SZ:42-43 – propriedade e impropriedade

A presença se constitui pelo caráter de ser minha, segundo este ou aquele modo de ser. De alguma maneira, sempre já se decidiu de que modo a presença é sempre minha. O ente, em cujo ser, isto é, sendo, está em jogo o próprio ser, relaciona-se e comporta-se com o seu ser, como a sua possibilidade mais própria. A presença é sempre sua possibilidade. Ela não “tem” a possibilidade apenas como uma propriedade simplesmente dada. E porque a presença é sempre essencialmente sua possibilidade ela pode, em seu ser, isto é, sendo, “escolher-se”, ganhar-se ou perder-se ou ainda nunca ganhar-se ou só ganhar-se “aparentemente”. A presença só pode perder-se ou ainda não se ter ganho porque, segundo seu modo de ser, ela é uma possibilidade própria, ou seja, é chamada a apropriar-se de si mesma. Os dois modos de ser propriedade e impropriedade ambos os termos foram escolhidos em seu sentido rigorosamente literal — fundam-se em a presença determinar-se pelo caráter de ser sempre minha. A impropriedade da presença, porém, não diz “ser” menos e nem tampouco um grau “inferior” de ser. Ao contrário, a impropriedade pode determinar toda a concreção da presença em suas ocupações, estímulos, interesses e prazeres. (p. 86)

Et le Dasein est encore à moi dans chaque manière d’être, celle-ci ou celle-là. Toujours s’est déjà en quelque façon décidé de quelle manière le Dasein est chaque fois à moi. L’étant pour qui il y va en son être de cet être même, se rapporte à son être comme à sa possibilité la plus propre. Le Dasein est chaque fois sa possibilité et ne l’« a » pas seulement à la façon dont on a simplement en sa possession un étant là-devant. Et parce qu’il tient à la nature du Dasein d’être chaque fois sa possibilité, cet étant peut en son être se « choisir », se trouver lui-même, il peut se perdre c’est-à-dire soit ne jamais se trouver, soit ne se trouver que pour le « semblant ». S’être perdu, il ne le peut, et ne s’être pas encore trouvé, il ne le peut aussi que dans la mesure où par essence il a la possibilité d’être proprement, c’est-à-dire d’être à soi. Les deux modes d’être que sont là propriété et l’impropriété — ces expressions sont des choix terminologiques à prendre au pied de la lettre — se fondent en ce que le Dasein se détermine principalement par l’être-chaque-fois-à-moi. L’impropriété du Dasein ne signifie pourtant pas une sorte de « moindre » être ou un niveau d’être « dégradé ». Au contraire l’impropriété peut déterminer le Dasein dans ce qu’il a de plus concret, dans son activité, son émotivité, l’intérêt qu’il prend aux choses, ce dans quoi il trouve son plaisir. (p. 74)

Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine (je meines). That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a property (eigenschaftlich), as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic — that is, something of its own¹ — can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) -are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness.² But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any ‘less’ Being or any ‘lower’ degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity — when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment. (p. 68)

Dasein is my own, to be always in this or that way. It has somehow always already decided in which way Dasein is always my own. The being which is concerned in its being about its being is related to its being as its ownmost possibility. Dasein is always its possibility. It does not “have” that possibility only as a mere attribute of something objectively present. And because Dasein is always essentially its possibility, it can “choose” itself in its being, it can win itself, it can lose itself, or it can never and only “apparently” win itself. It can only have lost itself and it can only have not yet gained itself because it is essentially possible as authentic, that is, it belongs to itself. The two kinds of being (Seinsmodi) of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) and inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) — these expressions are terminologically chosen in the strictest sense of the word — are based on the fact that Dasein is in general determined by always being-mine. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify a “lesser” being or a “lower” degree of being. Rather, inauthenticity can determine Dasein even in its fullest concretion, when it is busy, excited, interested, and capable of pleasure.

Und Dasein ist meines wiederum je in dieser oder jener Weise zu sein. Es hat sich schon immer irgendwie entschieden, in welcher Weise Dasein je meines ist. Das Seiende, dem es in seinem Sein um dieses selbst geht, verhält sich zu seinem Sein als seiner eigensten Möglichkeit. Dasein ist je seine Möglichkeit und es »hat« sie nicht nur noch eigenschaftlich als ein Vorhandenes. Und weil Dasein wesenhaft je seine Möglichkeit ist, kann dieses Seiende in seinem Sein sich selbst »wählen«, gewinnen, es kann sich verlieren, bzw. nie und nur »scheinbar« gewinnen. Verloren haben kann es sich nur und noch nicht sich gewonnen haben kann es nur, sofern es seinem Wesen nach mögliches eigentliches, das heißt sich zueigen ist. Die beiden Seinsmodi der (43) Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit — diese Ausdrücke sind im strengen Wortsinne terminologisch gewählt — gründen darin, daß Dasein überhaupt durch Jemeinigkeit bestimmt ist. Die Uneigentlichkeit des Daseins bedeutet aber nicht etwa ein »weniger« Sein oder einen »niedrigeren« Seinsgrad. Die Uneigentlichkeit kann vielmehr das Dasein nach seiner vollsten Konkretion bestimmen in seiner Geschäftigkeit, Angeregtheit, Interessiertheit, Genußfähigkeit. (p. 42-43)