Furthermore, τέλειον (teleion) relates to ἀρετή (arete). Insofar as ἀρετή means having something at one’s disposal, having a definite being-possibility (Seinsmöglichkeit) at one’s disposal, the determination of τέλος (telos) or τέλειον is already implict. The ability to have a being-possibility at one’s disposal means that a being that has an ἀρετή already has its end in this ἀρετή in a definite manner. The ἀρετή is a definite way of being, which in itself is directed to the τέλος, an ability to have at one’s disposal (Verfügenkönnen), an ability which need not explicitly reach its τέλος. (Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 20-23.) (GA18:84; GA18MT:59-60)

Aristotle provides a partitioning of the πίστεις (pisteis): (1) ἄτεχνοι (atechnoi), (2) ἔντεχνοι (entechnoi) (Rhet. A 2, 1355 b35). First, we will consider the πίστεις ἔντεχνοι (pisteis entechnoi), that which speaks for a matter that we can have at our disposal, what we ourselves can accomplish by ourselves. We ourselves have the possibility of being something that speaks for a matter. For such a speaking-being to be a πίστις (pistis), means that we become, in ourselves, πίστεις as ἔντεχνοι, accomplished by ourselves (bewerkstelligt durch uns selbst). (GA18:119; GA18MT:81-82)

(…) there are the πίστεις ἔντεχνοι. Of these ways of speaking-for-something that can be imparted through discourse itself, there are three types, in accordance with a three-fold possibility of taking λóγοι (logoi).

1. ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος (Rhet A 2 1356 a3), “in the comportment of the speaker,” in the manner by which the speaker offers and comports himself in his discourse. In this, there is something that can speak for the matter. The one giving the discourse is himself a πίστις (pistis) in his ἦθος (êthos), in his “comportment.”

2. ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως (Rhet A 2, 1356 a3), “in the bringing-into-a-disposition,” “in the manner by which the hearer is brought into a definite disposition,” the hearer who also belongs to λέγειν (legein). How the hearer is thereby positioned toward the matter, which position he is in, the manner and mode of bringing-the-hearer-into-a-disposition. In this there lies a πίστις — something that can speak for the matter. The διάθεσις (diathesis) of the hearer determines his κρίσις (krisis), his “view,” which he ultimately cultivates as he apprehends the matter.

3. ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λóγῳ (Rhet. A 2, 1356 a3): λέγειν itself is πίστις as the basic function of being-there itself. In this way, as was said, information is given about the matter itself. διὰ τὸ δεικνύναι (Rhet. A 2, 1356 a4): the manner and mode, as was said, the matter-offactness, or lack thereof, of the speaker himself. (GA18:120; GA18MT:82)