concept

Concept (Begriff), 2-6, 4fn, 7fn, 10, 16, 21, 37-39, 47, 51, 63-64, 150-152, 156-157, 201fn, 232, 311-316, 360-364, et passim; fundamental, 3-4, 9-10, 22, 39, 362, 397; formation of, 10, 39, 150-152, 157, 219, 312, 349, 375; of time, 17-18, 26, 235, 304, 326, 333, 338, 349, 404-406, 418, 420, 426-428, 432. See also CONCEPT of being; category; existentials; foreCONCEPTion (BT)

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Every intuition, he says, is a representatio singularis. [1] The CONCEPT, however, is also a representatio, a “self-presenting,” but, in this case, a representatio per notas communes. [2] The CONCEPT is distinguished from intuition by the fact that, as a presenting, it presents something that has the character of generality. It is a “general representation.” [3]

To better understand this, Kant   quite clearly says, in the introduction to the Logic that in every cognition, matter is to be distinguished from form, “the manner in which we cognize the object.” [A.a.O., Einleitung, S. 350.] A savage sees a house and, unlike us, does not know its for-what; he has a different “CONCEPT” of the house than we who know our way around in it. Indeed, he sees the same being, but the knowledge of the use escapes him; he does not understand what he should do with it. He forms no CONCEPT of house. [Cf. a.a.O., S. 351.] We know what it is for, and thus we represent something general to ourselves. We who know the use that one could make of it have the CONCEPT of house. The CONCEPT goes beyond answering the question of what the object is.

The CONCEPTuality and the sense of the CONCEPT depend on how one understands, in general, the question concerning what something is, where this question originates. The CONCEPT yields what the object, the res, is in the explicitness of the definition. [GA18  :10-12]