Do noein   se diz que é noema  : o que é tomado com atenção num captar atento. [GA7   214]

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Husserl   insists that it is necessary to distinguish between the particular psychic act of thinking (what he latter calls ‘noesis’) and the objective content of thought (the latter called ‘noema ). Take a simple mathematical proposition, say, 2 x 2 = 4. The content expresses an ideal   and objective necessity, which is, as such, independent of the real act of thinking that content. The truth of this proposition is not   governed by the factical thinking of a psyche  . Rather, it must govern the factical thinking of any psyche. If noesis and noema are different things, where does the sameness of the latter come from? The identity of noema cannot derive from the mind, but from the ideal object itself. Here, what is at stake is absolute and a priori   validity, and this does not stem from thought but from the object of thought. When I assert a true proposition, I assert its ideal essence, valid for all cases and eternally. Truth is either absolute or is no truth at all. This is Husserl’s response to those who embraced psychologism. They wanted to make truth relative and dependent on the human being that thinks it. But truth is unitary and identical, ‘it does not hang   somewhere in the void, but is a case of validity in the timeless realm of Ideas’ (HU XVIII, 136/Log. Inv. 1, 149). From the psychologistic point of view, human beings are completely bounded by the factical conditions in which they come to existence. Husserl, on the contrary, strives to show that human beings are not a mundane fact but the place of reason and truth, that is to say, they are transcendental   subjectivity. …… The principle of the material determination of form implies that categories have no meaning apart from their correlate, that is, the intuition of the represented object. If one leaves aside the relation to a subject, the logical clarity of the object becomes unintelligible. Here, reference to Husserl is crucial for understanding the conformity between judgement and object. The noema, i.e. the meaningful content of what is given, is nothing but the object itself insofar as it is apprehended in the secunda intentio   of reflection. In contrast to prima intentio, in secunda intentio consciousness is not directed towards ‘the real object in its immediate reality, but towards its own content’ (GA1  , 279). In this way, validity is no longer an irreducible transcendental category; it is grounded in intentionality: ‘intentionality is the category that defines the logical domain’ (GA1, 279), that is to say, it is ‘the moment at which an order is determined and which characterizes the domain of logic’. [EscuderoHEQB]