There are άρεταί (aretai), modes of possibilities of being, that are oriented by genuine speaking, deliberating, concrete grasping. Then there are modes of being able to have being at one’s disposal, in which λόγος (logos) is also there, but in which the deciding factor lies in the “taking hold,” the προαίρεσις (proairesis). The first are the άρεταί διανοητικαί (aretai dianoetikai); the second are άρεταί ήθικαί (aretai êtikai).1 διανοεΐσθαι (dianoetikai): “to think through,” “to suppose in a thorough manner,” “to reckon through.” Ηθικός (Êthikos) does not mean “moral”; one must not superficially hold oneself to words when considering the “ethical virtues.” Ήθος (Êthos) means the “comportment” of human beings, how the human being is there, how he offers himself as a human being, how he appears in being-with-one-another—the way that the orator speaks, has a comportment in the way he stands with respect to the matters about which he speaks. The partitioning of the άρεταί (aretai) cannot be followed more closely now. Later, we will examine the άρεταί διανοητικαί (aretai dianoetikai) 2 since the basic possibility of considering, of scientific research, of the βίος θεωρητικός (bios theoretikos), and therewith the basic possibility of human existence, is found in their domain. For us to get λόγος (logos) in view, it is important that this fundamental division of human being-possibilities, among orientations to λόγος (logos), is seen in its basic possibility of λόγος (logos). (p. 73)
- Eth. Nic. Α 13, 1103 a 4 sq.: λέγομεν γαρ αύτων τας μεν διανοητικας τας δε ήθικάς.[
] - Editor’s note: A detailed interpretation of άρεταί διανοητικαί is not found in this lecture. But see the reference to the εξις of άληθεύειν at p. 263 ff.[]