Vamos agora considerar o que pode ser descrito como uma investigação genealógica no sentido nietzschiano. Como sabemos, a genealogia dá respostas a perguntas sobre a origem. Uma investigação desse tipo, conduzida adequadamente, insiste na diferenciação rigorosa entre ancestrais bons e ruins e, portanto, fornece o modelo de uma disciplina crítica em uma agenda normativa. A oposição entre bom e ruim corresponde à oposição entre nobre e comum. Tradicionalmente, a genealogia pertencia ao arsenal intelectual de pessoas que queriam estabelecer que sua árvore genealógica remontava a origens nobres em tempos antigos. No entanto, ela também é útil para aqueles que querem confirmar sua suspeita de que o surgimento de uma determinada “dinastia” tem suas características obscuras. Não é de surpreender que a perspectiva genealógica possa ter aplicações metafóricas até certo ponto. Nietzsche, em particular, aprimorou a genealogia em uma ferramenta afiada para avaliar tradições culturais.
Aplicado à origem das atitudes teóricas em geral e às ciências em particular, pensar genealogicamente significa investigar se essas grandes ideias realmente vieram do bom histórico que nunca se cansaram de reivindicar para si. Será que a questão da origem já foi suficientemente examinada em relação à teoria? É possível que, quando começarmos a examinar os fenômenos mais de perto, encontremos influências suspeitas e misturas duvidosas na árvore genealógica da filosofia?
We shall now consider what might be described as a genealogical investigation in the Nietzschean sense. As we know, genealogy gives answers to questions about origin. A properly conducted investigation of this kind insists on strict differentiation between good and bad ancestry and thus provides the model of a critical discipline in a normative agenda. The opposition of good and bad corresponds to the opposition of noble and common. Genealogy traditionally belonged to the intellectual armory of people who wanted to establish that their family tree dated back to noble beginnings in olden times. It is also useful, however, for those who want to confirm their suspicion that the rise of a particular “dynasty” has its shady features. It is hardly surprising that the genealogical perspective can have metaphorical applications to some extent. Nietzsche, in particular, honed genealogy into a sharp tool for evaluating cultural traditions.
Applied to the origin of theoretical attitudes in general and the sciences in particular, thinking genealogically means investigating whether these great ideas really came from the good background they never tired of claiming for themselves. Has the question of origin ever really been sufficiently examined in relation to theory? Is it possible that, once we started scrutinizing the phenomena more closely, we would find suspicious influences and dubious admixtures in the family tree of philosophy?
Of course, we would not bother with such conjectures either in literal or in figurative research on ancestry if we were absolutely sure of own first-class pedigree. Anybody who adopts the genealogical perspective is admitting eo ipso the suspicion that, despite its noble appearance, the matter in question has an inborn flaw. In our case the critical question is: could it really be possible that the true beginning of the sciences does not actually reside in astonishment, as the ancients were so fond of claiming, under the assumption that anybody who evoked this reaction, which was regarded as noble, would be safe from further scrutiny? Moreover, is it not conceivable that Aristotle was deliberately trying to confuse by exaggerating when he claimed that all human beings aspired to knowledge “according to their nature,” with “nature” intended to mean the world’s oldest aristocracy, comparable to Nietzsche’s original noble title, “von Ohngefähr” (Lord Chance). What if the much-lauded theoretical virtues really derive from secret weaknesses? What if they were based on questionable compensation for stubborn defects, or even on the morbid inability to face the facts of life without embellishment and evasion? As for Husserl, who naively declared as an old man that he had felt compelled to philosophize otherwise he would have been unable to live in the world: in admitting this, was he not revealing something that risked reinforcing barely acknowledgeable fears about theory originating from overcompensation for deficiencies?