Rhetorik  , retórica, Rhetoric, Rhétorique, ῥητορική  

How, from Aristotle   himself, can we get the idea   that speaking-being was the basic phenomenon of Greek being-there and in what way it was? We are in a favorable situation   since we possess a Rhetoric of Aristotle’s, which surveys the phenomena that are assigned to speaking. Here, it must be noted that rhetoric, as a reflection on speaking, is older than the Aristotelian Rhetoric. In Aristotle’s works, there is also handed down to us the rhetoric ad Alexandrum. It does not   come from Aristotle. The most likely supposition is that it is pre-Aristotelian, and it is attributed to Anaximenes   by Spengel. Genuine reflection on speaking is traced back to two Sicilian orators, Teisias and Korax. Aristotle was the first to carry out such a reflection. That is no accident, but is grounded in the fact that Aristotle has at his disposal the right concrete view and the cultivated conceptuality for λέγειν   itself, and for all phenomena that come to language therewith. The question is: In what way is λέγειν the basic determination of being-there itself in the concrete mode of its being in its everydayness? We will take up a few characteristic chapters of the Rhetoric, and thus inquire back as to what is shown, on this basis, regarding being-there itself insofar as it does not explicitly reside in discourse. For these ways of discourse, which are expounded there, are only determinate possibilities that are already traced out in the everydayness of being-there.

What does rhetoric mean, generally speaking? In what sense does rhetoric have to with λέγειν? Aristotle defines rhetoric in Book 1, Chapter 2 as a δύναμις  . [Rhet. Α 2, 1355 b 25.] This definition   is asserted despite the fact that Aristotle more often designates it as τέχνη  . This designation is ungenuine, while δύναμις is the genuine definition. “Ῥητορική is the possibility of seeing what is given at the moment; what speaks for a matter that is the topic of discourse, the possibility of seeing at each moment what can speak for a matter.” [Rhet. Α 2, 1355 b 25 sq.] A δύναμις: I already said that the expression τέχνη, which is used from time to time, does not come into play as the basic definition. Rhetoric is δύναμις insofar as it sets forth a “possibility,” a possibility to speak in definite ways. Rhetoric as such does not have the task of πεῖσαι. [Rhet. Α 1, 1355 b 10] It does not have to cultivate a definite conviction about a matter, to set it to work with others. Rather, it only sets forth a possibility of discourse for those that speak, insofar as they are resolved to speak with πεῖσαι as their aim. The ῥήτωρ is a δυνάμενος, specifically, a δυνάμενος θεωρεῖν  —and not πεῖσαι—“to see” περὶ ἕκαστον τὸ πιθανóν. Just as the thief is one that can λάθρᾳ λαμβάνειν. But βούλεσθαι belongs to the genuineness of the way of being of a thief, namely, that a thief chose to steal. Still, the δύναμις of ῥητορική is different from that of σοφιστική. Σοφιστική   is also a mode of knowing-one’s-way-around discourse, but it is not ἐν τῇ δυνάμει. Instead, it is ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει [Rhet. A 1, 1355 b 18]. Ῥητορική is maintained ἐν δυνάμει. It cultivates a possibility for the one who wants to convince, a possibility that cultivates in itself the ability-to-see that which speaks for a matter; while it belongs to the sense of σοφιστική to convince another unconditionally. This definition, in contrast with the old definition, πειθοῦς δημιουργóς, is much more cautious. It does not include reaching the τέλος   of speaking. [GA18  :113-115]

rhétorique
rhetoric

NT: Rhetoric (Rhetorik), (125), 138, 341-342. See also Being-with; Communication; Everydayness; Fear; Hermeneutics; Idle talk; Political; Public [BT]