BRENTANO. GA20EN §4

Intentio is a Scholastic expression which means directing itself toward. BRENTANO speaks of the intentional inexistence of the object. Each lived experience directs itself toward something in a way which varies according to the distinctive character of the experience. To represent something after the manner of representing is a different self-directing than to judge something after the manner of judging. BRENTANO expressly emphasizes that Aristotle already made this point of view the basis for his treatment of psychic phenomena, and that the Scholastics took over this phenomenon of intentionality. GA20EN §4

Regarding this basic structure of psychic phenomena, BRENTANO divides the various ways of self-directedness toward their particular objects into three basic classes of psychic comportment: representation, judgment, and interest. “We speak of a representing wherever something appears,” wherever something is simply given and the simply given is perceived. Representing in the broadest sense is the simple having of something. BRENTANO interprets judging as “an accepting as true or a rejecting as false.” In contrast to merely having something, judging is taking a definite position toward the represented as represented. BRENTANO designates the third class with different titles: interest, love, emotion. “This class for us shall include all psychic appearances which are not contained in the first two classes.” He emphasizes that a proper expression for these acts of taking an interest in something is lacking. It was later also called ‘valuing,’ or better yet, ‘worth-taking.’ GA20EN §4

Using this basic division of psychic experiences as a guide, BRENTANO seeks to exhibit the basic structure of representing, judging, and emotions. Regarding the relationship of these phenomena, BRENTANO laid down the following basic thesis: Every psychic phenomenon is itself either a representation or is based upon representations. “This representing forms the basis of judging just as it does of desiring and every other psychic act. Nothing can be judged, but also nothing can be desired, nothing can be hoped or feared, if it is not represented.” Hence the simple having of something assumes the function of a basic comportment. Judging and taking an interest are possible only if something is represented, which gets judged, in which an interest is taken. BRENTANO operates not only in mere description but tries to set off this division from the traditional one in a critical examination which we will not pursue any further. GA20EN §4

Thus a completely new movement was initiated in psychology and philosophy, a movement which already had an effect upon the American psychology of that time, upon William James, who gained influence in Germany and all of Europe, and from James back upon Henri Bergson  , whose theory of the immediate data of consciousness (Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, 1889) accordingly goes back to the ideas of BRENTANO’s psychology. His idea   of a descriptive psychology had a profound impact upon Dilthey. In his Academy essay of 1894, “Ideas toward a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology,” Dilthey sought to make such a psychology the basic science among the human sciences. The truly decisive aspect of the development of BRENTANO’s way of questioning is to be seen in the fact that BRENTANO became the teacher of Husserl  , the subsequent founder of phenomenological research. GA20EN §4

Husserl himself was originally a mathematician. He was a student of Weierstrass and wrote a mathematical dissertation for his degree. What he heard of philosophy did not go beyond what any student picked up in the lecture courses. What Paulsen said was reliable and clear, but nothing apt to inspire Husserl to regard philosophy as a scientific discipline. It was only after he graduated that Husserl attended the courses of the man who was then much discussed. BRENTANO’s passion for questioning and reflection impressed Husserl so strongly that he remained with BRENTANO for two years, from 1884 to 1886. BRENTANO provided the decisive turn to the scientific direction which Husserl’s work was to take. His wavering between mathematics and philosophy was resolved. Through the impression which BRENTANO as teacher and researcher made upon him, Husserl espied, within the unproductive philosophies of the time, the possibility of a scientific philosophy. Characteristically, Husserl’s philosophical efforts did not begin with some contrived and far-fetched problem. Rather, in accord with the course of his own scientific development, he began to philosophize upon the foundation which he already had. Accordingly, his philosophical reflection, now guided by BRENTANO’s methodology, turned toward mathematics. GA20EN §4

At first, he was concerned with what was traditionally called the logic of mathematics. For Husserl, this meant not only the theory of mathematical thought and knowledge. The first theme of his reflections was the analysis of the structure of the objects of mathematics—number. A work on the concept of number written under Stumpf, BRENTANO’s very first student, in Halle at the end of the eighties qualified Husserl as an academic lecturer. This work, understood as an actual investigation of the matters at issue, became possible upon the basis provided by BRENTANO’s descriptive psychology. But soon Husserl’s questioning extended into matters of principle and his investigations advanced to the fundamental concepts of thinking as such and of objects in general. It grew into the problem of a scientific logic in close conjunction with reflection upon the methodological ways and means for the correct exploration of the objects of logic. This meant a more radical conception of what was already advanced in BRENTANO’s descriptive psychology, as well as a basic critique of the contemporary confusion of psychological-genetic inquiry with logical inquiry. This work on the fundamental objects of logic occupied Husserl for more than twelve years. The initial results of this effort form the content of the work which appeared in two volumes in 1900–1901 under the title Logical Investigations. This work marks the initial breakthrough of phenomenological research. It has become the basic book of phenomenology. The personal history of its origin is a story of continual despair, and does not belong here. GA20EN §4

We want to consider intentionality first, precisely because contemporary philosophy then and even now actually finds this phenomenon offensive, because intentionality is precisely what prevents an immediate and unprejudiced reception of what phenomenology wants to do. Intentionality was already alluded to in our account of how BRENTANO sought to classify the totality of psychic phenomena in strict accord with it. BRENTANO discerned in intentionality the structure which constitutes the true nature of a psychic phenomenon. Intentionality thus became for him the criterion for the distinction of psychic from physical phenomena. But at the same time this structure is the criterion and principle of a natural division among psychic phenomena themselves, inasmuch as it is already found in the essence which appears in these phenomena. BRENTANO expressly emphasizes that he is only taking up what Aristotle and the Scholastics were already acquainted with. It was through BRENTANO that Husserl learned to see intentionality. GA20EN §5

In the popular philosophical literature, phenomenology tends to be characterized in the following manner: Husserl took over the concept of intentionality from BRENTANO; as is well known, intentionality goes back to Scholasticism; it is notoriously obscure, metaphysical, and dogmatic. Consequently, the concept of intentionality is scientifically useless and phenomenology, which employs it, is fraught with metaphysical presuppositions and therefore not at all based upon immediate data. Thus, in “The Method of Philosophy and the Immediate,” H. Rickert writes: GA20EN §5

Especially where the concept of ‘intentionality,’ Scholastic in origin but mediated by BRENTANO, plays a role, there the concept of the immediate still seems to be left largely unclarified and the train of thought of most phenomenologists seems steeped in traditional metaphysical dogmas, which make it impossible for its adherents to see impartially what is before their very eyes. GA20EN §5

This article contains a fundamental polemic against phenomenology. Elsewhere also, and right in the Introduction to the new edition of BRENTANO’s Psychology by O. Kraus, it is stated that Husserl had simply taken over BRENTANO’s concept of intentionality. For the Marburg School as well, intentionality remained the real stumbling block, obstructing its access to phenomenology. GA20EN §5

We expressly reject such opinions, not in order to preserve Husserl’s originality against BRENTANO, but to guard against having the most elementary considerations and steps necessary for the understanding of phenomenology thwarted in advance by such characterizations. GA20EN §5

In the reception of intentionality as well as in the way in which BRENTANO was interpreted and developed, everyone saw not so much the exposition of this composition of the structure of lived experience as what they suspected in BRENTANO: metaphysical dogmas. The decisive thing about Husserl was that he did not look to the dogmas and presuppositions, so far as these were there, but to the phenomenon itself, that perceiving is a directing-itself-toward. But now this structure cannot be disregarded in the other forms of comportment as well. Rickert makes this the basis of his argument and disputes seeing such a thing in these comportments. He reserves intentionality for the comportment relating to judgment but drops it for representing. He says representing is not knowing. He comes to this because he is trapped in dogmas, in this case the dogma that my representing involves no transcendence, that it does not get out to the object. Descartes in fact said that representing (perceptio) remains in the consciousness. And Rickert thinks that the transcendence of judging, whose object he specifies as a value, is less puzzling than the transcendence which is in representing, understood as getting out to a real thing. He comes to this view because he thinks that in judgment something is acknowledged which has the character of value and so does not exist in reality. He identifies it with the mental which consciousness itself is, and thinks that value is something immanent. When I acknowledge a value, I do not go outside of consciousness. GA20EN §5

The essential point for us is not to prove that Rickert is involved in contradictions, that he now uses the phenomenological concept of representing and now a mythical one from psychology. The point is rather that he lays claim to intentionality in his own starting point to the extent that it fits his theory but casts it aside when it contravenes his theory that representing is not knowing. What is characteristic is that, in spite of all the sagacity, the most primitive of requirements is nevertheless missing: admission of the matters of fact as they are given. The thinking thus becomes groundless. The constraint of the facts cannot in one case be heeded and in others not; heeded when they fit into a preconceived theory and not heeded when they explode it. A typical example of this kind of thinking is Rickert’s theory of knowledge and of judgment as it takes its starting point from BRENTANO. We shall review it in order to see how judgments depend upon the apprehension of the matters themselves. GA20EN §5

Rickert takes from BRENTANO the definition   of judgment as acknowledging. We can trace the exact place where he makes use of intentionality as exhibited by BRENTANO and at the same time shuts his eyes to it and falls into theory construction. Let us briefly recall the theory which he bases upon BRENTANO’s account of judgment. GA20EN §5

Hence Rickert arrived at this theory not from a study of the matters themselves but by an unfounded deduction fraught with dogmatic judgments. The last   vestige of the composition of this matter is solely what Rickert took from BRENTANO. But even here it is questionable whether it is brought to bear upon the full composition of judgment. “When we characterize judgment as a comportment which is not like representation, this does not mean that, with BRENTANO, we see in it another kind of relation of consciousness to its objects than the kind involved in representation. This claim is for us far too full of presuppositions.” Here Rickert rejects intentionality, in BRENTANO’s sense, as a criterion distinguishing the comportments of representation and judgment. What does he put in its place? How does he define and ground the distinction? GA20EN §5

One would have to be blind not to see that this is word for word the position of BRENTANO, who wanted nothing other than to subdivide the genus of psychic processes according to the mode of our comportment, whether we contemplate them impassively or take an active interest in them. Rickert first takes his theory from a basis which is exposed by BRENTANO’s description but does not see that he lays claim to intentionality as the foundation of his theory of judgment and knowledge. The proof for this is that while he lays claim to this descriptive distinction Rickert at the same time employs a concept of representation which runs counter to that which he uses as a basis for securing the definition of judgment, here impassive directing-itself-toward—accordingly representing as the manner of representing—and there representation as the represented, where the represented is in fact the content of consciousness. Wherever Rickert refutes the idealism of representation and wants to prove that knowing is not representing, he does not restrict himself to the direct and simple sense of representing but bases himself upon a mythical concept. Rickert says that as long as the representations are only represented, they come and go. Representing is now not direct representational comportment; the representations now get represented. “A knowing that represents needs a reality independent of the knowing subject because with representations we are capable of apprehending something independent of the knowing subject only by their being images or signs of a reality.” In such a concept of representation it can of course be shown that representing is not a knowing if the directing-itself-toward can tend only toward signs. GA20EN §5

How is this analysis of intentionality different from BRENTANO’s? In intentionality BRENTANO saw the intentio, noesis  , and the diversity of its modes, but not the noema, the intentum. He remained uncertain in his analysis of what he called “intentional object.” The four meanings of the object of perception—the perceived—already indicate that the sense of ‘something’ in the representation of something is not transparently obvious. BRENTANO wavers in two directions. On the one hand  , he takes the “intentional object” to be the entity itself in its being. Then again it is taken as the how of its being-apprehended unseparated from the entity. BRENTANO never clearly brings out and highlights the how of being-intended. In short, he never brings into relief intentionality as such, as a structural totality. But this further implies that intentionality, defined as a character of a certain entity, is at one with the entity; intentionality is identified with the psychic. BRENTANO also left undiscussed just what intentionality is to be the structure of, since his theory of the psychic assumed its traditional sense of the immanently perceptible, the immanently conscious along the lines of Descartes’s theory. The character of the psychic itself was left undetermined, so that that of which intentionality is the structure was not brought out in the original manner demanded by intentionality. This is a phase which phenomenology has not yet overcome. Even today intentionality is taken simply as a structure of consciousness or of acts, of the person  , in which these two realities of which intentionality is supposed to be the structure are again assumed in a traditional way. Phenomenology—Husserl along with Scheler  —tries to get beyond the psychic restriction and psychic character of intentionality in two very different directions. Husserl conceives intentionality as the universal structure of reason (where reason is not understood as the psychic but as differentiated from the psychic). Scheler conceives intentionality as the structure of the spirit or the person, again differentiated from the psychic. But we shall see that what is meant by reason, spirit, anima   does not overcome the approach operative in these theories. I point this out because we shall see how phenomenology, with this analysis of intentionality, calls for a more radical internal development. To refute phenomenological intentionality, one cannot simply criticize BRENTANO! One thus loses touch with the issue from the very beginning. GA20EN §5

There was a tendency in logic to take the laws of thought as laws of the psychic processes of thought, of the psychic occurrence of thought. In opposition to this misunderstanding, Husserl, like BRENTANO, showed that the laws of thought are not the laws of the psychic course of thinking but laws of what is thought; that one must distinguish between the psychic process of judgment, the act in the broadest sense, and what is judged in these acts. Distinction is made between the real intake of the acts, the judging as such, and the ideal  , the content of the judgment. This distinction between real performance and ideal content provides the basis for the fundamental rejection of psychologism. To the extent that phenomenology works in this direction in logic against psychologism or naturalism, it was from the beginning safeguarded from the naturalistic misunderstanding. However, it must be noted that in this demarcation in the phenomenon of judgment—judged content as ideal being or valid being on the one hand and real being or the act of judgment on the other—the distinction between the real and the ideal being of judgment is indeed confronted, but that precisely the reality of this real aspect of acts is left undetermined. The being of the judgment, its being an act, that is, the being of the intentional, is left unquestioned, so that there is always the possibility of conceiving this reality in terms of psychic processes of nature. The discovery, or better the rediscovery of the ideal exerted a fascination, cast a spell, as it were, while on the other side, the acts and processes were relegated to psychology. The elaboration of the pure field here simply led once again to norms, as we saw, without raising the central question. GA20EN §13