But if we’re not asking for a definition of “being,” what is the question of being after? We make progress in understanding being, Heidegger argues, by getting clearer about the “meaning” or “sense” (Sinn) of being.1 The way Heidegger uses the term “sense” is akin to the way we say in English that something “makes sense.” Things make sense when they fit together, when there is an organized, stable, and coherent way in which they interact and bear on us and each other. We grasp the sense of something when we know our way around it, we can anticipate what kind of things can happen with respect to it, we recognize when things belong or are out of place, and so on. This is what Heidegger means when he says that “sense is that within which the intelligibility of something maintains itself. . . Sense is that onto which projection projects, in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something” (GA2 p.151, translation modified). Sense is the background way of organizing and fitting things together, which guides and shapes all our anticipations of and interactions with anything we encounter.
We explain the sense of being when we illuminate what we understand when we know our way around entities as entities, meaning that we are able to distinguish between what is and what is not, or between how something is and how it is not. The conceptual apparatus that must be brought to bear in explaining this sense, however, is anything but clear. Heidegger largely dispenses with traditional ontological categories and tries to develop his own ontological concepts by “interrogating” entities with regard to their being, viewing them in the context of their being rather than, for instance, in the context of their causal interactions with each other. Toward this end, Heidegger proposes that the inquiry should focus from the outset on a particular entity, one that is well suited for interrogation with respect to its being. Dasein has priority for the inquiry because we are defined as the kind of entity we are by our possession of an understanding of being. Moreover, we “relate [3] to being” (see GA2 12), meaning that we understand that there are different ways to be, and that we are capable of “deciding our existence” (GA2 12) by taking over a different way to be. Thus Dasein gets its “essential character from what is inquired about – namely, being” (GA2 7).
Dasein has priority in another way as well. It not only understands its own existence, but it “also possesses . . . an understanding of the being of all entities of a character other than its own” (GA2 13). If we examine another entity with regard to its being – for instance, a physical object like a stone – we can hope only for insight into its particular mode of being. But Dasein’s dealings with entities show a sensitivity to different ways of being. Thus, by analyzing Dasein’s different modes of comportment, we can hope to gain insight into a number of modes of being.
Heidegger offers two rather concise arguments meant to motivate the question of being, as well as to clarify further its function and aim. The question of being, Heidegger argues, has priority over all other scientific inquiries because every science presupposes a certain ontological understanding of its subject matter. The natural sciences, for instance, operate within a pre-theoretical understanding of what it is to be a natural entity (as opposed to a cultural or historical entity). Behind the basic concepts of any positive science, Heidegger argues, lies a tacit ontology, a “productive logic” that “discloses” an area of being and guides scientific inquiry within that domain (see GA2 10). Without an explicitly and thematically developed ontology, Heidegger argues, there is a danger that the sciences will be led astray by unfounded metaphysical assumptions (see GA2 11).
The other motivation for asking the question of being is rooted in our essence as Dasein. The “question of existence is one of Dasein’s ontical ‘affairs’” (GA2 12). We care about our being, that is, about the ways in which we have decided, and will decide, our existence. We thus care about the question of being, given the reasonable assumption that having a clear-sighted understanding of being gives us guidance on how we ought to take a stand on our being.
- The existing English editions of Being and Time translate “Sinn” as “meaning.” We prefer “sense,” both because it is etymologically closer to Heidegger’s term “Sinn,” and also because “meaning” tends to be heard as restricted to linguistic or semantic meaning, whereas Heidegger’s notion of sense is much broader than that.[↩]