GA18:297 – aí-não-se-é – ser-ausente

He (Aristotle) refers to a new phenomenon of being, στέρησις.¹ He obtains it from beings that are characterized as being-absent, and that are “in themselves non-being.” This non-being is a being καθ’ αύτό μή ον.² Negation is a position. When we say that non-being is a way of being, it sounds formal-dialectical. But one must see that it is interpreted on the basis of the sense of being: non-being in the sense of a definite there, the there of absence. On the basis of this being-that-is-not, the there is in the character of a determinate being-absent, from which “something can become,”³ that is, with the help of this peculiar non-being, “becoming,” μεταβολή, can become intelligible. Aristotle himself sees that this is a surprising claim by contrast with the previous one. He says: “One is surprised by it, and maintains that it is impossible for something to come from out of non-being,”⁴ insofar as one initially says that non-being is nothing, and from out of nothing, nothing can come. (p. 202)