GA17:48-49 – consciência

Bewusstsein

How does it become understandable that something like CONSCIOUSNESS is philosophy’s theme? This question becomes fundamental for us the moment we remind ourselves that the Greeks are unacquainted with CONSCIOUSNESS or anything like CONSCIOUSNESS. In Greek philosophy there is no concept of CONSCIOUSNESS. At the same time, to be sure, it must be said that what, among other things, is conceived under today’s specific, phenomenological concepts of CONSCIOUSNESS is already found precisely among the Greeks. In the course of the analysis of perceiving (Gelegenheit der Analyse des Vernehmens), for example, Aristotle saw that we co-perceive (mitvernehmen) a seeing (Sehen) itself as being (Seiendes), We have an αἴσθησις (perception) of seeing.1 He asks himself what kind of perceiving it is that we perceive the seeing and the like with. So, too, in the case of νόησις (noesis), the question arises: Does the thinking (Vermeinen) that thinks the perceiving have the same character of being? Both questions are left undecided. From the standpoint of the specific facts of the matter of research today, we can call this a much more fundamental insight into this context than the rash decision underlying the orientation of modern psychology, namely, that the perception of seeing (Wahrnehmen des Sehens), that of thinking, and so forth are a matter of one and the same thing, the inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung). However one intends to decide these things, perceiving how one conducts oneself has become a theme of the examination. What is perceived here should not be interpreted as an experience or mental existence in the modern sense. In spite of this fact, later Greek philosophy displays an acquaintance with what is today designated “CONSCIOUSNESS” or “self-CONSCIOUSNESS” (Selbstbewusstsein) – an acquaintance not on the path of philosophical reflection, but drawn instead from the natural experience of what we today call “conscience” (συνειδεσις) in a very accentuated sense. Thus, it enters into the Christian CONSCIOUSNESS of life and it undergoes a further explication in theology. But what was so designated is in no way an object of consideration. That something like CONSCIOUSNESS would become a theme of an investigation is out of the question for the Greek and Christian CONSCIOUSNESS. [GA17EN:36-37]

  1. Aristotle, De anima, Gamma 2, 425b12ff.[↩]
Excertos de

Heidegger – Fenomenologia e Hermenêutica

Responsáveis: João e Murilo Cardoso de Castro

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