koinon  , κοινόν, comum, common, público, koinonia, κοινωνία, comunidade

Aristotle   has recourse to the being-determination of human beings as ζῷον λóγον ἔχον  . He wants to show that the πóλις, a characteristic way of being-together, is not   brought to humans by chance, but rather that the πóλις is the being-possibility, φύσει, that itself lies enclosed and traced out in advance in the human being’s genuine being. Consequently, the πóλις arises out of a definite being-with-one-another that, for its part, is grounded in a having-with-one-another of something, in the specific sense of a κοινωνία of συμφέρον and of ἀγαθóν. The definite, circumscribed possibility of a distinctive being-with-one-another that is expressed through the πóλις is grounded in the having-with-one-another of the world with these determinations. And Aristotle endeavors to make precisely the κοινωνία ἀγαθóν itself intelligible on the basis of the being of human beings. Therefore, the κοινωνία ἀγαθóν must be led back to the being of human beings. This referring back directs Aristotle in such a way that he goes back to the phenomenon of λóγος. It is shown that the κοινωνία which forms the household (οἰκία) is only possible on the ground of λέγειν  , on the basis of the fact that the being of the human being is speaking with the world—expressing itself, speaking with others. Speaking is not primarily and initially a process that other human beings may join in on later, so that only then would it become a speaking with others. Rather, speaking is, in itself and as such, self-expressing, speaking-with-one-another where others are themselves speaking; and therefore speaking is, according to its being, the fundament   of κοινωνία. We must come to a better understanding of this by clarifying how it comes about that, in fact, λóγος is that which is able to constitute the having-with-one-another of the ἀγαθóν.

Aristotle touches on this in a context where he wants to establish that the human being is a ζῷον   πολιτικóν. In this context, he has recourse to the being of animals, and posits the ζῷον λóγον ἔχον as compared with a ζῷον that has only φωνή. He endeavors to show that life is already constituted through φωνή; that, furthermore, what is living in this way has a being that is fundamentally determined as being-with-one-another; and that animals are already, in a certain way, ζῷα πολιτικά. Human beings are only μᾶλλον ζῷον πολιτικóν than are (e.g., bees). By virtue of this demarcation from the being of animals, constituted through φωνή, the peculiar way of being that is determined by λóγος will become more precisely characterized. [Heidegger, GA18  :49-50]