Richardson (2003:597-599) – o Ser “quer” o pensamento

As to how Being is conceived in WD (GA8), there is at this point relatively little more to say. The essential is that Being is always the Being (ἔμμεναι) of beings (ἐόν), that by which beings — all beings — are. If beings are to be thought, what else in them is think-able except the presenc-ing by which they are? That is why the author constantly refers to Being as “eminently thought-worthy” (das Bedenklichste), sc. that which imparts to thought its to-be-thought.¹

Now Being “wants” thought. By reason of its nature, Being must itself be served, tended, guarded by thought, hence is “in want of” thought in order to be itself. Because of its own indigence, then, Being wants thought to be, in order that in its own way Being can be itself. This latter sense of “want” approaches the meaning that Heidegger gives to the Greek χρή, by translating it as “there is want of” (es brauchet). We have met this Greek word before. Deriving from χράομαι (cf. χείρ, “hand“), it suggests a process of hand-ling that does not simply use that which is handled but lets it be according to its own essence, lets it appear as what it is and conserves it thus. Although the formula is awkward, it is not impossible to say that a hand-ling of this sort “wants” that-which-is-handled to be itself. However this may be, we understand the translation of χρή as “there is want of” to suggest: that there is intrinsic to Being an “indigence” by reason of which it is “in want of” thought; that Being therefore “wants” to satisfy this indigence; that Being therefore “wants” thought to be, and, indeed, in abiding fashion. Obviously, we are refining here what EM spoke of as Being’s need for its There, If there is any further precision, it consists perhaps in the author’s present insistence that in releasing thought unto itself Being leaves to thought a certain liberty by reason of which it is more than a blind compulsion. We shall return to this point later.²

If Being wants thought, this want as such is efficacious. Hence “…in this wanting there is concealed an enjoining, an e-voking. …” (598) of thought.³ We are at the heart of the matter. The want is efficacious, for it implies letting thought be in abiding fashion. This is what we mean by saying that Being “grants” to thought its to-be-thought. Effectively, then, this wanting is a giving, a giving of Being itself as eminently thought-worthy. “… What (Being as thought-worthy) grants, the gift it bestows on us, is nothing less than itself. …” ⁴ This is precisely what we called before the im-parting of Being by mittence, where “im-parting” corresponds perfectly to what Heidegger understands Parmenides to mean by Μοῖρα.⁵

But since the giving proceeds from a want in Being itself, it carries the overtones of an appeal that calls thought forth. This giving under the guise of an appeal is what Heidegger understands by the “e-voking” of thought. He describes it by a profusion of terms. The appeal out of want sets thought on its way, summoning, commissioning, enjoining, soliciting, at-tracting, laying-claim-upon it. In doing so, the appeal pledges Being to thought, imparting thus both precept and admonition, committing Being completely to its custody, and since it is thus that Being comes to thought, it helps thought arrive at presence as itself.⁶

To the extent that we may reduce all these to a common denominator, we are going to fix this want-appeal that e-vokes thought by the word we used to translate the same word in the Hölderlin analysis, sc. “hail,” intending thereby to suggest: that the e-vocation is an address that proceeds from Being, which always retains its primacy; that it is a summons which is efficarious; (599) that its efficacy is such that it leaves to the hail-ed full liberty of response. This will enable us to see how for Heidegger the hailing of the poet and the e-voking of the thinker are in profound ac-cord.