De modo a retomar a compreensão hermenêutica da experiência vivida do mundo circundante, temos de a trazer à mente de tal forma que nos transportemos expressamente para ela. Quando Heidegger fala ocasionalmente de “olhar para a minha relação de visão com o púlpito dado no mundo circundante”, esta frase é inadequada para a compreensão hermenêutica, porque reaviva o pensamento de uma tematização objectificadora. Se o sentido do ver-o-púlpito for preservado da objectificação teórica, então o que se mostra a mim não é um eu desligado como o eu-pólo das minhas experiências vividas (da mesma forma que um eu desligado não se mostrou na discussão anterior sobre a experiência vivida da interrogação). Na experiência vivida do mundo circundante de ver o púlpito, eu vivo “adentro do” (into) púlpito tal como é entendido no seu significado. Neste meu viver-adentro (live-into), “algo está diante de mim”, mas não eu como um eu-pólo. Na minha experiência de viver-adentro, “o meu eu procede totalmente de fora de si mesmo e ressoa juntamente com este ‘ver’”. A ressonância com esta experiência viva de ver é a forma como o meu eu pertence à minha experiência viva. Este eu próprio experimenta o que o rodeia, e isto mundaniza-se (this worlds) para ele apenas na medida em que o eu ressoa juntamente com a experiência-viva do mundo circundante. Onde quer que e sempre que ele mundaniza-se para mim, onde quer que e sempre que eu encontre o que é significativo, “eu estou de alguma forma totalmente com ele”.
On the basis of the hermeneutic-phenomenological analysis of the lived-experience of the surrounding world that we have just performed, we can now go more in depth into the question of the structure of lived-experience. this was already indicated as happening (Ereignis), in contrast to what-passes-by (Vor-gang), which is the structure of theoretically objectified lived-experiences.
In order to take up again the hermeneutic understanding of lived-experience of the surrounding world, we must bring it to mind in such a way that we expressly transport ourselves into it. When Heidegger occasionally speaks of “looking into my seeing relation to the lectern given in the surrounding world,” this phrasing is inappropriate for hermeneutic understanding, because it revives the thought of an ob-jectifying thematizing. If the sense of seeing-the-lectern is kept cleanly from theoretical ob-jectifying, then what shows itself to me is not a disconnected I as the I-pole of my lived-experiences (in the same way that a disconnected I did not show itself in the previous discussion of the lived-experience of questioning). In the lived-experience of the surrounding world of seeing-the-lectern, I live-into the lectern as understood in its significance. In this living-into of mine, “something lies before me,” but not me as an I-pole. In my experience of living-into, “my I proceeds fully from out of itself and resonates along with this ‘seeing.’” Resonating along with this living-experience of seeing is the way in which my I belongs to my living-experience. This own I experiences what is surrounding, and this worlds for it only in the way that the I resonates along with the living-experience of the surrounding world. (45) Wherever and whenever it worlds for me, wherever and whenever I encounter what is significant, “I am somehow totally with it.”
In the lived-experience of the question “Is there anything at all?,” “I do not encounter myself” in the manner of my resonating along with the living-experience. But this “anything at all” from the lived-experience of questioning also does “not world.” For when we grasp (42) every possible aspect of the surrounding world as anything at all, as in this lived-experience of questioning, then the aspect of world and of what is significant is “snuffed out.” Along with this erasing of the aspect of world, my own I as what resonates along with the lived-experience of the surrounding world is repressed. In determining anything at all as object, the “oscillating, this co-emergence of what is mine is stifled.” Being an ob-ject as such “does not touch me”; my I does not resonate along with the determining cognition. The I that determines in cognition “is no longer the I” that resonates along with the living-experience of the surrounding world. If the living-experience is a determining of what is experienced, then it is “now only a rudiment of living-experience; it is an abandoning of living (Ent-leben). “Abandoning of living” is not some neologism of Heidegger’s, but was used in the seventeenth century in the sense of “to kill” (vita privare). In the living-experience of determining cognition, living-experience is deprived of its primary, originary character of living-experience, the living-experiences of the surrounding world. What is cognized in the cognitive living-experience is “removed” from the proper nearness that it has in the living-experience of the surrounding world, “lifted out of the actual (primary) living-experience” of the surrounding world.
A happening in the surrounding world, significant in this or that way as experienced in that world, can — like every significant something — be ob-jectified and perceived as an objective happening. The ob-jectified (46) happening can be described as “pro-cess,” because now it no longer comes across as significant, but instead it passes by the knowing I. For the knowing I the ob-jectified happening of the pro-cess has “only the relation of being-cognized, this deflated I-relationship, reduced to a minimum of living-experience.” Objectified things and connections with things show themselves only in cognizing, in the theoretical comportment for the “theoretical I.” In theoretical comportment, I in (43) my knowing am “aimed at” something. Being theoretically aimed at something, I do not live as an “historical I” that moves to the worldly. The I that resonates in the lived-experiences of the surrounding world is the historical [das historische, das geschichtliche ] I in contrast with the theoretical I. The historical I lives into the lived happening of the surrounding world as something worldly. In cognizing, the theoretical I stands over against an ob-jectified happening, which can be called pro-cess, because it (the ob-jectified happening) passes-by the theoretical I, without addressing and identifying the theoretical I as something worldly.
With that we now stand before a second notion of “pro-cess (Vorgang).” Pro-cess as passing-by was first designated as the character of reflective and ob-jectified lived-experiences, because these too pass by the reflecting I. But just now the word pro-cess (as what passes by) (Vor-gang) named the happening of the surrounding world that is objectified in the knowing living-experience and that loses its primary character of significance in this ob-jectification. We must differentiate these two notions of “pro-cess,” even if they have in common the fact that pro-cess as passing-by is in each case what is known in theoretical cognition.
The second notion of “pro-cess” was introduced into the course of the war emergency semester as a name for an ob-jectified happening, because here a worldly happening of the surrounding world as theoretically known by a cognizing living-experience is contrasted with the pre-theoretical lived happening of a living-experience of the surrounding world. By means of this contrasting of a theoretical knowing and a pre-theoretical (47) living-experience of the surrounding world, the essential structure of the primary lived-experience of the surrounding world and — insofar as the theoretical lived-experience is a modification of the pre-theoretical lived-experience — also of the derived theoretical lived-experience is determined.
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