SZ:42 – “Eu sou” – “Tu és”

(Desta caracterização da presença) resultam duas coisas:

1. A “essência” deste ente está em ter de ser. A quididade (essentia) deste ente, na medida em que dela se possa falar, há de ser concebida a partir de seu ser (existência). Neste propósito, é tarefa ontológica mostrar que, se escolhemos a palavra existência para designar o ser deste ente, esta não tem e nem pode ter o significado ontológico do termo tradicional existentia. Para a ontologia tradicional, existentia designa o mesmo que ser simplesmente dado, modo de ser que não pertence à essência do ente dotado do caráter de presença. Evita-se uma confusão usando a expressão interpretativa ser simplesmente dado para designar existentia e reservando-se existência como determinação ontológica exclusiva da presença.

A “essência” da presença está em sua existência. As características que se podem extrair deste ente não são, portanto, “propriedades” simplesmente dadas de um ente simplesmente dado que possui esta ou aquela “configuração”. As características constitutivas da presença são sempre modos possíveis de ser e somente isso. (85) Toda modalidade de ser deste ente é primordialmente ser. Por isso, o termo “presença”, reservado para designá-lo, não exprime a sua quididade como mesa, casa, árvore, mas sim o ser.

2. O ser, que está em jogo no ser deste ente, é sempre meu. Neste sentido, a presença nunca poderá ser apreendida ontologicamente como caso ou exemplar de um gênero de entes simplesmente dados. Pois, para os entes simplesmente dados, o seu “ser” é indiferente ou, mais precisamente, eles são de tal maneira que o seu ser não se lhes pode tornar nem indiferente nem não indiferente. Dizendo-se a presença, deve-se também pronunciar sempre o pronome pessoal, devido a seu caráter de ser sempre minha: “eu sou”, “tu és”. (p. 85-86)

(De cette caractérisation du Dasein) résultent deux choses :

1) L’« essence» de cet étant tient dans son (avoir) à-être ⁴. La quiddité (essentia) de cet étant doit, pour autant qu’on en puisse même parler, se concevoir à partir de son être (existentia). Dans ces conditions la tâche ontologique va justement consister à montrer que lorsque nous choisissons de désigner par existence l’être de cet étant, ce terme n’a pas et ne peut avoir la signification ontologique qu’a le terme traditionnel existentia·, suivant la tradition ontologique existentia équivaut à être-là-devant, un genre d’être qui est, par définition, incompatible avec l’étant qui a le caractère du Dasein. Pour éviter la confusion nous emploierons toujours à la place du terme existentia l’expression interprétative être-là-devant et nous attribuerons existence en tant que détermination d’être au Dasein et à lui seul.

L’« essence » du Dasein tient dans son existence. En conséquence les caractères qui peuvent être relevés sur cet étant ne sont pas des (73) « qualités » là-devant d’un étant là-devant ayant l’« air » de ceci ou de cela, ce sont au contraire chaque fois pour lui des manières possibles d’être, et rien que cela. Tout être-tel de cet étant est d’abord et avant tout être. Par suite le terme Dasein par lequel nous désignons cet étant n’exprime pas sa quiddité, comme le feraient table, maison, arbre mais au contraire l’être ⁵.

2) L’être dont il y va pour cet étant dans son être est chaque fois à moi. Le Dasein ne se conçoit donc jamais ontologiquement comme un cas et un exemplaire d’un genre d’étant au sens d’étant là-devant. Pour cet étant-là son être est « indifférent » ou plus exactement il « est » de telle sorte que son être ne peut lui être ni indifférent ni non-indifférent. Pour aborder le Dasein il faut, compte tenu du caractère d’être-chaque-fois-à-moi de cet étant, en passer toujours par le pronom personnel et dire : « je suis », « tu es » ⁶. (p. 73-74)

(This way of characterizing Dasein) has a double consequence:

1. The ‘essence’ [“Wesen”] of this entity lies in its “to be” (Zu-sein), Its Being-what-it-is (Was-sein) (essentia) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia). But here our ontological task is to show that when we choose to designate the Being of this entity as “existence” (Existenz), this term does not and cannot have the ontological signification of the traditional term “existentia”ontologically, existentia is tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is essentially inappropriate to entities of Dasein’s character. To avoid getting bewildered, we shall always use the Interpretative expression “presence-at-hand” for the term “existentia”, while the term “existence”, as a designation of Being, will be allotted solely to Dasein.

The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not ‘properties’ present-at-hand of some entity which ‘looks’ so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that.

All the Being-as-it-is (So-sein) which this entity possesses is primarily Being. So when we designate this entity with the term ‘Dasein’, we are expressing not its “what” (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being.

2. That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine. Thus Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an (68) instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand.⁷ To entities such as these, their Being is ‘a matter of indifference’ ;⁸ or more precisely, they ‘are’ such that their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite. Because Dasein has in each case mineness (Jemeinigkeit), one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: ‘I am’, ‘you are’. (p. 67-68)

(From this characteristic of Dasein) two things follow:

1. The “essence” [“Wesen”] of this being lies in its to be. The whatness (essentia) of this being must be understood in terms of its being (existentia) insofar as one can speak of it at all. Here the ontological task is precisely to show that when we choose the word existence for the being of this being, this term does not and cannot have the ontological meaning of the traditional expression of existentia. According to the tradition, existentia ontologically means being present (Vorhandensein), a kind of being which is essentially inappropriate to characterize the being which has the character of Dasein. We can avoid confusion by always using the interpretive expression objective presence (Vorhandenheit) for the term existentia, and by attributing existence (Existenz) as a determination of being only to Dasein.

The “essence” [“Wesen”] of Dasein lies in its existence (Existenz). The characteristics to be found in this being are thus not present “attributes” of an objectively present being which has such and such an “outward appearance,” but rather possible ways for it to be, and only this. All being, one way or another, of this being is primarily being (sein). Thus the term “Dasein,” which we use to designate this being, does not express its what-as in the case of table, house, tree — but rather being (Sein).

2. The being (Sein) which this being (Seienden) is concerned about in its being (Sein) is always my own. Thus, Dasein is never to be understood ontologically as a case and instance of a genus of beings objectively present. To something objectively present its being is a matter of “indifference,” [“gleichgultig”], more precisely, it “is” in such a way that its being can neither be indifferent nor non-indifferent to it. In accordance with the character of always-being-my-own-being (Jemeinigkeit), when we speak of Dasein, we must always use the personal pronoun along with whatever we say: “I am,” “you are.”

(Aus dieser Charakteristik des Daseins) ergibt sich ein Doppeltes:

1. Das »Wesen« dieses Seienden liegt in seinem Zu-sein. Das Was-sein (essentia) dieses Seienden muß, sofern überhaupt davon gesprochen werden kann, aus seinem Sein (existentia) begriffen werden. Dabei ist es gerade die ontologische Aufgabe zu zeigen, daß, wenn wir für das Sein dieses Seienden die Bezeichnung Existenz wählen, dieser Titel nicht die ontologische Bedeutung des überlieferten Terminus existentia hat und haben kann; existentia besagt ontologisch soviel wie Vorhandensein, eine Seinsart, die dem Seienden vom Charakter des Daseins wesensmäßig nicht zukommt. Eine Verwirrung wird dadurch vermieden, daß wir für den Titel existentia immer den interpretierenden Ausdruck Vorhandenheit gebrauchen und Existenz als Seinsbestimmung allein dem Dasein zuweisen.

Das »»Wesen« des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz. Die an diesem Seienden herausstellbaren Charaktere sind daher nicht vorhandene »Eigenschaften« eines so und so »aussehenden« vorhandenen Seienden, sondern je ihm mögliche Weisen zu sein und nur das. Alles Sosein dieses Seienden ist primär Sein. Daher drückt der Titel »Dasein«, mit dem wir dieses Seiende bezeichnen, nicht sein Was aus, wie Tisch, Haus, Baum, sondern das Sein.

2. Das Sein, darum es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein geht, ist je meines. Dasein ist daher nie ontologisch zu fassen als Fall und Exemplar einer Gattung von Seiendem als Vorhandenem. Diesem Seienden ist sein Sein »gleichgültig«, genau besehen, es »ist« so, daß ihm sein Sein weder gleichgültig noch ungleichgültig sein kann. Das Ansprechen von Dasein muß gemäß dem Charakter der Jemeinigkeit dieses Seienden stets das Personalpronomen mitsagen: »ich bin«, »du bist«. (p. 42)