διαλεκτική, dialektike  , dialectique, dialética, dialectic

Aristotle   makes a distinction in Metaphysics Book 4, Chapter 2 between διαλεκτική, σοφιστική, and φιλοσοφία  . [Met. Γ 2, 1004 b 17 sqq.] He says: “σοφιστική and διαλεκτική are concerned with the same issues as is φιλοσοφία  ,” [Met. Γ 2, 1004 b 22 sq.] but φιλοσοφία   distinguishes itself from both of them in its way of approaching these issues, namely, in the way it deals with the same object. It differs from διαλεκτική “in the mode of the possibility” [Met. Γ 2, 1004 b 24] to which it lays claim. “Διαλεκτική makes a mere attempt” [Met. Γ 2, 1004 b 25] to ascertain that which could be meant by the λόγοι, a διαπορεύεσθαι τους λόγου  ς, [Cf. Plato  , Sophist 253 b 10.] as Plato says, a “running through” of that which could perhaps be meant. That is the sense of Greek dialectic. The δύναμις   of διαλεκτική is, in contrast to philosophy, a limited one. Still, διαλεκτική is geared toward the matter, toward the laying out of that which is meant; as σοφιστική speaks about the same matter, “it appears” to be philosophy “but it is not  .” [Met. Γ 2, 1004 b 26] Indeed διαλεκτική is serious, but it is only the seriousness of an attempted investigation of what ultimately could be meant. In this sense, we are treating of philosophy in the mode of investigating what ultimately could be meant. What is decisive is that we come to a preliminary understanding of that which is meant by philosophy. [GA18  :5-6]

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O legein é o fio condutor para a conquista das estruturas do ser do ente que vem-de-encontro no dizer de e no dizer que. Por isso, a ontologia antiga, que se forma em Platão, torna-se "dialética". (SZ   25)

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VIDE: Dialektike

VIDE διαλεκτική

Aristotle makes a distinction in Metaphysics Book 4, Chapter 2 between διαλεκτική, σοφιστική, and φιλοσοφία. He says: “σοφιστική and διαλεκτική are concerned with the same issues as is φιλοσοφία,” but φιλοσοφία distinguishes itself from both of them in its way of approaching these issues, namely, in the way it deals with the same object. It differs from διαλεκτική “in the mode of the possibility” to which it lays claim. “Διαλεκτική makes a mere attempt” to ascertain that which could be meant by the λóγοι, a διαπορεύεσθαιτοὺς λóγους, as Plato says, a “running through” of that which could perhaps be meant. That is the sense of Greek dialectic. The δύναμις of διαλεκτική is, in contrast to philosophy, a limited one. Still, διαλεκτική is geared toward the matter, toward the laying out of that which is meant; as σοφιστική speaks about the same matter, “it appears” to be philosophy “but it is not.” Indeed διαλεκτική is serious, but it is only the seriousness of an attempted investigation of what ultimately could be meant. In this sense, we are treating of philosophy in the mode of investigating what ultimately could be meant. What is decisive is that we come to a preliminary understanding of that which is meant by philosophy. [GA18MT]