GA18:132-133 – pathos – psyche

Πάθος, in relation to the ζωή πρακτική μετὰ λόγου, is thus a being-taken of being-there. Being-there is taken with that which is there in the world with being-there itself — from without, but from without in the sense of the world as the wherein of my being. The possibilities and ways of its being-taken follow from being-there itself. Thus, this being-taken of being-there as being-in-its-world does not involve anything like what we could designate as the “spiritual,” which invites the conception of πάθος as affect. Instead, it is always a being-taken of beings as living things as such. Speaking precisely, I cannot say that the soul hopes, has fears, has pity; instead, I can only say that the human being hopes, is brave. (…) “To say that the soul gets angry is the same as wanting to say that the soul builds a house. It would be better to say not that the soul has pity or learns or believes something, but that the human being does τῇ ψυχή.” [De an. Α 4, 408 b 11 sqq.] Soul is here conceived as οὐσία, insofar as the being-taken of beings as living things is expressed in the πάθη. The topic that Aristotle refers to as Περι ψυχής, the ontology of beings, is precisely the human being. Therefore, the πάθη are not “psychic experiences,” are not “in consciousness,” but are a being-taken of human beings in their full being-in-the-world. That is expressed by the fact that the whole, the full occurrence-context, which is found in this happening, in being-taken, belongs to the πάθη. The so-called “bodily states” of anxiety, joy, and so forth, are not symptoms, but also belong to the characteristic being of beings, of human beings. [GA18MT:132-133]