About what is Anaximandros speaking here? About τὰ ὄντα. τὰ ὄντα—plural of the neuter τὸ ὄν—the being; plural: the beings. Yet from early on, already in Sanskrit, the neuter plural does not simply mean a multiplicity of individuals; instead, it signifies the many individuals in their unity: hence “that which is,” thereby thinking of that which is [das Seiende] as particularized into many individual beings, into the beings [die Seienden]. We could use “the beings” as a translation of τὰ ὄντα only provided we recognize there is no question here of arbitrary, individual beings. More clearly at first: singular—that which is—and this indeed now requires some comments.
That which is—about beings pure and simple (cf. below p. 35, sec. a, τὸ ἐόν)—not about just any arbitrary individual extant thing in its accidental obtrusiveness, e.g., the sea; also not the being we call the land; also not what is in the sea, on land, in the air, not the plants and animals; also not humans and their work, their trouble and joy, their success, their triumph, their death—all such is a being, not that which is. Even all this totaled up does not constitute that which is. For as soon as we start to seize any being whatever and ascribe something further to it, we have just as immediately wrenched that individual out of that which is. We do not first of all have nothingness and then the individual beings; on the contrary, first and last we have that which is. The latter is not simply all individual beings thrust together; it is more than all these and then again at the same time less. That which is means that which is before and around us, below us and above us, and includes ourselves. That which is: not this being and not that one and not everything together, but more than “everything.” Then what?
[2] Is there | something that could be “more” than “everything”? “Everything” does not tolerate still “more” outside of itself. “Everything” includes each thing and leaves nothing out. But if, for example, we carefully take apart and lay out “everything” that pertains to a plant, viz., root, stalk, leaves, blossoms, and if we omit nothing, then does all this together give us “the plant”? No; something is still missing. The whole of the plant does not result from thrusting together all the pieces but is on the contrary prior to all the components, even if these are not expressly present at hand but are, e.g., still in the bud or in the seed grain. Everything that pertains to the plant is not the plant as a being, is not the whole being.And so we will say: that which is—if it means more than all individuals, then it means the whole of beings.
We do not mean thereby that the whole of beings would be the same as, for instance, an immense plant or some other “organism.” The wholeness of a whole is not simply and necessarily the wholeness of an “organism.” Yet even if we take this reservation to heart, may we then equate “that which is” (τὰ ὄντα) with the whole of beings?
[…]τὰ ὄντα—that which is—means beings as a whole. From this is to be distinguished all beings as well as the whole of beings. Yet let us not fool ourselves. We do not have a fully clear understanding of what is meant here. Nevertheless, something is indicated for which we have a quite sure feeling. This “as a whole” is so ungraspable in an inceptual way precisely because it is constantly what is closest and most familiar to us: we always skip over it. Indeed, even further, for the most part we unwittingly misinterpret it and render it unrecognizable. In order to experience that which is, i.e., beings as a whole, we do not need to undertake gymnastically any sort of mysterious contortion of thought and representation. Quite to the contrary, we only need to loosen somewhat our everyday shackling to what is currently obtrusive and incidental—and already we will have explicitly experienced [3] what is astonishing in experience. | To be sure, only quite roughly, but this “roughly,” this “as a whole,” is in itself something completely determinate and essential, even if we are now still far removed from comprehending it.
Let this be a provisional elucidation of what Anaximandros is speaking about. We will now ask: 2) What does he actually say about it, about “beings”? “Whence (that out of which) beings step forth—precisely into this also their receding happens according to necessity.”