Let us sum up this point. The habilitation [of Heidegger] already betrays its phenomenological proclivity of backtracking to facticity in three clearly identifiable ways: 1) in the shift in the locus   of truth from judgment to simple apprehension, with simple apprehension already understood not   just as an empirical but more basically as a categorial intuition, or in Lask’s more nonvisual term, categorial immersion (Hingabe  ); 2) in the movement from a modus   cognoscendi activus to a more rudimentary noetic form of intentional   consciousness on the level of life itself, a modus essendi activus (the scholastics sometimes called this precognitive noetic act of immediacy, which is correlative to the immediate givenness of reality, intellectus   principiorum, an immediate understanding of the primary intelligibles of being, one, true, good; it is clearly the precursor to Dasein  ’s preontological understanding of being); 3) in the movement from form to matter or, more precisely, to the more basic “principle of the material determination of form [PMDF].” Look carefully at PMDF, of matter determining and differentiating form. It is simply a specification of the maxim of phenomenology: “Away from forms, back to the matters themselves.” What forms? What matters? Forms of thought, like “values.” Matters of life, like history. This at least will be the direction in which Heidegger applies PMDF three years later, in the opening hours of KNS   1919 [GA56-57  ], in order to free phenomenology itself from its residual neo-Kantianism, beginning with his own. [KisielBT]