The Greek expression phainomenon, to which the term ‘phenomenon’ goes back, is derived from the verb phainesthai, which signifies “to show itself “. Thus phainomenon means that which shows itself, the manifest (das, was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare). phainesthai itself is a middle-voiced form which comes from phaino – to bring to the light of day, to put in the light. phaino comes from the stem pha – , like phos, the light, that which is bright – in other words, that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself. Thus we must keep in mind that the expression ‘phenomenon’ signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest. Accordingly the phainomena or ‘phenomena’ are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light – what the Greeks sometimes identified simply with ta onta (entities). Now an entity can show itself from itself (von ihm selbst her) in many ways, depending in each case on the kind of access we have to it. Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as something which in itself it is not. When it shows itself in this way, it ‘looks like something or other’ (“sieht” … “so aus wie …”). This kind of showing-itself is what we call “seeming” (Scheinen). Thus in Greek too the expression phainomenon (“phenomenon”) signifies that which looks like something, that which is ‘semblant’, ‘semblance’ (das “Scheinbare”, der “Schein”). phainomenon agathon means something good which looks like, but ‘in actuality’ is not, what it gives itself out to be. If we are to have any further understanding of the concept of phenomenon, everything depends on our seeing how what is designated in the first signification of phainomenon (‘phenomenon’ as that which shows itself) and what is designated in the second (‘phenomenon’ as semblance) are structurally interconnected. Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of showing itself – that is, of being a phenomenon – can it show itself as something which it is not; only then can it ‘merely look like so-and-so’. When phainomenon signifies ‘semblance’, the primordial signification (the phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded. We shall allot the term ‘phenomenon’ to this positive and primordial signification of phainomenon, and distinguish “phenomenon” from “semblance”, which is the PRIVATIVE modification of “phenomenon” as thus defined. But what both these terms express has proximally nothing at all to do with what iscalled an ‘appearance’, or still less a ‘mere appearance’. BTMR §7
(SZ:29) This is what one is talking about when one speaks of the ‘symptoms of a disease’ (“Krankheitserscheinungen”). Here one has in mind certain occurrences in the body which show themselves and which, in showing themselves a s thus showing themselves, ‘indicate’ (“indizieren”) something which does not show itself. The emergence (Auftreten) of such occurrences, their showing-themselves, goes together with the Being-present-at-hand of disturbances which do not show themselves. Thus appearance, as the appearance ‘of something’, does not mean showingitself; it means rather the announcing-itself by (von) something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through something which does show itself. Appearing is a not-showing-itself. But the ‘not’ we find here is by no means to be confused with the PRIVATIVE “not” which we used in defining the structure of semblance. What appears does not show itself; and anything which thus fails to show itself, is also something which can never seem. All indications, presentations, symptoms, and symbols have this basic formal structure of appearing, even though they differ among themselves. BTMR §7
This is no less true of ‘psychology’, whose anthropological tendencies are today unmistakable. Nor can we compensate for the absence of ontological foundations by taking anthropology and psychology and building them into the framework of a general biology. In the order which any possible comprehension and interpretation must follow, biology as a ‘science of life’ founded upon the ontology of Dasein, even if not entirely. Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being; but essentially it is accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a PRIVATIVE Interpretation; it determines what must be the case if there can be anything like mere-aliveness (Nur-noch-leben). Life is not a mere Being-present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein. In turn, Dasein is never to be defined ontologically by regarding it as life (in an ontologically indefinite manner) plus something else. (SZ:50) BTMR §10
Nowadays there is much talk about ‘man’s having an environment (Umwelt)’; but this says nothing ontologically as long as this ‘having’ is left indefinite. In its very possibility this ‘having’ is founded upon the existential state of Being-in. Because Dasein is essentially an entity with Being-in, it can explicitly discover those entities which it encounters environmentally, it can know them, it can avail itself of them, it can have the ‘world’. To talk about ‘having an environment’ is ontically trivial, but ontologically it presents a problem. To solve it requires nothing else than defining the Being of Dasein, and doing so in a way which is ontologically adequate. Although this state of Being is one of which use has made in biology, especially since K. von Baer, one must not conclude that its philosophical use implies ‘biologism’. For the environment is a structure which even biology as a positive science can never find and can never define, but must presuppose and constantly employ. Yet, even as an a priori condition for the objects which biology takes for its theme, this structure itself can be explained philosophically only if it has been conceived beforehand as a structure of Dasein. Only in terms of an orientation (SZ:58) towards the ontological structure thus conceived can ‘life’ as a state of Being be defined a priori, and this must be done in a PRIVATIVE manner. Ontically as well as ontologically, the priority belongs to Being-in-the-world as concern. In the analytic of Dasein this structure undergoes a basic Interpretation. BTMR §12
In such PRIVATIVE expressions as “inconspicuousness”, “unobtrusiveness”, and “non-obstinacy”, what we have in view is a positive phenomenal character of the Being of that which is proximally ready-to-hand. With these’ negative prefixes we have in view the character of the ready-to-hand as “holding itself in”; this is what we have our eye upon in the “Being-in-itself” of something, though ‘proximally’ we ascribe it to the present-at-hand – to the present-at-hand as that which can be thematically ascertained. As long as we take our orientation primarily and exclusively from the present-at-hand, the ‘in-itself’ can by no means be ontologically clarified. If, however, this talk about the ‘in-itself’ has any ontological importance, some interpretation must be called for. This “in-itself” of Being is something which gets invoked with considerable emphasis, mostly in an ontical way, and rightly so from a phenomenal standpoint. But if some ontological assertion is supposed to be given when this is ontically invoked, its claims are not fulfilled by such a procedure. As the foregoing analysis has already made clear, only on the basis of the phenomenon of the world can the Being-in-itself of entities within-the-world be grasped ontologically. (SZ:76) BTMR §16
That which fear fears about is that very entity which is afraid – Dasein. Only an entity for which in its Being this very Being is an issue, can be afraid. Fearing discloses this entity as endangered and abandoned to itself. Fear always reveals Dasein in the Being of its “there”, even if it does so in varying degrees of explicitness. If we fear about our house and home, this cannot be cited as an instance contrary to the above definition of what we fear about; for as Being-in-the-world, Dasein is in every case concernful Being-alongside. Proximally and for the most part, Dasein is in terms of what it is concerned with. When this is endangered, Being-alongside is threatened. Fear discloses Dasein predominantly in a PRIVATIVE way. It bewilders us and makes us ‘lose our heads’. Fear closes off our endangered Being-in, and yet at the same time lets us see it, so that when the fear has subsided, Dasein must first find its way about again. BTMR §30
We can make clear the connection of discourse with understanding and intelligibility by considering an existential possibility which belongs to talking itself-hearing. If we have not heard ‘aright’, it is not by accident that we say we have not ‘understood’. Hearing is constitutive for discourse. And just as linguistic utterance is based on discourse, so is acoustic perception on hearing. Listening to … is Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it. Dasein hears, because it understands. As a Being-in-the-world with Others, a Being which understands, Dasein is ‘in thrall’ to Dasein-with and to itself; and in this thraldom it “belongs” to these. Being-with develops in listening to one another (Aufeinander-hören), which can be done in several possible ways: following, going along with, and the PRIVATIVE modes of not-hearing, resisting, defying, and turning away. BTMR §34
Truth (uncoveredness) is something that must always first be wrested from entities. Entities get snatched out of their hiddenness. The factical uncoveredness of anything is always, as it were, a kind of robbery. Is it accidental that when the Greeks express themselves as to the essence of truth, they use a PRIVATIVE expression – a-letheia? When Dasein so expresses itself, does not a primordial understanding of its own Being thus make itself known – the understanding (even if it is only pre-ontological) that Being-in-untruth makes up an essential characteristic of Being-in-the-world? BTMR §44
Death, in the widest sense, is a phenomenon of life. Life must be understood as a kind of Being to which there belongs a Being-in-the-world. Only if this kind of Being is oriented in a PRIVATIVE way to Dasein, can we fix its character ontologically. Even Dasein may be considered purely as life. When the question is formulated from the viewpoint of biology and physiology, Dasein moves into that domain of Being which we know as the world of animals and plants. In this field, we can obtain data and statistics about the longevity of plants, animals and men, and we do this by ascertaining them ontically. Connections between longevity, propagation, and growth may be recognized. The ‘kinds’ of death, the causes, ‘contrivances’ and ways in which it makes its entry, can be explored. BTMR §49
If Being is to be conceived in terms of time, and if, indeed, its various modes and derivatives are to become intelligible in their respective modifications and derivations by taking time into consideration, then Being itself (and not merely entities, let us say, as entities ‘in time’) is thus made visible in its ‘temporal’ character. But in that case, ‘temporal’ can no longer mean simply ‘being in time’. Even the ‘non-temporal’ and the ‘supra-temporal’ are ‘temporal’ with regard to their Being, and not just PRIVATIVELY by contrast with something ‘temporal’ as an entity ‘in time’, but in a positive sense, though it is one which we must first explain. In both pre-philosophical and philosophical usage the expression ‘temporal’ has been pre-empted by the signification we have cited; in the following investigations, however, we shall employ it for another signification. Thus the way in which Being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning determined primordially in terms of time, is what we shall call its “Temporal” determinateness. Thus the fundamental ontological task of Interpreting Being as such includes working out the Temporality of Being. In the exposition of the problematic of Temporality the question of the meaning of Being will first be concretely answered. (SZ:19) BTMR §5
In so far as a phenomenon is constitutive for ‘appearance’ in the signification of announcing itself through something which shows itself, though such a phenomenon can PRIVATIVELY take the variant form of semblance, appearance too can become mere semblance. In a certain kind of lighting someone can look as if his checks were flushed with red; and the redness which shows itself can be taken as an announcement of the Being-presentat-hand of a fever, which in turn indicates some disturbance in the organism. (SZ:31) BTMR §7
Whether PRIVATIVELY or positively, fearing about something, as being-afraid in the face of something, always discloses equiprimordially entities within-the-world and Being-in – the former as threatening and the latter as threatened. Fear is a mode of state-of-mind. BTMR §30
Willing and wishing are rooted with ontological necessity in Dasein as care; they are not just ontologically undifferentiated Experiences occurring in a ‘stream’ which is completely indefinite with regard to the meaning of its Being. This is no less the case with urge and addiction. These too are grounded in care so far as they can be exhibited in Dasein at all. This does not prevent them from being ontologically constitutive even for entities that merely ‘live’. But the basic ontological state of ‘living’ is a problem in its own right and can be tackled only reductively and PRIVATIVELY in terms of the ontology of Dasein. BTMR §41
That very potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which Dasein is, has Being-in-the-world as its kind of Being. Thus it implies ontologically a relation to entities within-the-world. Care is always concern and solicitude, even if only PRIVATIVELY. In willing, an entity which is understood – that is, one which has been projected upon its possibility – gets seized upon, either as something with which one may concern oneself, or as something which is to be brought into its Being through solicitude. Hence, to any willing there belongs something willed, which has already made itself definite in terms of a “for-the-sake-of-which”. If willing is to be possible ontologically, the following items are constitutive for it: (1) the prior disclosedness of the “for-the-sake-of-which” in general (Being-ahead-of-itself); (2) the disclosedness of something with which one can concern oneself (the world as the “wherein” of Being-already); (3) Dasein’s projection of itself understandingly upon a potentiality-for-Being towards a possibility of the entity ‘willed’. In the phenomenon of willing, the underlying totality of care shows through. BTMR §41
At the same time our interpretation of understanding has shown that, in accordance with its falling kind of Being, it has, proximally and for the most part, diverted itself (sich … verlegt) into an understanding of the ‘world’. Even where the issue is not only one of ontical experience but also one of ontological understanding, the interpretation of Being takes its orientation in the first instance from the Being of entities within-the-world. Thereby the Being of what is proximally ready-to-hand gets passed over, and entities are first conceived as a context of Things (res) which are present-at-hand. “Being” acquires the meaning of “Reality”. Substantiality becomes the basic characteristic of Being. Corresponding to this way in which the understanding of Being has been diverted, even the ontological understanding of Dasein moves into the horizon of this conception of Being. Like any other entity, Dasein too is present-at-hand as Real. In this way “Being in general” acquires the meaning of “Reality”. Accordingly the concept of Reality has a peculiar priority in the ontological problematic. By this priority the route to a genuine existential analytic of Dasein gets diverted, and so too does our very view of the Being of what is proximally ready-to-hand within-the-world. It finally forces the general problematic of Being into a direction that lies off the course. The other modes of Being become defined negatively and PRIVATIVELY with regard to Reality. BTMR §43
The expression ‘history’ has various significations with which one has in view neither the science of history nor even history as an Object, but this very entity itself, not necessarily Objectified. Among such significations, that in which this entity is understood as something past, may well be the pre-eminent usage. This signification is evinced in the kind of talk in which we say that something or other “already belongs to history”. Here ‘past’ means “no longer present-at-hand”, or even “still present-at-hand indeed, but without having any ‘effect’ on the ‘Present’”. Of course, the historical as that which is past has also the opposite signification, when we say, “One cannot get away from history.” Here, by “history”, we have in view that which is past, but which nevertheless is still having effects. Howsoever, the historical, as that which is past, is understood to be related to the ‘Present’ in the sense of what is actual ‘now’ and ‘today’, and to be related to it, either positively or PRIVATIVELY, in such a way as to have effects upon it. Thus ‘the past’ has a remarkable double meaning; the past belongs irretrievably to an earlier time; it belonged to the events of that time; and in spite of that, it can still be present-at-hand ‘now’ – for instance, the remains of a Greek temple. With the temple, a ‘bit of the past’ is still ‘in the present’. BTMR §73
Nevertheless, in the idea of ‘Guilty there lies the character of the “not”. If the ‘Guilty!’ is something that can definitely apply to existence, then this raises the ontological problem of clarifying existentially the character of this “not” as a “not”. Moreover, to the idea of ‘Guilty!’ belongs what is expressed without further differentiation in the conception of guilt as ‘having responsibility for’ – that is, as Being-the-basis for … Hence we define the formally existential idea of the ‘Guilty!’ as “Being-the-basis for a Being which has been defined by a ‘not” – that is to say, as “Being-the-basis of a nullity”. The idea of the “not” which lies in the concept of guilt as understood existentially, excludes relatedness to anything presentat-hand which is possible or which may have been required; furthermore, Dasein is altogether incommensurable with anything present-at-hand or generally accepted (Geltenden) which is not it itself, or which is not in the way Dasein is – namely, existing; so any possibility that, with regard to Being-the-basis for a lack, the entity which is itself such a basis might be reckoned up as ‘lacking in some manner’, is a possibility which drops out. If a lack, such as failure to fulfil some requirement, has been ‘caused’ in a manner characteristic of Dasein, we cannot simply reckon back to there being something lacking (Mangelhaftigkeit) in the ‘cause’. Being-the-basis-for-something need not have the same “not”-character as the PRIVATIVUM which is based upon it and which arises from it. The basis need not acquire a nullity of its own from that for which it is the basis (seinern Begründeten). This implies, however, that Being-guilty does not first result from an indebtedness (Verschuldung), but that, on the contrary, indebtedness becomes possible only ‘on the basis’ of a primordial Being-guilty. Can something like this be exhibited in Dasein’s Being, and how is it at all possible existentially? (SZ:284) BTMR §58