destaque
(…) De acordo com a primeira frase do livro propriamente dito (SZ 41), somos nós próprios Dasein. Mas esta é a frase mais mal compreendida de todo o Heidegger. Porque os leitores supuseram que “Dasein é apenas um termo novo para “pessoa” (ou “ego” ou “mente”) — por outras palavras, que cada um de nós é ou tem um Dasein, e que há um Dasein para cada um de nós. Isto está errado, e a primeira indicação é um simples ponto textual. ‘Pessoa’ é um substantivo contável (podemos “contar” uma pessoa, várias pessoas, e assim por diante); Dasein (virtualmente) nunca é usado como um substantivo contável. Por outro lado, também não é um substantivo de massa (tal como “água” ou “ouro”); o Dasein não pode ser medido (por exemplo, em galões ou onças), tal como não pode ser contado. Gramaticalmente, “tuberculose” é uma analogia mais próxima. Não contamos a “tuberculose” nem medimos as suas quantidades; ela surge, antes, em ocorrências ou casos distintos (que podem, evidentemente, ser contados). Uma pessoa é como uma ocorrência ou um “caso” de Dasein — exceto que não há apropriação da tuberculose, e muito menos passar por sobre ela. O Dasein não é uma espécie de que somos espécimes, um tipo de que somos símbolos, uma característica que temos, um espírito que está em nós, uma condição em que nos encontramos, ou mesmo um todo de que fazemos parte (embora isso esteja mais próximo). As pessoas estão para o Dasein como os jogos de basebol estão para o basebol, como os enunciados estão para a linguagem, como as obras estão para a literatura. O Dasein é o fenômeno global, constituído inteiramente pelas suas “ocorrências” individuais e, no entanto, pré-requisito para que qualquer uma delas seja o que é. O inglês carece de uma palavra convincente para esta relação, pelo que me contento em dizer que uma pessoa é um caso de Dasein.
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We are at last in a position to address the fundamental question for any interpretation of Being and Time: What is Dasein?1 According to the text, (9) the anyone (SZ 126-30), the world (SZ 64, 364, and 380), language (SZ 166), and even the sciences (SZ 11) all have “Daseins kind of being.” We can make sense of this astonishing diversity if we understand Dasein to be the anyone and everything instituted by it: a vast intricate pattern—generated and maintained by conformism—of norms, normal dispositions, customs, sorts, roles, referral relations, public institutions, and so on.2 On this reading, the anyone, the (everyday) world, and language are different coherent “subpattems” within the grand pattern that is Dasein; they have Daseins kind of being because each of them is Dasein (though none of them is all of Dasein). Within the anyone and all it institutes, the science of chemistry is a coherent subpattern: chemistry is Dasein—and so are philately, Christmas, and Cincinnati.
There is, however, one crucial omission from the foregoing list. According to the first sentence of the book proper (SZ 41), we are ourselves Dasein. But this is the most misunderstood sentence in all of Heidegger. For readers have surmised that ‘Dasein is just a newfangled term for ‘person’ (or ‘ego’ or ‘mind’)—in other words, that each of us is or has one Dasein, and there is a Dasein for each of us. This is wrong, and the first indication is a simple textual point. ‘Person’ is a count noun (we can “count” a person, several people, and so on); Dasein is (virtually) never used as a count noun.3 On the other hand, it is not a mass noun, either (such as ‘water’ or ‘gold’); Dasein can no more be measured out (e.g., in gallons or ounces) than it can be counted. Grammatically, ‘tuberculosis’ is a closer analogy. We neither count “tuberculosis” nor measure amounts of it; it comes, rather, in distinct occurrences or cases (which can, of course, be counted). A person is like an occurrence or a “case” of Dasein—except that one does not catch it, let (10) alone get over it. Dasein is not a species of which we are specimens, a type of which we are tokens, a feature which we have, a spirit which is in us, a condition which w7e are in, or even a whole of which we are part (though that is closest). People are to Dasein as baseball games are to baseball, as utterances are to language, as works are to literature. Dasein is the overall phenomenon, consisting entirely of its individual “occurrences,” and yet prerequisite for any of them being what it is. English lacks a convincing word for this relation, so I will settle for saying that a person is a case of Dasein.4
- In the book manuscript of Dasein Disclosed, Haugeland chose to treat ‘dasein’ as a naturalized English word, uncapitalized. In this paper he had not yet made that choice, and his capitalization of ‘Dasein’ has been retained to acknowledge that later change in his thinking about how to present Heidegger in English. In some of Haugeland’s other previously published papers, ‘Dasein’ was capitalized against his intentions, due to copyediting decisions for consistency throughout an edited volume. In those cases, the lower case dasein’ has been restored.—Ed.[↩]
- Compare this with Dewey’s remark about “mind” (which he clearly distinguishes from personal consciousness): “the whole history of science, art and morals proves that the mind that appears in individuals is not as such individual mind. The former is in itself a system of belief, recognitions, and ignorances, of acceptances and rejections, of expectancies and appraisals of meaning which have been instituted under the influence of custom and tradition” (1925, ISO; compare 184). [The later view identifies these subpatterns with unowned dasein rather than with dasein tout court.—Ed.] [↩]
- The Macquarrie and Robinson translation, however, is poor in this regard; thus, they render the opening sentence (just mentioned) as follows: “We are ourselves the entities to be analyzed (i.e., Dasein).” The plural ‘entities’ would suggest a count noun, but the German is singular; such errors are common. (But on rare occasion, Heidegger himself seems to slip up; see e.g., SZ 240 and 336.)[↩]
- German does not have a terrific term for it. either; when Heidegger wants to speak of individuals, he qualifies it with ‘je’ or ‘jeweilig,’ meaning, roughly, “in each case” or “in the given case.”[↩]