Hartmut Rosa (Resonance) – sujeito e mundo segundo Charles Taylor

James C. Wagner

(…) Of particular significance here is the fact that not only are subjects’ attitudes toward, outlooks on, and relatedness to the world individually and culturally variable, but what constitutes or is knowable as world is also co-variable.

The Canadian social philosopher Charles Taylor, whose work can be read as an analysis of the modern transformation of the boundaries between subject and world, has impressively illustrated this. In Sources of the Self, he surmises that in modernity’s predominating naturalistic/rationalistic interpretation, the subject has gradually dwindled into what he calls a “punctual self.” To the punctual self, all relationships and even all qualities are external; it distances itself from its wants and needs, physical qualities and temporary beliefs, as well as from its actions and its relationships to its community. None of these has any constitutive significance, but only instrumental significance for the naturalistically shaped subject. Taylor speaks in a similar way of the “buffered self” in his later book A Secular Age, writing there that the modern subject is all but forced to hold the world at a distance. Between his or her inner life and the conditions and proceedings of the external world there exist no intrinsic, quasi-magical relationships that can only be disclosed hermeneutically, but only causal, contingent or instrumental connections. In symbolic terms, this means that lightning and thunder are not reactions to our mental state, that the path of the clouds tells us nothing about whether we will have a successful interview, that earthquakes are not punishments for our sins. (This bygone form of “magical thinking,” or feeling, establishing an inner connection between self and world, continues to suggest itself to us, however, as can be seen wherever attempts are made to attribute tsunamis, droughts, earthquakes, or hurricanes to human misconduct – though this of course does not mean that there could not indeed be a causal relationship here.)

Taylor contrasts the “buffered” twenty-first-century self with the open, “porous” self of the fifteenth century, which recognized a quasi-magical inner correspondence between the internal and external world, and the limits of which could literally be transcended. Spirits could take possession of it at any time, although the application of holy water or other “external” substances could also protect it against evil thoughts and feelings, and correspondences could be calculated and predicted between planets, gemstones, organs, and emotional states. In short, the self circa 1500 was embedded in a stream of life that comprised material and immaterial, physical and metaphysical substances alike, and that placed the members of a community in relation to each other in terms of influence and resonance in ways that ultimately are not even really imaginable to the twenty-first-century individual.

This contrast between a hermetically sealed contemporary self and a porous late medieval self intrinsically connected to nature, the “spirit world,” and its community is meant to serve only as a striking example of two entirely different relationships to the world, each of which gives expression to different types of self and world that are related to each other in different ways. I will nonetheless retain the polar terms subject (or, for now synonymously, self) and world, as they remain unavoidable from a phenomenological perspective. Subjects here are defined by two essential characteristics that are invariable despite the variety of possible relationships to the world. First, subjects are those entities that have experiences or, taking into account that experiences are always constituted intersubjectively, to which experiences manifest themselves. Second, subjects are the site at which motivated psychic energies materialize, i.e. at which the impulse to act becomes operative. This, moreover, makes it clear that subjects, in the terminology of the phenomenological tradition since Husserl, are always related to “their” world intentionally; in other words, we are dealing here with not only a cognitive, but also an evaluative and existential relationship. Subjects are thus entities that encounter world and that respond to the world intentionally. The world appears to them as inherently significant, whether positively (in the sense of a desire) or negatively (in the sense of a fear). Consequently, relationships to the world can also be understood as “concretions of intentionality.”

Sacha Zilberfarb

Excertos de

Heidegger – Fenomenologia e Hermenêutica

Responsáveis: João e Murilo Cardoso de Castro

Twenty Twenty-Five

Designed with WordPress