The generalisation and universalisation of ethics threatens to result in a reduction of the question ‘what is it to be human?’ to a metaphysical fixity, with an abstract definition of what it is to be human taking priority over a lived negotiation with being human. The fixity is more dangerous than other metaphysical fixities, since in the name of ethical differences people are massacred, distinct groups subjected to genocide. Ethics ceases to be a set of questions about what it takes for human beings to flourish, an issue for individuals to confront within whatever specific context of existence. Ethics becomes a set of issues for which there is offered a global, indeed a final, solution in all its horror. This is the culmination of a historical tendency whereby human beings cease to belong to discrete, marked groups and become, like the entities postulated in Greek philosophy, of a single nature, determined in relation to the current sending of being, as technology. This can lead to death for those who are not useful in relation to the needs generated by technical relations and technical processes. The actualising of metaphysics in technology reduces the question of ethics to a question about the nature of human beings in terms of usefulness and productiveness, a question which received a certain kind of answer in the death camps. (HODGE, Joanna. HEIDEGGER AND ETHICS, p. 27)