Hinterhersein, being-after, ἐφίεσθαι, ὄρεξις  

“It appears that every τέχνη   (knowing-one’s-way-around [Sichauskennen] something, in a definite mode of concern [Besorgen  ]; the shoemaker understands how one makes a shoe, he knows his way around in it), every knowing-one’s-way [Auskenntnis  ] in a concern, every μέθοδος  , every pursuing-of-a-matter [Einer-Sache  -Nachgehen], being-on-the-way [Auf  -dem-Wege-Sein  ] after a matter (yet again, a mode of being-oriented, of knowing-one’s-way-around) — in the same way, the concern and the occupying oneself [Sichvornehmen] with something that is to be settled, that is to be brought to an end through concern — all these modes of knowing-one’s-way-around and of concern about something, appear to be after some good [Gut  ].” [1] This ἐφίεσθαι, this “being-after,” [Hinterhersein] belongs to its being itself. As knowing-one’s-way-around, concern about something has an ἀγαθόν within itself, explicitly there. Concern is not   something different than, and so only accidentally, a being-after. [GA18MT  :47]

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Insofar as the human being lets something be said, he is λóγον ἔχον   [logon echon] in a new respect. He lets something be said insofar as he hears. He does not hear in the sense of learning something, but rather in the sense of having a directive for concrete practical concern. This ability-to-hear is a determination of ὄρεξις [orexis]. Aristotle   designates λóγον ἔχον in this second sense as also ἄλογον [alogon  ]. The ὄρεξις is not speaking without qualification, but hearing. [GA18:111; GA18MT:76]

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LÉXICO: Hinterhersein